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Abstract
This work provides an analysis of the impact of regulation on the environmental 
performance of the automobile industry. It therefore seeks to contribute to the 'greening 
of industry' body of literature by discussing the relationship between environmental 
regulation and the auto industry technological development, commercial imperatives and 
wider social benefits in the context of the 'license to operate' framework.
Three case studies have been conducted. The first is the pioneering tailpipe emissions 
regulations from the state of California, in the United States. This original legislation was 
the stepping stone in the development of automobile air emissions regulations around the 
world. California is still the leader in environmental regulation regarding air emissions, 
with the establishment of the Zero Emissions Vehicles Program (ZEV), and both are 
discussed in the same case study. The second case study is the Brazilian experience with 
ethanol. This event constitutes the first attempt to use an alternative fuel to propel 
vehicles on a large scale. The third case study is the European Union end-of-life vehicle 
directive that incorporates the extended producers’ responsibility principle to address 
waste from vehicles in the end-of-life phase.
The three case studies are discussed using the 'license to operate' framework, so 
providing an empirical understanding of the relationship between environmental 
regulation and auto industry technological development, commercial imperatives as well 
as the wider social benefits in these context specific cases; they also show how regulation 
has been able to foster corporate environmental performance in the automobile industry.
/
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction
1.1 - Introduction
Industry holds a crucial role in humankind’s effort towards sustainable development. 
Local communities, scientists and environmental groups indicate environmental negative 
externalities produced by industry. Policy makers and legislators, in response, find ways 
of addressing these issues by creating environmental regulation. However, in practical 
terms, the implementation of environmental measures falls to industry. Generally, 
industry has to adopt specific technologies, bearing the associated costs, including the 
abandonment of sunk-costs and the risks relating to the core adjustments of any 
entrepreneurial activity.
The impacts caused by the adoption of environmental regulation to the industry have 
been a topic of discussion in the policy making and business management areas in recent 
years. Initially, environmental regulations were perceived as being detrimental to 
business. The pioneering ‘command-and-controT measures adopted to tackle the first 
environmental problems were strongly opposed by industry. This view was challenged in 
the 1990s with the emergence of the 'greening of industry' perspective that saw 
environmental regulation as inducing positive effects. A polarised debate emerged 
between those who perceived environmental regulation as fostering innovation and 
creating economic profit (Porter and Van der Lind, 1995), and those who saw regulation 
as being solely a source of cost to the industry (Palmer et al., 1995). This dispute 
eventually evolved into a more nuanced understanding of the effects of environmental 
regulation to firms and society" in terms of innovation and environmental benefits 
(Reinhardt, 2000).
The automobile industry is an important field to investigate the effects of regulation on
industry. Due to its magnitude and importance, it has been one of the first industrial
sectors to be targeted by environmental regulation and has served as a benchmark for
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other regulated industries (Wells and Orsato, 2005). The regulatory pressure that the 
sector has received has been directly related to technological development. There has 
been a clash between the best available technologies that can be used to address an 
environmental issue and the business imperatives of the industry at the time.
In this respect, this work investigates the effects of environmental regulation on the 
environmental performance of the automobile industry, taking into account not only the 
central concerns of regulators, but also other areas that have been affected by regulators 
in the short and long term. As indicated by Press (2007), having a clear understanding of 
these effects and the factors that have influenced the industry has not been possible until 
recently. The assessment of the effects of regulatory policy in relation to the environment 
and the competitiveness of firms has not been feasible because of the lack of consistent 
data in relation to the innovation and environmental effects of these measures. Aside 
from this, ex-post analyses have systematically been more precise and provide clearer 
insights into the secondary effects of environmental policy (Press, 2007).
This thesis aims to contribute to the recent body of literature termed the 'greening of 
industry' within the context of the licence to operate model. The research looks at the 
effects of environmental regulation on the automobile industry taking an ex-post analysis. 
In this regard, elements of business strategy and business political strategy are used to 
understand how the industry’s behaviour has been influenced by regulation and the 
factors that have been conducted for specific outcomes.
1.2 - Area of interest and scientific field
The area of interest where this thesis aims to contribute is the field defined as the 
‘greening of industry’. The field understands that industry plays a prominent and 
decisive role in the process of change towards more a sustainable society. According to
the Greening of Industry Network (2009), the ‘greening of industry’ aims to align 
industrial development policies with sustainable development principles. Therefore, the 
following concepts are taken as the basis for the research conducted in the field:
(1) - Sustainable development is a global imperative. Development must take into 
account the carrying capacity of the environment and focus on increasing the quality of 
life of present and future generations.
(2) - Major changes in production and consumption systems are required to meet the 
needs and aspirations of a growing world population which needs to use environmental 
resources in a sustainable manner.
The term ‘greening of industry’ was generated in the early 1990s where the focus of 
research was on the environmental change of the industry. In recent years, the scope has 
been enhanced to consider the broader issues of sustainability in the industrial system. 
The industrial system includes not only the industry (supply) but also consumption 
(demand). The inclusion of the consumer as an important stakeholder in the industrial 
process of change has significant consequences for the future progress of the field (GIN,
2009).
The field also gives significant relevance to the growing role that technological 
development can play in the path toward a more sustainable society. Technology has 
been perceived as a crucial element in the industrial process of change impacting on the 
quality of life of present and future generations. Relevant to this discussion is the Factor 
X school of thought that understands that technological improvements can result in 
dematerialisation or the eco-efficiency improvements in a quantitative measure between 4 
and 20 (Reijinders, 1998). Von Weiszacker et al. (1997) provided one of the most 
influential studies in this area, where 50 cases of technological improvements are 
documented showing a doubling improvement in welfare while the consumption of 
natural resources in customary products and services is reduced in half.
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The process of rapid globalisation provides complementary significance to technological 
developments as the achievements can be extended to markets at an international level. 
Multinational firms have enhanced the connection between different nations and regions 
of the world, by extending the gains from research and the development of new 
technologies (GIN, 2009).
1.3 - Broad topic
The broad topic of this thesis can be summarised as the empirical investigation of the 
impact of environmental regulation on the technological development of the automobile 
industry, taking into account economic and social demands. A stylised debate around this 
issue is given in this section, showing different sides of the topic. A deeper discussion on 
this issue is conducted in the literature review chapter.
The growth in the ‘greening of industry’ literature on the effects of environmental 
regulation to industry has been accompanied by the historical development of 
environmental thinking in society and by the chronological development of 
environmental regulation (Fisher and Schot, 1993). Initially, the industry’s 
preoccupations with the effects of environmental regulation started with the primary 
wave of environmental regulations that began in the 1960s and 1970s. Industry in general 
resisted the implementation of environmental regulation that was based on the 
‘command-and-control’ approach (Kagan, 1994). For firms, environmental regulations 
were perceived as an additional cost and compliance was respected only when it was 
legally obligatory. This industry behaviour has been termed as ‘resistant adaptation’ 
(Fiorino, 2006). Under this perception, environmental regulation would reduce the 
profitability of the industry (Palmer et al., 1995).
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In the 1980s, regulation forced businesses to initiative actions with respect to industrial 
waste and the .use of natural resources. The use of certain raw materials and the 
production of toxic wastes was restricted or banned (Fuchs and Mazmanian, 1998). 
Industry responded with the development of codes of conduct, and the use of alternative 
materials. In the United States, for example, the chemical industry has been a pioneer in 
creating the Responsible Care program (Delmas and Montiel, 2008). The focus was on 
reducing the future liabilities that could be imposed by environmental regulation and not 
on adopting wider innovative measures. In certain places, the adversarial legalism of the 
legal system has been responsible for creating divergent relationships and industry has 
taken a pro-active role in pursuing law suits (Kagan, 2001).
In the 1990s, the environmental dimension began to be perceived as a strategic aspect of 
business. Proactive industry environmental strategies with the purpose of gaining 
economic benefits and enhancing the public image of the industry as an entity were 
indicated (Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). The ‘greening of industry’ literature provides 
a rapidly growing body of literature around the effects of environmental regulation to 
industry. The early work in the field consisted of the documentation of successful case 
studies that verified how the adoption of environmental regulation generated 
environmental benefits accompanied by financial gain (Schidheiny, 1992). The term 
‘triple bottom’ line was used to indicate that the integration of the social and economic 
terms is required if real progress is to be observed in the environmental dimension for 
businesses (Elkington, 1994). The emergence of the field came to question the previous 
understanding that environmental regulation would significantly enhance industries’ 
aggregate costs. Later work presented a more strategic aspect of greening, focusing on 
the role that environmental regulation could play in indicating areas of future investment 
(Fiorino, 2006). The forces behind the trend have also been studied, looking at the 
conditions under which greening would emerge in an industry and provide benefits 
(Roome, 1998).
As a result of this, some of the literature in this field has centred on managerial tools that
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enhance the concept of greening in firms and institutionalise internal actions. The most 
practical work on internal change has focused on the development of industry codes of 
environmental management practice (Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997), environmental 
management systems (Cognlianese and Nash, 2001) and industry self-regulation (Rees,
1997). Terms such as ‘sustainability’ and ‘environmental stewardship’ emerged with 
wider preoccupations that included impacts on local communities and on the end-of-life 
management of products. According to Fiorino (2006), the focus of the literature had 
shifted from bottom-line cost reduction savings to top-line value in terms of greater 
market share and the proactive management of the environment. Established entities such 
as The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) have also 
defended this outcome, under an industry-wide understating of more than 200 key 
international companies to take the business leadership in policy development and 
demonstrating the business contribution to sustainable development and to shared best 
practices (WBCSD, 2010).
Most of the 'greening of industry' literature from this period is optimistic with respect to 
the ways in which industry can reap benefits from environmental regulation. The Porter 
and Van der Lind hypothesis (1995) that argued for the correlation between strict 
environmental regulation and industry profit, and the work of Hart (1997) that understood 
that a sustainability vision is necessary for industry were widely quoted.
The positive perception that opportunities for product stewardship and clean technologies 
would provide a profitable outcome for industry followed the notion that environmental 
regulation could provide positive outcomes for firms and was widespread in the ‘greening 
of industry’ literature (Fiorino, 2006). This includes the authors influenced by the Porter 
and Van der Lind hypothesis (Porter and Van der Lind, 1995) and Hart (1997), as well as 
other authors such as those of the schools of the factor X (Von Weiszacker et. al., 1997), 
and the eco-efficiency (Schmidheiny, 1992). As a consequence, some research evolved to 
consider industrial efforts that were beyond the simple compliance with environmental 
regulation and became more proactive behaviour (Gunningham et al, 2003). According to
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the prevailing understanding of this body of knowledge, many firms have enacted or 
looked for ways, of improving on being simply obedient to the environmental rule as this 
would generate benefits to the firm.
This progressive behaviour has been the concern of the field in recent years. The present 
perception in the field is that greening can be translated into a constant and verifiable 
effort by industry to do better than simply comply. It is characterised by a more nuanced 
vision of the effects of regulation to the industry that look at the conditions under which 
environmental regulation can provide benefits to industry (Reinhardt, 2000).
1.4 - Empirical focus - the automobile industry
The automobile industry has traditionally been targeted by environmental regulators, due 
to the scale of the industry and the vast array of negative environmental externalities 
generated. The internal combustion engine-based automobile became one of the most 
important industrial icons of the 20th century. It completely reshaped the way modem 
society perceives mobility. Nowadays, the use of the automobile is widespread with the 
world fleet reaching over 600 million cars in 2006 (The Society of Motors Manufacturers 
and Traders Limited - SMMT, 2007). Car ownership is still perceived as an indispensable 
part of modem identity (Mann and Abraham, 2006), which along with growing 
disposable incomes worldwide provides the basis for the continued expansion in demand 
for new cars. v
Automakers, coerced primarily by regulation, have had to adapt the automobile to 
modem environmental mandates. The current automobile is much more efficient in terms 
of energy use and power per volume, for example, and in relative terms may be perceived 
as less harmful to the environment than the first models. However, the modem
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automobile is much heavier and produces about the same fuel economy as the older 
vehicles. In short, the automobile is still an unsustainable product in its present form 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003) since aggregate fuel economy has not improved much 
due to the increase of vehicle weight and addition of extra components. It still produces a 
large number of negative externalities, and if the scale of vehicle ownership is taken into 
account, the environmental damage is particularly disturbing (Graedel and Allenby,
1998).
The negative environmental consequences of automobile use have been subject to a 
detailed analysis from the environmental view point in several studies, including 
MacLean and Lave (1998), Sullivan et al., (1998), Graedel and Allenby (1998) and 
Greadel et al.(2002). These authors use life cycle analysis to investigate the impact of the 
automobile on the natural environment. The flow of materials is explored in all the 
phases of the life cycle of the product (Graedel and Allenby, 1998). In this sense, a better 
grasp of the negative environmental externalities can be gained and corrective actions can 
be suggested (Robert, 2000). Life cycle analysis is also relevant to link the material flow 
analysis to the core principles of sustainability in a step towards a closed-loop economy 
(Robert, 2002).
The life cycle of the automobile is complex. The product is composed of a large number 
of auto-parts built out of a wide range of materials, using a wide range of industrial 
processes and involving a great number of firms (Graedel et al., 2002). The life cycle of 
an automobile can be divided into six stages:
Raw material extraction; several elements found in the natural environment are 
extracted, including: coal, limestone, iron ore, several types of alloys, bauxite, 
copper, lead, zinc, silica, kaolin, natural gas, petroleum, natural rubber and other 
metals. These materials are then processed, refined, mined, drilled, distilled or 
processed. The vast amount of raw materials required to produce an automobile 
reflect the different amount of substances that compose the auto-parts.
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Auto-part production; the processed materials are used to form metal ingots, 
plastic pellets, rubber pellet and auto paint. These are ready to be used in the 
manufacturing process in order to make auto-parts. The auto part production phase 
involves many firms that supply the vehicle assemblers with a very large amount of 
auto-parts.
Vehicle assembly; the manufacturing part of the life cycle of the automobile is 
where the automobiles are produced as the vehicle is assembled. During this phase, 
the auto-parts are attached to the all-steel-body structure that also supports the 
intemal-combustion engine. Paint is applied to the plastic and metal parts. The 
painting process releases a considerable amount of polluting gases.
Retail and distribution; before reaching the consumer the vehicle is packed and 
shipped. The distribution network of the industry is globally dispensed as the retail 
and sales network are widely dispersed, while the production tends to be located in a 
smaller number of regions.
Vehicle use; during the period that the vehicle is being used by the consumer, 
other auto-parts are required to provide the necessary maintenance to the vehicles on 
the road. This is a crucial phase for the environmental impact of the automobile as a 
large number of polluting gases are emitted from the internal combustion engine. 
Vehicle emissions consist of: carbon dioxide - C02, particulate matter - PM, 
nitrogen oxides - NOx, volatile organic compounds - VOCs and carbon monoxide - 
CO (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995).
End-of-life phase; when the car reaches its end-of-life phase it constitutes a 
sizable volume of waste that needs to be dismantled, decontaminated and recycled. 
Some parts of the vehicle are destined for remanufacturing, while others are more 
suitable for recycling. In Europe, if treated according to the European Union End-of- 
Life Vehicle Directive - EU ELV directive, the hulk of the automobile is shredded
18
and scrap metal can be fed back into the system. However, a considerable amount o f 
material waste is generated.
The initial environmental preoccupation relating to the automobile has been air pollution, 
since this constitutes the most visible negative externality in large city centres (Faiz et al., 
1996). However, the scope of regulation has been expanded with the introduction of 
broader environmental preoccupations related to sustainable development and an analysis 
of the life cycle of the automobile (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 1994).
Figure 1.1 presents a summary of the automobile environmental negative externalities 
which have been addressed by regulation (Delucchi, 2003). The types of automobile 
environmental externalities include: air pollution, noise, oil dependency, infrastructure 
costs, end-of-life waste, traffic with accidents as well as congestion costs and urban 
sprawl including parking costs. Air pollution, oil dependency and end-of-life waste are 
direct environmental costs, while the other types of automobile externalities relate more 
to urban arrangement issues.
Figure 1.1 -  Types of automobile externalities addressed by regulation
Air P o llu tion
N o ise W a ste
ELVs
A u to m o b ile
E xternalities
A c c id e n ts
Traffic
U rban
Spraw l
Parking
Costs
Source: Adapted from Delucchi (2003).
The most relevant negative environmental externality is air pollution. Reserved studies
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have been conducted on the economic cost of air pollution and the savings from its 
abatement (Small and Kazimi, 1994) and (Madison et al. 1996). Emission limits have 
changed over time, with wide implications with issues such as the type approval and 
wider safety regulation being discussed. In recent years, the production of carbon 
dioxide emissions has gained wider importance as climate change has become a crucial 
issue in the environmental and policy making arenas (Houghton et al., 2001). Air 
pollution has been regulated from several sources, including the production, the use (tail 
pipe and crank case emissions) and from the end of life (OECD, 1986). The specific case 
of the C02 emissions, have only recently been indirectly regulated via fuel economy 
targets (e.g. The US Corporate Average Fuel Economy rules - CAFE rules). The EU 
measures newly introduced are the first to tie vehicle manufacturing targets to a system of 
fines. Due to governmental regulation and engine development, a decrease has been 
observed in the average C02 emissions of new vehicles sold. According to SMMT 
(2007), from 1997 to 2007 the reduction has been of 13.1% per annum. However, in 
aggregate terms, global emissions have been rising exponentially. Firstly, the world fleet 
has rapidly increased. The average world annual growth rate of the automobile fleet was 
4.6%, from 1960 to 2002 (Dargay et al., 2007). Secondly, the average distance travelled 
has also increased, which counterbalances the increase in fuel economy. From 1997 to 
2002 in the United Kingdom, the average distance travelled increased by 5% (SMMT, 
2007).
Regardless of several decades of environmental regulation and the adoption of more 
advanced technologies, the environmental burden caused by the automobile industry is 
significant. According to the European Environmental Agency -  EE A (1995), the 
transportation sector alone is responsible for 24% of emissions in Europe.
Aside from the environmental dimension, a relevant aspect of the modem automobile 
industry is the economic state of the industry. In aggregate terms, the automobile industry 
has been struggling financially for several years (Vlasic and Bunkley, 2008). Consecutive 
financial loses and minimal profit margins have become a pattern for the majority of
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automakers. Traditional firms, such as General Motors and Ford Motor Company, have 
seen their stock value drastically reduced during the past few decades (Marketwatch, 
2008a) and (Marketwatch2008b). Recently, there has been major governmental 
intervention to save General Motors and Chrysler Motor Company from bankruptcy in 
the United States (The New York Times, 2010). The industry has responded with a series 
of strategic business shifts based on cost minimisation, quality improvement, 
organisational flexibility, design for manufacturing and lean thinking. Synergic mergers 
and acquisitions have also been used as a solution and have proved to have controversial 
effects (Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2001). However, the modem business of producing 
automobiles has been shown to be characterised by increasing competition and low 
profitability. The automakers claim that one of the causes of this degenerated state of the 
industry is the increasing pressure caused by environmental regulations which require 
large investments in research and development in areas that challenge their main business 
model. The automobile was not originally designed with environmental preoccupations in 
mind, and the adaptation processes over the years have been largely incremental (Zapata 
and Nieuwenhuis, 2010). The mainstream automobile is still based on the internal 
combustion engine and on the all-steel body structure. These two elements have been the 
pillars of the business of making cars since the early days of mass production and are 
unsustainable in environmental terms (Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2001).
The fragile economic state of the automobile industry and the claim that environmental 
regulations put additional pressure on the business model of the industry is a relevant 
element that needs to be considered by governments when establishing environmental 
regulation. Several attempts to provide better regulation roadmaps have been made, 
including the Bellagio Memorandum on Motor Vehicle Policy (The Energy Foundation, 
2001) and EU Cars 21 high level group (European Commission, 2006). However, these 
wide frameworks have failed to provide more practical applications to the industry, and 
they can be criticised for the lack of stakeholder involvement and very broad indications 
of how regulatory policy should be designed.
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1.5 - Focused topic and research question
In this section, the central research question of this thesis is provided with a short 
description of the reasons why this constitutes the central thread of analysis and the broad 
topic previously discussed.
The main focus of this research question is on looking at the impacts of environmental 
regulation on industry, contrasting the newer ideas of the ‘greening of industry’, in which 
it is assumed that industry can reap benefits from environmental regulation, with a more 
traditional view that assumes that regulation has been costly.
Up to the present, social scientists have not offered complete answers to this issue. This 
thesis therefore aims to aid the progress towards responding to this intricate subject by 
providing an account of the past regulations and how they have affected the industry in 
economic, social and environmental terms. As indicated by Press (2007), having a clear 
understanding of these effects which have influenced the industry has not been possible 
until recently because of the lack of consistent data in relation to the innovation, the 
environmental effects of these measures and the discrepancy between ex-ante analysis 
and ex-post analysis.
The main research question of this investigation is as follows:
• What is the relationship between environmental regulation and auto industry 
technological development, commercial imperatives and wider social 
benefits?
A few elements of the central research question must be defined:
Environmental regulation: Environmental regulation has been defined as regulation that 
has an environmental element for the legal norm. The definition of environmental
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regulation follows a broad understanding of a regulation that may have a significant 
positive impact in relation to the environment.
Auto industry technological development: The importance given to technology 
development relates to the cost of research and development to adapt the internal 
combustion engine to the new law requirements, or to development a new automobile.
1.6 - Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into 8 Chapters and Figure 1.2. provides a graphical representation 
of these. In Chapter 1 there is an introduction to the area of interest and scientific field of 
the thesis. Details in relation to the broad topic and the empirical focus are discussed, 
along with the research question, which will be at the centre of the investigation 
throughout.
Figure 1.2 -  Structure of the Thesis.
C ase Study 1
C ase Study 3
Chapter 2 consists of the critical literature evaluation or literature review. This considers
previous theoretical developments in the field, and initially two generations of the
23
‘greening of industry’ literature in relation to the effects of environmental regulation are 
discussed. Following the elements discussed in the first part of the literature review, the 
chapter provides further detail in relation to the strategic use of government regulation 
and the potential beyond compliance behaviour that may be adopted by industry towards 
environmental regulation.
Chapter 3 provides the researchable propositions that will be investigated by the case 
studies. In order to do so, the chapter provides a deeper discussion of the 'license to 
operate' framework, and a general contextualisation of the framework to the automobile 
industry.
Chapter 4 gives a justification of the methods selected, including the research design and 
the case study design. The case study, combined with historical analysis, is the core 
methodological tool used in the thesis. Hence, special attention is given to the 
justification of the case studies selected and the data collection instruments. A case study 
protocol is presented to enhance the comparability between the selected cases.
Following the case studies, Chapter 5 considers the air emissions regulations in the 
United States, Chapter 6 looks at the Ethanol Regulations in Brazil and Chapter 7 is 
concerned with the End-of-life Vehicle Regulations in the European Union. The cases are 
guided by the researchable propositions and follow the case study protocol presented in 
the Chapter 4.
The case study on air emissions regulations in the United States uses a historical account 
of the federal emissions regulations and also those in the state of California. The chapter 
discusses the initial tail pipe emissions, originally presented in California and later taken 
up by the Federal government between 1950 and 1990. Following this, the Zero 
Emissions Vehicle Program (ZEV) is examined. The ZEV was a drastic, pioneering 
environmental initiative conducted by the California Air Resources Board (CARBS) 
which was met with considerable resistance by the automakers.
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The ethanol regulations in Brazil describe the first large scale experiment to introduce 
ethanol fuel, which is derived from sugar cane and used as a substitute for petrol. The 
Proalcool program adopted in Brazil was a government-led initiative to tackle energy 
security in the country during the 1970s. This chapter gives a historical description of the 
factors that led the government to adopt this initiative, focusing on the formation of the 
legal, social and economic licenses. The role of the government here is further 
highlighted; not only did it serve as the primary source of direct and indirect subsidies, it 
also established a firm strategy to foster the development of ethanol engines in 
government-owned research centres and to support the early adoption of ethanol-only 
engines. Here, the primary and secondary effects of the regulation are also presented.
The case study of the end-of-life vehicle directive in Europe provides another important 
dimension to the case study selection. The chapter begins with a description of the 
implementation process of the directive, and introduces the conceptual framework of the 
extended producer’s responsibility, which constitutes its central theoretical concept. The 
main elements of the EU ELV directive then follow. The chapter ends with a brief 
analysis of the primary effects of the directive.
Chapter 8 makes the concluding remarks. The conclusions aim to provide a contribution 
to the 'greening of industry' body of knowledge. This is presented in sections that include 
the empirical evidence provided by the case studies and the implications for policy 
makers and industry.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
2.1 - Introduction
The literature review is focused on the 'greening of industry' body of knowledge that this 
thesis aims to contribute to. In the literature, theoretical frameworks from the business 
strategy literature, with elements of the corporate political strategy subfield, are utilised 
in order to build the stepping stones of a theoretical framework that is presented in the 
next chapter.
Industry has been particularly sensitive to environmental dimensions in the past 20 years, 
as deeper and systemic studies on the relationship between industry and the natural 
environment have emerged. Similarly, research has been preoccupied with how industry 
should respond to the environmental pressures, including the tension posed by regulation. 
This has been an important matter especially for large industries where regulation has 
forced the adoption of specific technologies (Kleiner, 1991). In the same way, and in a 
world under economic pressure, this is relevant for governments which aim to produce 
more effective environmental regulation which is simultaneously efficient and less costly 
to industry.
Taking a styled view on the general effects of regulation, three major categories of effects 
can be identified: (1) economic effects; (2) environmental effects; (3) innovation effects. 
The economic effects relate to the competitiveness of the industry and to firm 
profitability and market share while environmental effects refer to the reduction of 
negative environmental externalities and wider impacts on natural resource use. 
Additionally, the innovation effects look at how regulation has been able to force or 
stimulate innovation activities or technologies in the industry.
Despite this rather instructive categorisation, the three types of effects are deeply 
interrelated. The economic effects are directly linked to the innovation effects as changes
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in the technologies used for production impact on the investment cycles, especially on the 
utilisation of sunk costs and the maximisation of economies of scale. Both of these 
changes also impact on the environment. It is also assumed that the technology and 
management used dictate natural resource consumption and the sorts of negative 
environmental externalities production.
The initial focus of this 'greening of industry' literature review is on the economic effects 
of environmental regulation, when significant technological developments are required. 
However, the development in the literature follows a more general understanding of the 
interconnection between the types of effects, and environmental and innovation effects 
are given more prominence. Relevant to this investigation is the link between economic 
and innovation effects that constitute the basic argument taken by Porter and van der Lind 
(1995b) in their initial proposition.
Environmental regulations that require significant advances in technology directly affect 
the business model of the firm and are of greater importance to the economic impacts 
upon the industry (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 1997). It is also assumed that for the 
automobile industry to become more sustainable, major changes in the product itself are 
necessary, and this requires considerable technological development that will eventually 
provide a positive environmental impact. The link between the effects of environmental 
regulation therefore seems to be a crucial issue for the development of the field.
2.2 - The first generation of the ‘greening of industry’ literature regarding the 
effects of environmental regulation
Until the mid 1990s there was a wide understanding that environmental regulations 
would directly incur greater production costs for the regulated industry. Siebert clearly 
summarises this view: “The traditional view is that improved environmental
performance increases production costs and thus necessarily harms economic
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performance. Such an argument is easy to establish based on economic theory.” (Siebert, 
1985, p.125)
With the emergence of the 'greening of industry', a different perception of the issue has 
been brought forward following a diverse set of theoretical assumptions. In general terms, 
the 'greening of industry' constitutes a research area that focuses on the role that 
industrial firms can play in the transformation towards a more sustainable society. As 
indicated by Groenewegen and Fischer (1996), the greening change has the potential to 
profoundly reshape industries and not only includes their strategies, but also their 
business models.
Initially, successful case studies of greening were documented where environmental 
regulation was able to generate environmental benefits while having positive economic 
outcomes and profitable technological innovations (Shmidheiny, 1992). The driving 
forces behind the successful case studies were researched, including technological 
solutions adopted by industry and the perception of the problem. The documentation of 
successful cases was perhaps a reflection of a widespread optimism towards the potential 
for inventive and profitable solutions for environmental problems. There has also been a 
bias in journals towards ‘positive’ outcomes, especially in the business literature.
The Porter and van der Linde hypothesis was often cited as the basic assumption behind 
the optimistic greening trend (Porter and van der Linde, 1995b). The win-win hypotheses 
received a vast amount of attention due to its positive view which suited the illustrative 
successful case studies and backed up the willingness of researchers on the ‘greening of 
industry’ to find positive results. In this respect, the theoretical approach proposed by 
Porter and Van der Linde (1995a) introducing the notion of the double-dividend was 
groundbreaking as it provided the theoretical basis for a proactive industry position 
regarding the environment. According to the theoretical approach:
Properly designed environmental standards can trigger innovations that lower the
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total cost of a product or improve its value. Such innovations allow companies to 
use a range of inputs more productively- from raw materials to energy to labor- 
thus offsetting the costs of improving environmental impact and ending the 
stalemate. Ultimately, this enhanced resource productivity makes companies more 
competitive, not less. (Porter and van der Linde 1995a, p. 12)
They also provide an important critique of the traditional approach of environmental 
regulations. Models are built using the ceteris paribus assumption, where other variables 
aside from environmental policy are held constant, these representing a static scenario 
instead of the dynamic reality. The traditional notion that environmental policy is costly 
to firms is a consequence of this theoretical issue. However, the Porter and van der Lind 
understanding developed the idea that firms are dynamic systems which are constantly 
looking for innovative ways to overcome competition, satisfy customers and meet the 
demands of regulators (Porter and van der Linde, 1995b). The hypothesis can be 
summarised in the form of the following diagram:
Figure 2.1 -  The Porter Hypothesis
Business
Performance
Environmental
PerformanceEnvironmental
Policy
Innovation
R&D
Source: Ambec and Lanoie (2008).v
According to this argument, the relationship between environmental and business 
performance has been framed incorrectly. Past studies wrongly focused on the static cost 
impacts of environmental regulation and more pertinent offsetting productivity benefits 
from innovation have been ignored. This line of thinking has multiplied the costs of
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environmental regulation since regulations have been implemented in such a way that the 
promotion of innovation is stopped. Moreover, firms have tended to resist regulations 
instead of innovating to address them (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a).
Hart (1997) illustrates the proposal that firms should endeavour to further enhance their 
environmental performance, presenting a much wider perspective of sustainability:
The responsibility for ensuring a sustainable world falls largely on the shoulders 
of the world's enterprises, the economic engines of the future. Clearly, public 
policy innovations (at both the national and international levels) and changes in 
individual consumption patterns will be needed to move toward sustainability. 
But corporations can and should lead the way, helping to shape public policy and 
driving change in consumers' behavior. In the final analysis, it makes good 
business sense to pursue strategies for a sustainable world. (Hart, 1997, p.75)
Critics of the hypothesis pointed to the unrealistic expectations that this could generate 
for firm managers and policy makers, as it could be the exception and not the rule. 
Walley and Whitehead (1994) assume that to comply with strict environmental 
regulations, firms have to incur vast sunk costs that could not be recovered. In their view, 
“this popular idea is also unrealistic. Responding to environmental challenges has always 
been a costly and complicated proposition for managers. In fact, environmental costs at 
most companies are skyrocketing, with little economic payback in sight” (Walley and 
Whitehead, 1994, p.46).
Palmer et al. (1995) have provided the basic criticism of the robustness of the case study 
method used by Porter and van der Linde. The argument of the static mindset where all 
the variables are ceteris paribus except for the environmental regulation is contested by 
the successful outcomes on the use of economic incentive instruments for environmental 
policy. This approach takes into account the effects of the various policy instruments on 
research and development and the decisions relating to technological development
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(Palmer et al., 1995). Other authors have used the same argument to analyse the 
hypothesis from a formal point of view. However, it is important to indicate that these 
studies clearly suffer from the static approach of the economic models, which does not 
properly address the uncertainties relating to the technological innovation in a dynamic 
framework.
For the purposes of this work, it is relevant to cite the further refinement that Jaffe and 
Palmer (1997) made of the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis. This analysis presents 
three distinct variants of hypothesis: the weak, die narrow and the strong versions. Table 
2 presents them along with their characteristics. The division is relevant as it provides a 
further delimitation of how the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis may be observed in 
real life case studies, especially with regard to the effects of regulation on the industry. 
The variants of the hypothesis are perhaps an indication of how unrealistic the original 
proposition was.
Table 2.1- Variants of the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis.
Variant of the Porter and van 
der Linde hypothesis
Characteristics
Weak Version Environmental regulation will stimulate certain kinds of 
environmental innovations
Narrow Version Flexible environmental policy regimes give firms greater 
incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations (such as 
technology-based standards)
Strong Version More stringent environmental policy may induce 
innovation that may compensate (or more than 
compensate) for the cost of complying with it.
Source: Adapted from Lanoie et a l . (2007).
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Several studies have aimed at testing the empirical validity of the Porter hypothesis.
These studies can be divided in three categories:
1. Studies that focus on cross-selection analysis which investigate the 
correlation between economic and environmental performance. Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996), for example, discuss this issue by looking at the market 
return response to investment in new and more environmentally friendly products 
and services. The research is based on the New York Stock Exchange -  NYSE - 
and the American Stock Exchange - AMEX stocks. Here, a positive relationship 
is observed, but there is no causality. Murty and Kumar (2003) analysed the effect 
of water environmental regulation on 92 Indian firms. They saw indicators of the 
Porter and van der Linde hypothesis, as the most efficient firms were able to 
maintain the minimum amount of water per unit of sales. The study also considers 
heterogeneous firms in diverse sectors but does not look at the specific response 
to the environmental pressure.
2- Documentation of successful beyond compliance behaviour that resulted 
in economic or performance gain; Maxwell et al. (1997) report several situations 
where firms were able to utilise their corporate environmental strategy for 
economic gain. They compare the environmental management programs of 
Volvo, Polaroid and P&G, pointing to the importance of corporate environmental 
behaviour. Another important study under this category is that of Sinclair- 
Desgagne (1999) which looked at how strict environmental regulation can 
increase both social welfare and a firm’s profitability, by giving the latter 
incentives to innovate using the empirical example of the Peugeot SA and the lean 
bum Engine. In his view “The hypothesis cannot be rejected on theoretical 
grounds, unless one sticks to a very narrow view of neoclassical economics. The 
regulations most likely to fit the hypothesis and yield win-win situations depend 
on the type of innovation that is pursued - incremental (low-hanging fruits), risk 
reducing or radical” Sinclair-Desgagne (1999, p.l 1). In this respect, he argues that
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specific policies can be crafted to generate specific types of innovation cycles.
3 -  International trade studies that consider the competitiveness of nations with 
regard to their ability to attract new firms or to influence the international 
competitiveness of stabilised industries. Mulatu et al. (2001) proposed the 
estimation of the effect of environmental regulation on international trade. Their 
study casts doubt on the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis, as they conclude 
that the environmental stringency and trade performance has a significant effect. 
Other important analysis has been carried out by Jaffe et al. (1995). These 
researchers present an econometric study of the competitiveness of the American 
manufacturing industry indicating that the cost related to environmental 
adaptation or protection had been a small part of the total amount spent by the 
firms, and negative effects on competitiveness could be observed.
Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagne (2001) understand that the interaction between 
environmental policy and the firm’s allocation of resources is not straightforward and 
depends on the firm’s organisational failures. Aside from this, they argue that the 
existence of low-hanging fruits may due to managerial inefficiencies, as strict 
environmental regulation may be able to take place in “cheap innovations is logically 
most likely in situations where the firm is far from the efficiency frontier, where the 
burden of the compliance cost is light, and where the shift to the frontier can be made 
cheaply” (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagne 2001, p. 152).
For the purposes of this thesis, the first and second categories of empirical studies are 
more relevant as they address the economic effects of the establishment of environmental 
policy. The Porter hypothesis and van der Lind has been particularly relevant for this 
debate as have the studies that looked at the relationship between the environmental 
variables of the firm and the effects of economic performance. The empirical
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investigation of the Porter and van der Lind’s hypothesis can be criticised by the limited 
focus on single point in time and selected specific cases. The two first categories, can be 
criticised because they show a correlation between the two variables, environmental gain 
and economic performance, but do not show a causality between the two. The 
international comparison studies do not address the core aspects of the hypothesis as they 
are interested in the allocation of new industries and the international competition for 
desirable industries.
The empirical tests of the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis provide mixed views of 
the veracity of the premise. However, there is no question that the discussion has been 
profitable for environmental, managerial and policy studies. However, environmental 
protection is not a zero-sum game, and regardless of the fact that some environmental 
measures may result in economically efficient outcomes because of innovative 
technologies which will reduce environmental externalities, not all of them will have this 
effect. The importance of these empirical studies is that they indicate that the hypothesis 
may be true under certain circumstances, this being a relevant insight for the effects of 
environmental regulation to industry. In this respect, in the second generation of the 
‘greening of industry’ literature, the debate devolved to a discussion and was not focused 
on whether the economic gain could be observed but rather under which circumstances 
wider benefits would emerge.
2.3 - The second generation of the ‘greening of industry’ literature on the
effects of environmental regulation.
The theoretical importance of the ‘greening of the industry’ perspective has grown 
significantly as the concepts have understandably evolved towards more practical 
applications to firm management and strategy, with important implications for policy 
makers (Groenewegen and Fischer, 1996; Fuchs and Maznamian, 1998). The way the 
field has understood the effects of environmental regulation to industry has also changed.
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The initial phase (described previously) was based on an optimistic view that presented 
the potential for win-win outcomes regarding the impacts of environmental regulation on 
industry. However, this optimistic view was not supported by the industries' behaviour 
toward regulation, this being questioned and challenged in court (Kagan, 1994). Lobby 
groups defended less stringent measures and demanded governmental aid to fully adopt 
standards (Fiorino, 2006). Here, successful case studies appeared to be the exception and 
not the norm.
The field broadened the analysis of the effects of environmental regulation to industry as 
studies began to analyse the market forces which could contribute to a more sustainable 
outcome. The effects of different policies for the development of the green industry were 
indicated, correlating specific policy measures with their effect on the industry. As a 
result, the use of policy instruments for public policy design and implementation was also 
linked to the discussion of 'better regulation' presented in other literatures, especially in 
law and economics (Fiorino, 2006). Certain studies contrasted ‘command-and-control’ 
measures to the more flexible economic incentive instruments. Others were centred on 
the role that large multinational corporations could play in pushing the 'greening' agenda 
around the globe by adopting voluntary and beyond compliance behaviour (Fuchs and 
Maznamian, 1998).
The most recent phase of the 'greening of industry' provides a more complete and 
detailed analysis of the effects of environmental regulation on industry. The general 
understanding of the field is that environmental performance developed another 
dimension for industrial development; the industry shifted the focus from pollution 
prevention and environmental management to a broader and more complete approach that 
discussed active sustainability and environmental stewardship as ways of proactively 
seeking better market positioning (Fiorino, 2006). The literature reports efforts by leading 
firms to incorporate the environmental variable as a strategic and essential aspect of their 
business; a position that incorporates long-term sustainability, focusing on more complex 
causal relationships, has been proactively highlighted (Roonie, 1998). More mechanistic
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approaches which confirm the usefulness of specific management tools and systems are 
also defended, such as the codes of environmental management practice (Nash and 
Ehrenfeld, 1997) and of environmental management systems (Coglianese and Nash, 
2001).
Schot and Fisher (1993) indicate that the discussion on the effects of environmental 
policy on industry has followed the historical development of policy making and the 
industries’ responses. In this sense, the connection between the industries’ responses and 
the sort of regulatory pressures that have been placed on industry is a relevant aspect of 
the discussion. In the first generation of environmental policy, regulations were 
characterised by strict ‘command-and-control’ measures and firms tended to resist 
regulation, and complied only when coerced. After this, firms started to embrace the 
environment without innovating, as this began to be linked to profitability; use of the 
environment became a strategic and important dimension in business strategy. The 
environment began to be perceived as another issue that had to be managed to enhance 
profitability, to gain more market share and to show business success (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995a).
In this respect, the contemporary perception for firm managers regarding the ‘greening of 
industry’ is that industry must be committed to a steady and demonstrable endeavour to 
do better than mere environmental law compliance. Here firms search for ways to do far 
better than the requirements of regulation, as they perceive this as an important element 
in their business strategy (Fiorino, 2006). Moreover, a focus on the role of corporate 
environmental strategy has emerged with the development of particular organisational 
capabilities, which directly influence the firm’s competitiveness (Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 1998). For their part, Buysse and Verbeke (2003) indicate that several 
improvements in organisational capacities and resource use are necessary for firms to 
become more proactive in environmental terms.
One of the more sophisticated levels of analysis on this matter is presented by Reinhardt
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(2000) who indicates that the firms that take the best strategic approach are the ones that 
can comply with the necessary environmental regulations while delivering superior value 
to their shareholders. In his analysis, those in industry should not perceive the 
environmental dimension as an outside element in their business strategy but as an 
indispensable part of the entire business strategy. The modem firm should then put 
environmental management on the same level as other principles, such as strategy, 
finance and marketing.
Reinhardt (2000) indicates five strategic areas where the competitive advantage from the 
proactive use of environmental strategy can be gained. Figure 2.2 shows the basic 
environmental management approaches. The initial situation of the firm is displayed in 
point A in the first iso-profit line. At this point the firm has defined costs and revenues, 
which dictate its profitability. The second iso-profit line (displayed to the right) 
represents an environmental shock, such as environmental regulation where the firm has 
to implement costly technological procedures. In this case, the firm moves from point A 
to point B, where the revenues remain unchanged but costs increase.
However, Reinhardt’s analysis shows how the environmental shock can be surpassed. 
Point C refers to the environmental product differentiation strategy where the firm can 
operate in the improved iso-profit line. Firms tend to gain monopolistic gains by 
supplying environmentally friendly products. Hence, they try to persuade the consumers 
that their products are unique so they would have no real competitors. Rodriguez-Ibeas 
(2007) indicates that the net result of the environmental product differentiation strategy 
depends on the extent of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it, so that it can be 
compared to non-environmental differentiated products.
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Figure 2.2 -  Basic approaches to environmental management 
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Source: Adapted from Reinhardt (2000).
Under this strategy the firm is able to increase its price since the rivals’ costs are also 
increased. Reinhardt (2000) notes that:
To make environmental product differentiation succeed, a business must satisfy 
the following three requirements: 1- it must find, or create, a willingness among 
customers to pay for environmental quality; 2 - it must establish credible 
information about the environment and other attributes of its products; 3 - its 
innovation must be defensible against imitation by competitors. (Reinhardt, 2000,
p. 18)
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These conditions are able to raise the business costs, and are also able to grasp a price 
premium in the market or gain a further market share. Point D represents the reduction of 
costs within the firm. According to this, the firm would be able not only to improve its 
environmental quality but also to reduce overall costs. This scenario is in direct 
accordance with the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 
1995a), as the revenue would remain constant while the cost decrease would generate 
larger profit margins. Since environmental regulation is able to increase the cost of 
pollution, firms have the incentive to utilise more cost effective technologies. Here, 
several types of tools have been successfully used to minimise costs, such as life cycle 
assessments and environmental management systems (Nielsen and Wenzel, 2002).
The last case represented by point E shows the market redefinition strategy, where the 
firm would be able not only to increase revenue but also to reduce costs. In this example, 
shareholders, customers and the environment gain from the innovations adopted. Several 
traditional industrial sectors have tried to adopt alternative business models to gain 
additional profits from complementary products and services. The Blue Ocean Strategy 
framework, for instance, provides important insights into this discussion (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 2000). Alternative business models for established industries are a relevant 
theme in this case. One example is the micro-factory retailing system which is 
particularly important in this discussion (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003). The micro 
factory retailing system is a business model in a distributed economy, based on the use of 
several smaller vehicle manufacturing plants instead of a larger traditional one.
Reinhardt (2000) also notes that the firm should be able to directly manage risk and 
uncertainty. The intention is to minimise future environmental risks that may be 
established by the regulatory systems. The environmental strategies are important for 
firms that have been traditionally targeted by regulation, such as the automobile industry. 
In order to diminish the risk they have implemented formal and informal environmental 
management systems and product substitution (Ashford, 2000). In this respect, it is 
relevant to note that several firms may seek to capture regulatory rules ahead of their
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enactment by helping to define what is possible in a regulatory sense. They do this in part 
via their efforts in-environmental management systems and controls.
Other more recent strategists have indicated that the industry must identify the relevance 
of the 'green wave' that has been sweeping the modem corporate world (Esty and 
Winston. 2006). They emphasise the importance of a strategic approach to this issue 
since a firm or industry must be seek strategic advantages from the environmental 
pressures. Others authors have also defended this, including Laszlo (2008), who 
perceives that the global industry is recasting the role of business in society. Industry has 
shifted away from negative environmental externalities’ minimisation to innovative 
solutions to global problems that have not properly been addressed by governments. Esty 
and Winston (2006) indicate several successful case studies of firms that have provided a 
wider benefit to society and reaped profits thereby, such as General Electric, Toyota and 
Dow. These firms have tried to make the transition from being part of the problem to 
being part of the solution.
A more practical perspective is offered by Hoffman (2007) and shows how multinational 
companies have incorporated carbon reduction initiatives into their business plans for 
reasons of both environmental risk and opportunity.
Porter, one of the most influential authors of the first phase, has refined and extended his 
analysis and provides a more detailed perception of the effects of environmental policy to 
industry. There is emphasis on intangible gains, such as a better reputation, higher 
employee morale and competitive advantage in attracting human resource attraction. He 
also criticises the fragmented approach to environmental management in firms, as it 
should be part of the intrinsic business model of the industry (Porter and Kramer, 2006, p. 
78). Methodical tools are presented by Holliday, Schmidheiny and Watts (2002) for ‘eco- 
efficiency’ in industry. This might be achieved by dematerialisation, with a minimisation 
of waste leading to production loop closure. They also present argument for changes in 
business models that will provide service extension, with leasing instead of selling, and
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functional extension, with the extended value of the product for the consumer.
Notwithstanding that the second generation of the 'greening of industry', the literature on 
the impact of environmental regulation on industry is more refined and nuanced than the 
initial studies suggest, and there is restricted empirical support for the generalisation. 
These authors understand that the successful case studies serve as a benchmark for 
mainstream business and other industries to follow the same path (Laszio, 2008; Holliday 
et al., 2002). Without doubt, the second generation of the studies in the 'greening of 
industry' are more empirically informed than the earlier, largely anecdotal accounts of 
successful case studies. However, the literature has not addressed the wider issue of 
greater gains from beyond compliance measures, and why some industrial sectors have 
been able to gain tangible and intangible benefits, while others have not.
Nevertheless, this literature on corporate environmental strategy adopts the assumption of 
a competitive market where firms are openly willing to compete with each other to gain a 
larger market share. However, in markets with imperfect competitive structures like the 
automobile industry, these models have a limited application as there has been a tendency 
for the industry to operate as a collective action to pursue a corporate political strategy.
In the next section, the reduction of risks and uncertainty is discussed according to the 
strategic use of governmental regulation.
2.4 - The strategic use of government regulation
Traditionally, industry has taken up a reactive and confronting position. In general terms, 
industry has asked for more flexible standards or the delay the implementation of 
regulatory measures. The asymmetry of information between regulators and industry in 
regards to the costs of technological development has been the key element in this 
dispute. However, several studies have indicated how industry has consistently 
overestimated the cost of compliance and neglected several secondary positive effects.
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The strategic use of environmental regulation goes against this reactive and 
argumentative behaviour (Maloney and McCormick, 1982). Baron (1995) points out that 
non-market environmental strategies are social, political, and legal arrangements that 
construct the interactions amongst companies and their public. In this sense, industry can 
actively influence policy makers to make regulation more suitable for the present 
business model or to impose additional costs to competitors (Hillman and Hitt, 1999).
Reinhardt (2000) proposes that political debates over environmental policy are 
opportunities for firms to capture value; the 'greening of industry' literature perceives the 
proactive role of firms as a natural step in the development towards a sustainable society. 
In this respect, the positive industry position towards environmental regulation can 
induce the adoption of a specific technology that is at the same time more sustainable and 
secures the established business model. For this to take place, it is necessary that 
regulators perceive the necessity to regulate the specific market, and to force the 
technological development in this area. The industry or the firm must also have the 
ability to convince other stakeholders that technological innovation is technically 
feasible, and can provide better end results for society (Reinhardt, 2000). It should also 
be noted that this is implicitly pluralist, and assumes that a consensus can be arrived at.
Following a more optimistic perception of the use of regulation, industry may also have a 
rational interest to promote more stringent regulations; they can perceive that 
environmentally responsible products can be launched and the improved iso-profit line 
can be reached, as in Reinhardt’s analysis. Regulations can increase the aggregate costs 
of an entire industry, but the firm can still extract a competitive advantage if there is a 
perception that a superior product can be offered to the market. Both early mover and 
first mover firms can be in a better position, or even create their own industrial standard 
that would eliminate potential market entrants (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).
The technological choice taken up by regulators to address an environmental externality
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has wider implications for the future business and the environmental performance of the 
industry. Regulators can adopt a specific technology which favours the present business 
model of the industry (Salop and Scheffman, 1987), creates barriers to the entry of new 
competitors in their market (Demsetz, 1982), or directs the industry to a novel business 
model (Reinhardt, 2000). Another measure that impacts on the competitiveness of the 
industry or the firm and is worthy of mention includes environmental information 
disclosure, where the industry could indirectly raise the costs of the potential competitors 
or enhance its image to the consumer (Yoffie, 1988). Hillman and Hitt (1999) present a 
comprehensive taxonomy for types of corporate political strategies that include these 
kinds of non-market strategies.
Reinhardt (2000) also warns that industry must look beyond the domestic market, as 
international competitors that are out of reach of national legislators must be taken into 
consideration. This specific issue seems particularly important for industries that have 
limited competition in the domestic market and can be threatened by overseas new 
entrants. The role of multinational firms in this context is also relevant. These global 
firms may have the intent of pushing the harmonisation of environmental standards to 
regional markets so that production flexibility is enhanced by the economies of scale of 
designs and processes. In this respect, larger companies possess a significant competitive 
advantage in terms of size compared to smaller firms that may have difficulties in 
meeting the standards (Vogel, 1995).
A further commonly used approach is to utilise supporter groups, which is a more 
complex procedure than a straightforward lobby. The most polluting firms would have 
the greatest incentive to form and contribute to like-minded lobby groups (Damania and 
Fredriksson, 2000).
However, the literature of non-market strategies goes beyond intra-market competition, 
and there are also studies that propose aggregate sector lobbying for research and 
development funds, which have a crucial area of discussion in the automobile industry.
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Innes and Bial (2002) noted that the government can provide incentives for research and 
development (R&D) based on the firm’s incentive to raise rival’s costs. A firm that is a 
technology winner will have the incentive to precisely report the nature of their new 
innovation to the government so that the standards can be tightened, which can lead to the 
persuasion of regulators to push more stringent standards, or in some cases, firms can 
adopt voluntary over compliance behaviour. The government can also invest in research 
and development as the problem of asymmetry of information may be overtaken.
Gersbarch (2002) provides a useful self-financing policy system where governments can 
design environmental policy to avoid hold-ups that may emerge in environmental policy 
when technological innovations are particularly costly. The Innes and Bial (2002) article 
also presents similar conclusions and another important duopoly model is presented by 
Salop and Scheffman (1987).
Despite the theoretical importance and mechanistic approach, duopoly models fail to 
provide a complete picture of the process. Not only is the focus on success stories, but 
these models do not allow for the influence of other stakeholders who are a determinant 
in the regulatory process. In this sense, the application of the models to real life markets 
is rather limited, as few sectors reflect the theoretical assumptions.
2.5 - The beyond compliance behaviour
The first theoretical developments on firm behaviour were based on the traditional 
‘command-and-control’ measures, where strict legal compliance has been the key 
indicator of a firm’s environmental performance (Gunningham et al., 2003). However, 
the literature has developed to present a much more complex and nuanced understanding 
of the potential consequences and actions that can be taken up by industry to address 
environmental regulation. In this sense, the field has been indicative of the rational 
beyond-compliance measures. Gunningham et al. (2003) provide four reasons that would
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be conducive for firms to take beyond-compliance environmental protection measures.
• 'win-win' measures; these environmental measures are introduced because they 
are able to impact positively on the profits of the industry. This can be seen as a 
stronger version of the Porter and van der Lind hypothesis (Lanoie et al., 2007). 
Aside from direct economic profit, other less quantifiable gains are also included 
in this category and the enhancement of the image of the industry is an important 
example. Industry actively seeks to improve its reputation with relevant 
stakeholders, including consumers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
social activists, local communities and even regulators.
• Margin of safety measures; the firm decides to over-comply with current 
regulations to ensure that the minimum environmental standards will be met. This 
minimises the risks of potential mistakes or accidents in normal production 
systems.
• Anticipatory compliance measures; the industry anticipates that a more stringent 
regulation will be established. In terms of economies of scale and production 
flexibility, it is more profitable to adopt a stricter standard in the beginning of 
investment cycles. This could be particularly relevant for large industries that rely 
on economies of scale for business success and important examples are the 
automotive, chemical and mining industries.
• Good citizenship measures; these are based on the fact that the management of the
firm feels that more stringeiit environmental measures should be established on
moral grounds. Good environmental citizenship also positively affects the public
image of the firm. Authors such as Mehta and Hawkins (1998) believe in the
emergence of a strong sense of moral and legal obligation, with supporting
compliance behaviour from the majority of managers in several sectors of the
British economy. Managerial responsiveness to environmental values is another
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motive and workers sometimes feel that some actions are just the right thing to 
do. This has been analysed by new institutionalism (Edelman and Suchman, 
1996).
According to a dominant understanding in the ‘greening of the industry’, business leaders 
will eventually evolve to a position of over-compliance as the management realises the 
importance of the greening for business success and the role that industry has in the 
search for sustainable development. Several authors, such as Winsemius and Gumtram 
(1992), Roome (1992) and Hunt and Auster (1990) support this idea. In contrast, 
Schaefer and Harvey (1998) criticise this hopefulness, arguing that the classification 
system used in identifying beyond-compliance behaviour can be disputed, as some of the 
categorisation is hard to be translated into practical managerial measures. Prakash and 
Kollman (2004) also highlight that several of the case studies selected are the success 
stories of large corporations, where the simplest win-win measures were identified and 
more core business-related measures are not addressed.
Steger (1993) concludes that the factors that determine if an industry has a proactive 
attitude towards environmental protection are dictated by external factors. These include 
the environmental risks related to the firm’s operation and the market opportunities the 
firm can foresee in environmental innovation. In this sense, risk-free business operations 
for those who cannot identify an economic gain from the environmental investment and 
development will result in a lack of investment in new environmentally friendly 
technologies. However, this is a limited perception of how industry behaves, as other 
important elements are not considered.
The ‘license to operate’ framework provides a more complete perception of industry 
behaviour giving a more detailed analysis of the importance of several stakeholders on 
the environmental performance of the industry; it offers a relevant basis from which to 
analyse the actions that motivate firms to respond to environmental regulation 
(Gunningham et al., 2003). From this perspective, the environmental performance is a
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direct result of a combination of internal and external factors that are calibrated by the 
environmental management style of a firm. The external factors are a combination of 
‘licenses to operate’ that represent the legal, social and economic facets of business. O f 
particular interest for this thesis is the complex relationship between the three types of 
licenses, and how they are shaped and enforced.
Internal drives are shaped by several elements, such as the industry structure, history, 
culture, type of internal culture and the personnel. This includes, amongst others, how 
environmental codes of practice and environmental management systems are adopted by 
the industry (Hirschhom and Oldenburg, 1991). Figure 2.3 provides a graphical 
representation of this framework.
Figure 2.3 -  License to operate framework
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Source: Gunningham (2007)
The external image that the firm wants to depict is also a significant factor shaping the 
managerial style. Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) and Prakash (2000) note the 
relevance that local communities may also have, when managers and employees live in 
the area. In this case, they may be interested in minimising the environmental negative 
externalities in the local area. Hartman et al. (1997) also point to community
47
involvement; environmentally friendly firms or those that display good citizenship tend 
to be well perceived by consumers (Foster, 1998). Environmental NGOs have also played 
a significant role in informing the public of the environmental impact of the firm’s 
activities (Prakash , 2000). The reputation of the firm is also important for regulators, as 
this may have an impact on how strictly legislation will be imposed, or on how future 
legislation can be adopted.
There is also the aspect of ‘institutional isomorphism’. If successful firms in one sector 
are the one that adopt environmental beyond-compliance behaviour in their operations or 
administrative control systems, other competitors in the market are bound to follow 
(Cashores and Vertisky 2000; Hoffman 1997). Delmas (2001) indicates the wide 
adoption of the International Organization for Standardization - ISO 14000 
Environmental management standards constitutes an empirical example that demonstrates 
how corporate isomorphism has been spread over several sectors around the globe.
In certain markets, firms may still be forced by powerful industrial organisations to 
follow a specific technology, imposing the association’s view on all firms competing in 
the relevant market (Gunningham and Grabousky, 1998). In this sense, even if a specific 
competitor has the intention and the ability to use a more modem technology with 
alternative materials, the organisational consensus may stop their efforts.
External factors are fundamental but insufficient to explain the corporate environmental 
behaviour and intra-organisational factors are cmcial in determining attitudes towards the 
environment. The resource-based view of the firm, for instance, argues that an 
environmentally competitive strategy depends upon the specific organisational resources 
and capabilities of the firm, which are more likely to emerge in periods of crisis 
(Wemerfelt, 1984).
The extent of the firm’s commitment to beyond-compliance measures will be influenced 
by a combination of external pressures and internal variables. Regulatory demands, the
perception of the market and other stakeholder pressures are also relevant elements to 
consider (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002) and the firm will model the external factors 
depending on the internal capabilities it possesses (Roome, 1992).
2.6 - Conclusions
The industry’s perspective on the environment has significantly changed over the past 
decades. The environment has shifted from being an irrelevant and unusual preoccupation 
into a mainstream and essential aspect of modem business management (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 1998). The theoretical development on the effects of environmental regulation 
on; industrial performance has been significant since major advances in the literature 
regarding the subject have been observed.
Initially there was a belief that regulations would hinder the development of the industry. 
The general perception as shared by the industry and researchers was that regulation was 
costly and had a negative effect on the competitiveness of the industry. Nevertheless, the 
'command and control' based regulation provided several environmental benefits, 
creating several undesirable effects to industry.
Following this, the first generation of writers of the ‘greening of industry’ emerged, 
questioning the traditional vision. The Porter and van der Linde hypothesis brought an 
optimistic view of the potential effects of environmental regulation to industry. From this 
point of view, well designed regulation would spark innovation and create benefits for the 
industry. This optimistic view was shared by several authors who were influenced by this 
idea, and supported the notion that industry would be able to find reasonable solutions for 
sustainable development without radical change. However, empirical and theoretical 
studies have failed to identify the veracity of the premise. Despite this, the first phase was 
a significant period for the advancement of the literature in the field, not merely because
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of the documentation of the positive case studies but also for the development of 
environmental management tools and pollution prevention systems.
The modem understanding of the issue is based on a more inclusive perspective which is 
concerned with sustainability and stewardship (Schot and Fisher, 1993). Here, the effects 
of environmental policy on industry are perceived in a more nuanced manner. The 
discussion has shifted from the debate between the 'win-win' defenders and the 'win- 
lose' supporters to an analysis of the conditions under which different outcomes can 
emerge (Reinhardt, 2000). According to this vision, industry can reap benefits and adopt 
particular strategies to cope with the environmental dimension. One of these strategies 
refers to the positive use of governmental regulation, which is a much more complex 
process than a simple lobby and involves a wider engagement of the industry with key 
societal stakeholders.
The framework of the ‘Licence to operate’, presented by Gunnigham (2007), is rather 
illustrative of the elements that influence firms in an industry to take proactive steps 
towards environmental management. The framework provides better knowledge about 
the causes behind industry environmental behaviour and the complexity of the 
relationships between the commercial imperatives, technological development and the 
environmental performance of the industry. Within the framework the difference is noted 
between the internal drives, the external environment, intra-organisational factors and the 
interaction of internal and external factors as separated elements that need to be 
accounted for to understand industrial environmental performance. (Gunningham et al , 
2003).
The framework also provides important insights into the discussion on the 'greening of 
industry' which understands the more complex process relating to environmental policy 
making. The design, implementation and monitoring of environmental policy has to take 
into account other stakeholders aside from the firm and the regulators. Industry can 
actively seek to influence regulators, as the costs can be better estimated and potential
competitive advantages assessed. However, the important query that has not been 
properly responded to by the field is that if the positive effects of regulation can be 
generated to industry why have the majority of firms not adopted beyond-compliance 
behaviour?
In a wider criticism of the field, it is understood that there is trust in incremental rather 
than radical change. The belief that sustainable development can be achieved is based on 
the fact that industry can find the necessary solutions for negative externalities within its 
own boundaries and external pressures may not be necessary. Despite a more nuanced 
and informed phase of analysis, the field is still characterised by the documentation of 
successful case studies and the trust on industry decisions to steer society to a sustainable 
path.
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Chapter 3 - Researchable Propositions
3.1 - Introduction
This chapter provides the initial answers and researchable propositions to the central 
question proposed in this thesis. As indicated in the previous chapter, the body of 
knowledge termed as the 'greening of industry' has evolved to a more inclusive and 
nuanced understanding of the effects of environmental regulation on industry. The debate 
has shifted from the 'win-win' believers (Hart, 1996), who dominated the first phase of 
the field, to a more balanced intuition under which positive outcomes can emerge 
following certain conditions and specific arrangements (Reinhardt, 2000).
The 'greening of industry' body of knowledge, therefore sees the effects of 
environmental policy on industrial firms as a multifaceted phenomenon involving several 
stakeholders. Here, the specific and particular conditions of each industry shape internal 
and external factors which determine the industries’ environmental performance (Kagan 
et al. 2003). Therefore, in order to better comprehend how the relationships between 
environmental policy, firm economic imperatives and environmental industrial 
performance come about, the 'license to operate' framework has been selected as the 
main framework of analysis in this chapter (Gunningham, 2007).
The framework can incorporate the influence of several stakeholders and has been widely 
used to discuss the formation of legal standards (Hoffman, 1999). The choice of this 
framework is based upon the possibility of considering the influence of multiple 
stakeholders and the potential contribution that this research can provide to the 'greening 
of industry' body of knowledge. The license to operate framework is therefore able to 
capture the ample influence of several groups which influence the environmental 
performance of the firm. Moreover, it does not focus on single point relationships such as
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the regulators-industry, as other frameworks do (an example of this is the game theory 
(Pearce et al., 1995). Rather, the 'licence to operate' framework is more suitable for the 
more general perspective adopted in the field that tends to look at a diversity of 
stakeholders and how they interact with each other. Following the discussion of the 
'licence to operate' framework, the potential contribution this thesis makes to the 
development of the framework is discussed alongside the researchable propositions. 
Initially, this chapter provides a short description of the license to operate framework, 
since important elements of the framework are later used. The chapter then briefly 
discusses the proactive role of the industry, and the environmental management style. 
After this, the relevant aspects of the license to operate are contextualised to the 
automobile industry and presented so that researchable propositions can be introduced at 
the end of the chapter.
3.2 - The 'license to operate' framework1
The license to operate framework understands that multi-faceted licenses simultaneously 
motivate and constrain the actions of industry as regards the environmental dimension 
(Gunningham et al. 2003, 2004; Hoffman, 1999). The framework is flexible as it can be 
applied to an entire industry or to individual firms. The flexibility of the framework 
possesses particular strengths for researchers as it can be applied to a wide range of 
industries in several situations. However, it is necessary to provide a rich 
contextualisation since elements may emerge that restrict the discussion. The terminology 
used in the framework is based upon the original notion of the legal license under the 
'command-and-control' regulatory regime (Kagan, 2005). The legitimacy of any industry 
is constructed by regulatory permits and legal obligations that the industry must comply 
with in order to operate. Policy makers can modify environmental requirements for 
industry in specific markets, and this includes not only the necessary permits but, most
- The license to operate has been termed as a model in other studies. However, in this thesis the 
license to operate is seen as a framework of analysis as it has a wider understanding of the relationships 
between variables and does not have the power of prediction that a model would possess.
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importantly, the impacts on the business model of the firm, including the legal requisites 
of certain technologies. Aside from the legal license, the 'license to operate' framework 
also perceives the pressure of other informal and less quantifiable external influences 
captured by the concepts of the social and the legal licenses (Gunnigham et al. 2003). The 
three licenses can be defined as follows:
- The legal license refers to the combination of several legal requirements and 
the necessary permits that are issued by environmental, health and safety officials. 
In general terms, firms need to comply with the minimal legal standards, 
respecting mandatory technology. Legal requirements applied to industry can be 
said to be concerned with safety or environmental matters in their discourses and 
there is a conceptual link between two theoretical preoccupations (Kagan, 2005). 
In sum, the legal license constitutes the formal regulation with which the industry 
must comply.
- The economic license represents the demands of the economic stakeholders 
and is defined by the lenders and stockholders who require a reasonable rate of 
return for their investment. The economic license frames how firms can respond 
to environmental necessities, adopt new technologies, invest in Research and 
Development (R&D) and implement wider modifications to the business model of 
the industry. In this sense, the economic license can be tightened or loosened 
depending on the market conditions of the industry and, more specifically, on the 
economic performance of each firm (Gunnigham et al. 2003). The economic 
license is part of informal regulation.
The social license relates to the requirements of the social actors involved in 
the production and their use of the industry. Social actors belong to a wide range 
of interest groups, including: local communities, national environmental groups, 
workers, media, consumers and society in general. Each one of these groups 
perceives the actions of industry and the negative environmental externalities
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produced differently, and each has a variable influence over the industry. The 
recipients of environmental and social externalities are also included as key social 
groups in the process. The social license is also part of the informal regulation 
alongside the economic license (Kagan et. al, 2005).
The 'license to operate' framework shows that the final outcome of the interaction 
between the terms of the three licenses is larger than the actions of each one individually, 
because stakeholders are able to influence multiple licenses simultaneously. According to 
Gunningham (2002), ‘these regulatory, economic and social license requirements are 
monitored and enforced by the stakeholders who generate them, and who commonly seek 
leverage by exploiting a variety of license terms’ (Gunningham, 2002, p. 19).
The conditions of some of the legal license requirements expand the reach and impact of 
the social license by directly empowering social interest groups in a number of ways 
(Gunningham et al., 2003). Social stakeholders can have a direct impact on the permit- 
granting process, the negotiation of standards, or access to environmental information 
regarding the negative externalities produced by the industry. Consequently, an industry 
that is not able to deal properly with the obligations imposed by the social license risks 
having its legal license constricted. Social stakeholders can directly pressure policy 
makers and regulators to impose stricter regulations. In this case, the future liabilities 
imposed may further constrain the economic license. Another interest group that may 
influence several licenses is the workforce of the industry. Workers help to shape the 
social license, and may have a significant influence on the way the industry addresses 
environmental concerns. Hence, employees can shape not only the social license but also 
the internal management style of each firm of the industry.
The terms of each of the licenses to operate are subject to interpretation (Gunningham et 
al. 2003). Different stakeholders have diverse opinions with regards to what is tolerable, 
not only in relation to the market conditions, but also in terms of the historical 
development and the environmental impact of industry. The complexity of the 
interactions between the stakeholders and the perception of the externalities of industry is
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highly dependent upon the type of industry and the interplay between the three licenses 
with the internal management of the firm. The framework is then highly context specific 
and needs to be detailed so that it is adapted to particular industries.
Figure 3.1 shows a graphical representation of the license to operate framework. 
According to this, the economic, social and legal licenses simultaneously shape the 
industry’s environmental performance. Here, the management style is indicated in the 
middle of the graph as it is influenced by the three different types of licenses and has a 
direct impact on the environmental performance of the industry. The graphical 
representation in Figure 3.1 shows the same shape for one of the three types of licences 
but solely for the purposes of graphical display.
Figure 3.1 -  The License to operate
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Figure 3.1 indicates that the three different licences are intertwined, providing a joint 
effect on the environmental performance of the industry. The initial studies that used the 
framework were concerned with understanding the differences between the leaders and 
laggards within the same industry, and how firms have been able to display different 
environmental performance within the same licenses (Gunnigham et al., 2003). This 
work, however, takes the aggregate framework and applies it to the auto industry at 
context-specific points in time to understand how the legal license was able to influence 
the environmental performance of firms within that industry. The differences observed 
between firms are indicated as important demonstrations of the diverse interpretation of 
the macro-level licences in the internal management style of the firms.
The environmental dimension is an important aspect that needs to be discussed in the 
context of the 'license to operate'. The environment has a wide impact on the formation 
of the licenses, as it possesses profound social, economic and regulatory implications; 
this is because a greater range of stakeholders monitor and pressure the industry to adopt 
specific behaviour and responses towards the negative environmental externalities 
produced or the natural resources used. Environmental groups can influence the 
regulatory license by demanding more stringent standards. The economic license can also 
be influenced by consumers who can switch the demand towards products or producers 
which are perceived to be more sustainable. Workers of the firm can also be influenced 
by the social perception of tightening the social license. Moreover, stakeholders and 
stockholders might perceive the rate of return of the investment as being directly related 
to the environmental performance of the firm and the terms of the social license.
/
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3.3 - The proactive role of industry and the license to operate
The framework is helpful to understand the role that a proactive industry can play in 
shaping the licenses (Kagan et al., 2005); a wider understanding of the effects of industry 
on the environment and the role that a proactive firm engages in is also more far-reaching 
than a submissive position. The strategic use of governmental regulation is well defined 
as an active business strategy. Following the analysis presented by Reinhardt (2000) and 
other strategists, such as Hart (2003), it has been argued that industry can find profitable 
outcomes from addressing environmental shocks, including: the reduction of costs, 
environmental product differentiation and market redefinition strategy, where industry 
would be able not only to increase revenue but also to reduce costs by offering superior 
products in environmental terms (Reinhardt, 2000). In this context, it is also relevant to 
mention the industry’s political activity that constitutes its attempts to shape government 
policy to favour the firm (Baysinger, 1984). However, despite the initial focus Of the field 
on a firm-level political engagement, a wide range of scholars have indicated the 
importance of industry-wide political activity (Shaffer, 1995). For the purposes of this 
work, the industry-wide focus on the broader analysis is more relevant.
The pro-active role of the industry in forming the legal license is supported by greater 
information about costs, business cycles and the incremental limits of the business model. 
In this sense, industry has a better grasp of what is possible in technological terms and the 
consequences of pressures from the economic license to the established business model. 
Therefore, although the problem of the asymmetry of information has negative 
consequences for policy makers, it can serve as a positive element for pro-active 
industries willing to engage in a political strategy (Salop and Scheffinan, 1987).
The characteristics of the market are crucial to comprehend the interaction between the
licenses. It includes the relationship that industry has with regulators, as well as the level
of cohesion that the firms operating in this market have. Consequently, more specific
characteristics of the market such as the number of firms, baniers to entry and historical
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relationship with regulators and consumers are also relevant to contextualise case specific 
responses to environmental demands. The ‘collective action problem’ addresses the 
connection between the industry level structure and the ability to organise political action 
(Getz, 1997). The industry level analysis follows an older interest in firm-level 
engagement, where issues such as firm size, dependency on government, the 
diversification level, foreign ownership, the age of the firm, formalised firm structures 
and managerial influence are relevant levels of analysis.
Industry-wide analysis indicates that the industry structure is considered as a determinant 
antecedent of active political activity. Here, concentrated industries are more likely to 
engage in lobbying and campaign contributions in the US than fragmented ones (Schuler 
et al., 2002). The same conclusion has been reached concerning firms operating in other 
parts of the world (Coen, 1997); there is therefore a causal relationship between the level 
of the firm, the industry and wider impacts on the firm level corporate political activity 
(Gray and Lowery, 1998).
The characteristics of the market impact on the formation of the legal and economic 
licenses to operate are the key to appreciate how an industry may be able to influence 
regulators. Industry can pressure for the use of a specific technology that is aligned with 
the prevailing businesses model, lobby for subsidies for R&D, or force the creation of 
specific rules and regulations to form larger barriers to the entry of new competitors in 
their market (Demsetz, 1988).
The influence of policy salience is also relevant to indicate industry engagement and how 
the issues that are being regulated by policy makers are perceived by the industry. 
Moreover, firms estimate the potential impact on the firms’ competitive advantage and 
strategy (Schuler and Redhein, 1997). The environmental dimension has been indicated 
as being of prominent political salience for several industries, including the automobile 
industry. The present business model of the automobile industry is particularly vulnerable 
to future regulations as the automobile was not initially designed with environmental 
concerns in mind (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003).
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Another important aspect that has been highlighted in the literature has been the potential 
development of greening success stories that would lead to a beyond-compliance 
behaviour. This can be interpreted as a non-market strategy to influence the social 
license and to anticipate the formation of the legal license. Beyond-compliance behaviour 
can be the result of cooperative efforts across the industry; it may also be a result of 
influence over governmental policy to develop and implement new technologies that will 
enhance the environmental performance of the industry, and will encourage policy 
makers to adopt the more advanced standards that are already met by the industry.
3.4 - The environmental management style2
Corporate behaviour has been addressed by organisational theory literature. Most of the 
work in this field is concerned with the differences between firms seeking to establish a 
competitive advantage with regard to environmental regulations through voluntary 
corporate behaviour. Other authors have indicated that individual firms interact with 
each other in order to jointly shape diverse licenses, including the legal licence and 
standards (Elderman et al., 1999; Hoffman, 1999).
The relevance of the internal factors of the firm need to be accounted for when dealing 
with the effects of environmental regulation, including:
-  Managerial perceptions (Bansal, 2003);
-  Organisational cultures (Forbes and Jermier, 2002; Vanderbergh, 2003);
-  Organisational structures (Delmas and Toffel, 2005);
-  Managerial commitment (Coglianese and Nash, 2001).
Note - Under the banner of corporate environmental responsibility - industry understands that its role is part of the 
solution to the environmental problem and not as part of the problem. - For the present purposes, CER (a sub-category of the broader 
concept of corporate social responsibility -  CSR), will be defined as practices that benefit the environment (or mitigate the adverse 
impact o f  business on the environment) that go beyond those that companies are legally obliged to carry out. This definition is broadly 
consistent with that put forward by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 1
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These firm level aspects help to translate the different terms of each licence in a wide 
range of practical actions. The literature is silent on examples of empirical studies that 
control external factors to provide a clear comparison of internal factors across firms 
(Howard-Greenville, 2006). Despite this, several attempts have been brought forward 
based upon organisational theory to provide a theoretical delimitation of the types of 
management style that influence the firm in translating the terms of the three licenses in 
order to operate in practical actions.
In the 'license to operate' framework the managerial style serves as a filter through which 
the management of each one of the firms composing the industry interprets the three 
types of licenses. The license to operate can be translated differently by the diverse firms 
operating in the market. The management style is able to translate stakeholders’ demands 
into practical actions for industry as several other aspects need to be accounted for, 
including, the history of the firm, the specific characteristics of the market, general 
corporate culture, history, network relationships and individual membership to industry 
associations. These variables are important in determining if the industry can adopt a 
collective action strategy towards regulation or have individual responses if specific firms 
perceive the potential to gain competitive advantage.
A pro-active environmental management style is described very well in the model 
presented by Orsato (2006), where firms are divided into broad categories of 
environmental action in regards to regulation. Based on Reinhardt (2000), Orsato (2006) 
argues that competitive advantage can be gained using lower costs or differentiation, 
which in turn should be the focus of organisation processes or in the products or services 
of the firm. These variables can lead to four different types of environmental proactive 
management style strategies: eco-efficiency, beyond-compliance leadership, eco- 
branding and environmental cost-leadership.
Table 3.1 provides a graphical representation of the pro-active management style 
strategies presented by Orsato (2006). The structure of the industry in which a firm
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operates, its position within that industry, the types of markets the company serves, and 
its capabilities will suggest the appropriate competitive focus (organisational processes or 
products/services) and the potential source of competitive advantage (cost or 
differentiation) of a firm.
The distinction between organisational processes and products and services is possible 
only because the four strategies can work independently. For instance, by being the first 
to certify its environmental management system, a firm may differentiate itself from 
competitors, while its products or services do not present any environmental features. 
Conversely, a firm may decide to sell products with eco-labels but not explore the green 
features of its organisational processes. A criticism of this model is the difficulty of 
spotting clear cut differences between these four types of strategies. In this sense, it may 
become hard to understand empirically how a firm can typify wider environmental 
friendly managerial strategies that will affect the four typologies described. However, the 
classification of pro-active management styles is relevant to the discussion of the license 
to operate framework.
Table 3.1 - Environmental regulation and corporate strategy
Competitive Lower costs l.Eco-efficiency 4.Environmental Cost
Advantage Leadership
Differentiation 2.Beyond-compliance 3. Eco-branding
Leadership
Organization processes Products and Services
Competitive Advantage
Source: Orsato (2006).
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3.5 - Proposed extensions of the 'license to operate' framework to the problem 
in question
The general conceptual framework presented in the previous section indicates that the 
license to operate framework is context specific. The framework has been applied to 
sectors that have very particular characteristics, including the pulp and paper industry 
(Gunnigham et al., 2003), mixed industrial facilities (Howard-Greenville et al. 2007) and 
extractive industries (Parker et al., 2008). Each of the studies has looked at industries in 
certain periods of time and centralised on specific negative environmental externalities. 
One of the extensions that this work proposes to explore is to appreciate the suitability of 
the framework to problems in the automobile industry. This has specific and important 
characteristics that shape the licenses to operate and may lead to a diverse set of 
conclusions.
Most of the work in this area has given wider emphasis to the formation of the legal 
license as a more prominent issue in distinguishing leaders and laggards in environmental 
performance (Gunningham et al., 2003). The researchers generally possess a policy­
making background, and provide conclusions focused on the regulatory aspect of the 
issue. Central has been the concern of further developing the literature on the 
environmental management style.
This work has a different focus. The aspiration is to investigate the relationships between 
the corporate commercial requirements, the legal license and environmental pressures. 
The relationship between environmental regulation and automotive industry 
technological development is dependent upon the necessity to satisfy the different set of 
licenses taking into account the particular characteristics of the industry and the market at 
the time. The business characteristics of the automotive industry require discussion as 
they not only shape the market structure of the firms operating in the market, but also 
have a wider impact upon the sorts of measures that can be adopted in order to cope with 
environmental pressures (Requate, 2005).
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Based upon the theoretical discussion presented in Chapter 2, and on the discussion of the 
'license to operate' presented in this chapter, it is imperative to recognise the specific 
characteristics of the automobile industry to better understand the formation of the three 
licenses to operate. In this sense, the next section discusses the main business and 
economic characteristics of the industry that may affect how the industry can be 
influenced by the licenses to operate and how industry can adopt a pro-active role, so 
influencing the formation of the licenses.
3.6 - The 'license to operate' and the automobile industry
The business of the mass-produced vehicle is based on two important technical concepts: 
the internal combustion engine and the all-steel body structure (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 
2007). These two elements were able to make the automobile a mainstream product and 
they are still the pillars of the modem business of building cars on a large scale. 
Consequently, they directly impact on the relationship that the industry has with the 
natural environment (Orsato, 2007) and shape the economic license. Since the economic 
feasibility of the industry is based upon large-scale production, the initial investment in 
machinery, design and industrial structures is significant, forming high barriers to entry 
for new competitors. In this sense, large firms have operated throughout recent years with 
financial losses in several of the most important markets, including the United States 
(Vlasic and Bunkley, 2008), Europe (Deutsche Welle, 2010) and Asia (Frakler, 2008).
The cost structures of the automobile industry are a fundamental factor in understanding 
the formation of the economic license. The Samsung experience of entering the Korean 
automobile market in 1994 provides a relevant indication as regards the present costs of 
entering the market which are very different to the initial firms. It is estimated that the 
Samsung Group spent more than US$5 billion from 1994 to 2001 in order to build
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production and research facilities, and the distribution network (Ravenhill, 2001). After 
the Asian financial crises of 1998, the new firm in the Asian market had close to 2.33 
trillion Won in debt in 2000. Renault acquired the firm for US$100 thousand, and took on 
$250 millions of Samsung’s debt3.
According to Gerosky (1995), entry rates in general markets diverge over time. The entry 
rates are often higher in the early life of any market. This phenomenon was observed in 
the case of the automotive industry, both in the United States and in Europe. O'Connell 
(1998) notes that in early days of the British motor industry, more than 400 different 
vehicle brands were available for purchase. Clark (1983) reached similar conclusions for 
the North American market and Nieuwenhuis and Wells (1997) also note the rapid rise in 
the number of car firms in France between 1894 and 1904.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of firms involved in the production 
of vehicles was relatively large in comparison to the size of the market, as the barriers to 
entry were less significant. Many small-scale manufacturers were involved in the supply 
of vehicles. However, as the industry matured, new industrial groups emerged as central 
players with concentrated and larger markets shares (Chandler, 1964). Nowadays, the 
modem automotive industry is composed of a limited number of groups that possess a 
wide number of brands4. Here, vehicle manufacturers are the most important firms in the 
automotive supply chain. Not only are they the ones responsible for the construction of 
the automobile, but they are the ones who command the suppliers and provide the 
necessary products for the consumers. Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2003) provide three 
general categories of automotive manufacturers:
1 -  High volume producers; these firms produce large volumes of vehicles that dominate 
the market as the greater part of the demand is supplied by them. The models offered by
3 - http://www.korealaw.com/node/109
4 - It is important to note that the automobile industry is composed of more than just vehicle 
manufacturers. There are suppliers of OEM and aftermarket equipment, distributors, retailers, and all of the 
wider network of activities including insurance, policies, emergency repair tod others.
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these firms range in size and capabilities, and are destined for the lower section of the 
market. In a simplistic analysis, the major source of profit for these firms lies in the 
economies-of-scale as they strive to maximise their initial investments by selling a large 
volume of cars at low cost. Examples of these include: Ford, General Motors, Honda, 
Toyota, Nissan, Fiat, Peugeot, Renault, Chrysler and Volkswagen; the business models of 
these firms are based on cost reduction (Williams et al., 1994).
2 -  Specialist producers; these firms are characterised by more sophisticated products that 
rely on technical sophistication, offering larger and higher performance vehicles. The 
source of profit for these companies is differentiation, and a combination of exclusivity 
and quality. Examples here include: BMW, Mercedes-Benz, AUDI, Alfa Romeo, Saab 
and Volvo. Cost recovery is the central element in the business model (Williams et al., 
1994).
3 -  Niche producers; these companies are typified by extreme performance and 
exclusivity. The products offered are unique, with variable durability and quality. Most of 
them are exotic high performance sports cars or extremely luxurious models with a vast 
amount of craftsmanship. Examples include: Ferrari, Maserati, Lamborghini, Pagani, 
Bugatti, Bentley, Rolls Royce, Aston Martin and Noble. These firms also based their 
businesses models on cost recovery strategies (Williams et al., 1994). Another important 
feature of these firms is the use of advanced materials. The body follows a non-Budd 
pattern.
In addition to this, these types of producers distinguish their products in several areas. 
The number of units produced is relevant, such as the more exclusive the vehicle, the 
higher its market value. The engine size and general performance of the vehicle are also 
very important, as vehicles with higher performance utilise more powerful engines and 
are built with more expensive materials. Brand image also plays a relevant role in the 
definition of price. Certain brands possess a heritage linked to sports cars, which is 
valued by the consumer, such as Fiat’s Abarth. Amongst several studies that model the
66
demand function for new automobiles, Arguea et al. (1994) indicate that the demand for 
horsepower is elastic in relation to income, while capacity is unitary and is negatively 
correlated to fuel efficiency. This indicates that as consumers get richer, they care more 
for comfort and performance and less about the miles per gallon.
Despite the instructive importance of the general categories of automobile manufacturers, 
this categorisation is not without problems. The world automotive industry is dominated 
by a restricted number of industrial groups which absorb several car brands within these 
different categories. Some of the larger ones try to compete in every market, offering a 
vast number of brands to the consumers, which include high volume brands, specialist 
and niche brands. The Volkswagen Group, for example, is a public-listed automotive 
producer, which holds the ownership of several important vehicle brands, including: 
Volkswagen vehicles, Volkswagen commercial, Audi AG, Bentley Motors Ltd, Bugatti 
Automobile SA, Lamborghini S.p.A, SEAT S.A, Porsche AG, Skoda Auto, various joint 
ventures links and other truck brands (Scania AB and 29% in MAN AG).
Figure 3 .2 shows a graphical representation of the automobile market with the division of 
three different types of suppliers: high volume producers, specialist producers and niche 
producers. The areas represent the distribution of vehicle models. The graph has two 
important elements to discuss. The first is the inverse relationship between price and the 
quantity of vehicles offered. This relationship is clearer for the niche market, where the 
exclusivity factor is an important attribute for the consumer who is willing to pay a 
premium for a limited product. This relationship may not be so clear for the high volume 
producers, where sometimes the best sold vehicles are not the cheapest, but provide the 
best value in combination with what is demanded by the consumer.
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Figure 3.2 Automobile market divisions
Price
Examples o f  Vehicles fro 
(Volksi
m  different Automobile Brands 
vagen Group)
Automobile market 
division
Vehicle
A -N iche Bugatti Veyron
Bentley Continental Flying Spur
Lamborghini Murcielagp
B- Specialist/ niche AndiRS
I  a m h n r g h i n i  O a lb tn r ln
Audi RS6
C -  Specialist Audi A6
Audi A3
E- High volume/ specialist Volkswagen Phaeton
D -  High Volume SkodaFabia
Volkswagen G olf
Volkswagen Passat
Seat Ibiza.
Quantity
The second feature o f this graph is the intersection between the areas. In the intersections 
the suppliers often contain products from one group or another. In the high volume and 
specialist intersection, high volume producers may introduce more sophisticated versions 
of their products or specialist producers may introduce simpler and smaller versions of 
their standard models.DThere are several cases of high volume producers who produce 
vehicles aimed at specialist vehicle consumers, such as the Volkswagen Phaeton. Certain 
models from specialist vehicle manufacturers are also aimed at supplying high 
specification, high volume vehicles, such as the Audi A2. The same rational is valid for 
niche vehicles and speciality vehicles. The table provides six examples of vehicle models 
that can be found in each of the areas. The entire vehicle brands selected in Figure 1 
belongs to the Volkswagen AG. This representation illustrates how one single automobile 
group possesses brands that are competitors to other brands o f the same group. The 
competition can even occur between models and brands of the same group, which, in this 
case, would be in the high volume, brands of the Volkswagen Group: Volkswagen, 
Skoda, Seat and some Audi Models. Another automobile group that would present a wide 
display in the graph is the FIAT S.p.A. because the group would have examples in each 
of the three large areas and in the intersections with Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Maserati and 
Ferrari.
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Williams et al. (2004) note that it is important to differentiate cost reductions from cost 
recovery strategies. Within the cost reduction strategy, firms rely on the economies of 
scale to lower the unit cost of each single product. Costs can be distributed between each 
single unit of produced product. In this sense, the larger the quantity of vehicles produced 
and sold, the higher the profit of the firm. These firms try to compete on the general 
market where they have very little negotiation margins. However, the market cannot be 
classified as a perfectly competitive market as there is not an infinite number of suppliers, 
the products offered are not perfectly substitutable and the barriers to entry are significant 
(Varian, 1992).
The other sort of economic strategy of firms is cost recovery (Williams, 2004). Here, the 
most important elements of the business model of the firm are exclusivity and product 
differentiation. Since these firms try to perceive themselves as specialist or niche 
producers, they can capture profit, so providing a distinctive product with a higher market 
value. Consumers take into account a large number of issues when selecting these 
vehicles, including power, performance, brand image and durability. In this sense, the 
business model for these firms is essentially different from the large scale manufacturers 
and they do not solely rely on economies of scale, but on other less quantitative elements 
related to brand reputation and image. According to Fisher et al. (1995) manufacturing 
flexibility is an important attribute for firms that seek to supply niche markets, and can be 
achieved by not relying on Budd technology. The environmental cost differentiation 
proposed by Orsato (2006) and Reinhardt (2000) would therefore be classed as cost 
recovery.
The modem automotive industry is composed of a restricted number of industrial groups 
that possess ownership of several brands of high volume manufactures, specialist 
producers and niche products. Table 3.2 presents a summary of the leading automotive 
groups, along with owned Brands, the brands that are partially owned and the joint 
ventures or collaboration agreements with others.
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Table 3.2- Global Automobile Groups (2007)
Group Owned Brands Partial ownership Joint Venture
General Motors Corporation Buick; Cadillac; 
Chevrolet; GMC; 
Holden; Hummer; 
Opel; Pontiac; Saab; 
Saturn; Vauxhall
Fiat (10%) 
Daewoo (50,9%) 
Suzuki (3%)
Toyota -  NUMMI;
Lada; BMW (co-develop Hybrid)
Manufacturing ventures with several automakers 
around the world, including Toyota, Suzuki, 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. of China, 
AVTOVAZ of Russia and Renault SA of France.
Ford Motor Company Ford; Lincoln; 
Mercury; Volvo;
Aston Martin 
(8,32%)
Mazda (33,4%)
PSA Peugeot Citroen -  Joint venture diesel 
engines;
Fiat.
Fiat Group
Fiat S.p.A. -  Fabbrica italiana 
de automobili Torino)
Fiat group 
automobiles (Fiat, 
Fiat Professional, 
Lancia, Alfa Romeo, 
Abarth);
Maserati, IVECO
Ferrari (85%); Fiat; Ford (co development and production)
PSA Peugeot Citroen (collaboration agreement -  
Sevel).
BMW AG Rolls Royce, BMW, 
MINI
Toyota (diesel engine for the mini); PSA (Prince 
engine). GM and Chrysler (co-develop hybrid).
Toyota Motor Corporation Scion, Lexus, Toyota Daihatsu (51,2%); 
Hino (50,1%); Fuji 
Heavy Industries 
Ltd. -  Subaru (8,7%) 
Isuzu (5,9%)
GM -  NUMMI; PSA (TPCA); Porsche (hybrid 
technology); BMW Mini -  diesel Engine.
PSA Peugeot Citroen Peugeot; Citroen BMW (Mini engines), FIAT (Sevel), Ford joint 
venture (diesel engines), Mitsubishi (alliance), 
Dongfeng Motors, Toyota.
PSA Renault Renault; Renault 
Samsung motors; 
Dacia.
Nissan
(44.4%)alliance 
-Volvo trucks 20%)
-  who owns 100% of 
Renault Trucks and 
Mack.
Nissan Nissan, Infiniti Renault (15%) 
alliance
Dongfeng motor corporation
Shanghai automotive Industry 
corporation -  group.
Shanghai; Nanjing 
automobile group ( 
Soyat (licensed Seat 
and Isuzu), Chinese 
Fiat, MG, Rover.
SsangYong motor 
(50,1%) ;Chery 
(20%);
Volkswagen 
Shanghai GM.
Fiat China -  FIAT.
Hyundai, Kia Automotive 
Group
Hyundai, Kia Mitsubishi motors (joint manufacture and 
technology license); Kia with Dongfeng
Honda Motor Co., Ltd Honda, Acura Dongfeng motor corporation
Daimler AG Merced Benz cars 
(Maybach, Mercedes- 
Benz, AMG, Smart)
Mitsubishi motors
Chrysler LLC
(80,1% owned by Cerberus 
capital management L.P.)
Chrysler, Dodge, 
Jeep, Global Electric 
Motor cars
Mitsubishi motors (joint venture platform); GM 
and BMW (co-developed hybrid))
Volkswagen AG 
(owned 30,9 % by Porsche)
Audi AG, automobile 
Lamborghini, Seat, 
Volkswagen,
Bentley, Skoda, 
Bugatti.
Commercial 
Vehicles (Man 
29,9% and 52% by 
Scania), Scania 
(20,03%)
Proton (strategic partnership) 
Shanghai (joint venture).
Proton Proton Cars Lotus cars (63,75%) VW (strategic partnership)
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Tata Motors Jaguar, Daimler 
(owned by Jaguar) 
Land Rover, Tata
Suzuki Motor Corporation Suzuki Maruti General motors, Subaru, Mazda, Nissan, Maruti 
Suzuki.
Source: various sources (2007).
This shows two important characteristics of the modem automobile industry. First, 
globally there are a relatively small number of industrial groups dedicated to automotive 
production. The data demonstrates that a limited number of firms operate in all the most 
important markets and most of them concentrate their operations on home or specific 
markets. Vehicle line ups are set up taking into account several factors, such as local 
consumer preferences, and the price of fuel, local safety regulations, local and 
environmental regulations. Vehicle manufacturers also account for factory location, 
currency exchange rates and international trade agreements. In fact, each geographical 
market is supplied with different vehicles that are more suitable to the test and specific 
local characteristics of that regional market. Firms select the most appropriate vehicle 
line up to be offered to the specific market. The variety of products has to be taken into 
consideration when providing a market definition of the relevant market.
Imported vehicles are relevant elements in the characterisation of levels of 
competitiveness in the geographical markets. The current North American market 
provides a rich empirical example. American, Japanese and European brands have 
assembly-plants operating in the country, but the market also has many imports. The 
small import duty tax (6%), which enhances the competition in the internal market, is one 
of the reasons for the strong presence of imported units. On the other spectrum, the 
Brazilian market can be considered a closed market for imports. The government has set 
up rules to foster the development of the local production to the detriment of imported 
competition. In this sense, the country has one of the highest import taxes in the world 
(35%). Only new vehicles can be imported and private parties cannot complete the import 
requirements. Additionally, all independently imported vehicles must comply with local 
safety regulations which enhance the bureaucratic process. In real terms, Brazil has one
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of the most expensive vehicles in the world, where analysts calculate that the direct taxes 
for the consumer are 30% (Pinheiro, 2007).
The automotive industry can be characterised as an oligopoly with product 
differentiation, and not as a perfectly competitive market. The levels of competitiveness 
must be assessed in geographical terms as certain countries and regions have more 
suppliers operating in the market, making it more competitive. This holds important 
lessons for policy makers, and since the industry operates as an oligopoly, there are 
significant barriers to entry with each competitor in the market having a limited market 
power. It is also relevant to contextualise the analysis of the license to operate.
Economic literature has conventionally modelled the automotive market as an 
imperfectly competitive market (Goldberg, 1995). The main aim has been to classify the 
industry as an oligopoly with product differentiation (Berry et al. 1995). Krugman (1987) 
provides a significant discussion on the new developments in international trade theory, 
looking at the impacts of free trade in imperfect competition industries, which are directly 
linked to the automotive industry. For this study, the importance of the market 
characterisation of the industry is that it holds crucial lessons for implementation of 
environmental policy and assumptions that can be constructed for the sustainability of the 
industry.
Additionally, another relevant aspect of a global industry is the fact that global groups 
have a tendency to incorporate similar parameters throughout their car production plants. 
Sturgeon and Florida (1999) indicate that the modem automobile industry has 
transitioned from an old model of competition, characterised by the focus on the domestic 
market, to a global model, where the production function of the firm is organised on a 
regional and global basis. This distinction also has implications for emerging markets that 
have evolved from simple adopters of old models and production equipment to builders 
of leading-edge productive capacity. The industry has also changed from an export-lead 
industry to a networked led industry, where each major firm produces with the focus of
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supplying major markets. The prime reasons for this change in the model of competition 
are considered to have been the advent of modularisation and supplier outsourcing 
(Sturgeon and Florida, 1999).
Under this new 'global' model, high volume manufacturers can maximise investments (if 
they can spread the 'sunk costs' in the research and development of new products) in 
several operational plants around the world (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003). The ideal 
situation is for firms to offer similar models around the world. This gives the firm a larger 
flexibility to steer production from one market to another, as there is a surplus or deficit 
of a specific product. Firms like Toyota, for example, produce the same model in three 
continents -  the Toyota Corolla, has minor differences in the three markets. This strategy 
makes the firm dilute sunk cost in design and auto part production, through a larger 
number of units.
The relationship of the global and cohesive oligopolistic firm is relevant for the study of 
the pro-active role of the industry. The structure of the market in business and 
competitive terms can directly impact on the manner in which the industry can organise 
itself in order to interact with environmental regulators. This is not only in terms of 
regulatory compliance but also with regard to the direction of future regulations 
(Requate, 2005). The global size and scale of the industry therefore enhances the 
influence of new standards.
In the context of the license to operate, as previously discussed, the main business and 
economic characteristics help to shape not only the economic license but also the 
potential political pro-active strategy to influence the formation of the legal license. Thus, 
the automobile industry as an oligopoly with product differentiation has a considerable 
interest in engaging in industry-wide corporate political activity.
The political salience that the environmental dimension has gained in recent years 
indicates that the present business model of the firm is highly vulnerable to further
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regulatory measures. In this sense, it is in the interests of the industry to adopt a pro­
active role in influencing the formation of the legal license, though direct lobby and the 
social license, so influencing the public and society in general regarding active 
environmental measures to control the formation of the social license.
3.7 - The fundamental drivers for change in the automobile industry and the 
'license to operate'
Following the characteristics of the automobile industry presented in the previous section, 
the most relevant issues and the consequences of the present business model of the 
industry along with the respective influence for the licence to operate framework are 
introduced in Table 3.3.
The issues identified here are as follows: environmental and safety regulation, market 
fragmentation, design limits for general purpose all-steel cars and the capital intensity of 
production technology. These are key issues that pressure the present business model of 
the firm and have significant influence on the license to operate the automobile industry. 
According to Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2003), the present strategy of reliance on 
incremental innovations has reached certain technical limits, and the market could be 
ready to see the emergence of a disruptive environmental technology.
Following the discussion of corporate political activity, the pressures caused by 
environmental, health and safety regulation need to be accounted for. The increasing 
scope and severity of regulation has placed important constraints on the basic 
characteristics of the automobile industry: the internal combustion engine and the all- 
steel body structure. The existing technologies have also been challenged for their ability 
to deliver profitable and sustainable outcomes, so tightening the economic and social 
licenses. In the same sense, market fragmentation, with the growing market divisions,
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undermines the concept of long product life cycles and mass-production economies of 
scale and enhances the pressure on the design limits of the all-steel body structures. The 
capital intensity of the production produces high risks on the investments decision which 
results in conservative product design. The combination of these elements then enhances 
the constraints posed by the interplay of the social and economic licenses.
The drivers of change can be perceived under the license to operate framework as 
potential liabilities for the present business of the industry regarding how these areas 
constrain the environmental performance of the industry. As indicated in Table 3.3, in the 
context of the license to operate, these drivers significantly stress the formation of the 
three licenses. The economic license is therefore heavily constrained by the 
environmental and safety regulation, since incremental limits of existing technologies are 
being reached. Further strain is therefore placed on the formation of the economic license 
which is already heavily constrained. The economic license is also influenced by the 
consumer’s demands for a greater variety of products, this contrasting with the design 
limits of the all-steel body vehicles. The capital intensity of production technology has a 
dual effect. On the one side it helps with the formation of barriers to entry for new 
competitors but on the other also enhances the potential political action of industry. The 
automotive industry also has a discontinuity between the cost-reduction benefits of an 
increasingly global production and market structure against a less than uniform 
regulatory framework; national regulations still vary widely, as do national market 
conditions and requirements. The industry lobbies for cohesive regulation, but this of 
course also makes the transition process slower, and hence old technologies can be 
retained for longer.
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Table 3.3 - The fundamental drivers for change in the automobile industry
Issue Manifestation Consequences for 
the present 
business model
Influence on the license 
to operate framework
Environmental and 
safety regulation
Increasing scope and 
severity of regulation 
of the car on safety, 
toxic emissions and 
C02 emissions and 
waste
Reaches limits of 
incremental 
improvement to 
existing 
technologies
Pressures over the social, 
economic and legal 
licenses.
Market
fragmentation
Consumers demanding 
greater variety of 
products
Undermines the 
economies of 
scale; reduced 
product cycle
Pressure over the 
economic license
Design limits for 
general purpose all- 
steel cars
General purpose all- 
steel cars too heavy to 
meet C02 reduction 
targets, not ideally 
suited to the task, 
wider use of plastics -  
ELV issue
Could lead to 
dramatic change in 
dosing concepts 
and materials use, 
resulting in radical 
shift in production 
technology.
Pressure over the 
economic license and the 
social license as 
consumers may demand 
better products with 
environmental aspect.
Capital intensity of
production
technology
Capacity expanded in 
large increments at 
high cost
Results in high 
risk, hence 
conservative 
product design
Legal licenses may force 
the industry to adopt 
more advanced products. 
The economic license is 
constrained by the main 
characteristics of the 
industry.
Source: adapted from Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2002)
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3.8 - Researchable propositions
One of the gaps identified in the review of the 'greening o f industry ' literature has been 
the belief that industry, by itself, is able to find long-term profitable solutions for 
environmental issues. The intrinsic perception has been that a pro-active management 
style combined with the benchmark of success stories would be able to take the industry 
from a largely unsustainable position to a sustainable arrangement. The model of 
corporate environmental strategy presented by Orsato (2000) highlights this point, as 
firms would be able to adopt pro-active green strategies to find market gain in the 
products or services offered. They could also search for competitive modifying 
organizational processes and not introducing any changes to their products or services. 
The strategic model presented by Reinhardt (2000) also discusses the condition under 
which industry could profit from environmental regulation by perceiving opportunities to 
gain competitiveness. Regulation could, in this sense, constitute an additional source of 
information whereby firms could address environmental issues for industries that had an 
advanced perception of adopting beyond compliance behaviour. The regulatory pressures 
would, in this case, formalise pro-active industrial behaviour that had already been in the 
process of implementation (Reinhardt, 2000).
Notwithstanding this, it can be argued here that the relationships are more complex; the 
specific case of the automobile industry presents a different and more multifaceted 
picture. In the present economic state of the industry, and not coping with economic 
demands has placed additional pressure on the industry to provide solutions which are at 
the same time sustainable and profitable. Questions can also be raised as to whether the 
present direction and pace of technological development following a pattern of 
incremental innovation is sufficient. Little weight has been placed on a scenario of 
economic constraints and whether, under these conditions, the automobile industry would 
have the ability to translate an abstract willingness to change into an effective 
transformation towards sustainable development. Therefore, the 'greening of industry' 
analysis needs to consider the relevance of the market forces shaping the economic
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licence which also impact on the legal license to operate. The cases will investigate this 
proposition.
The 'licence to operate' framework also indicates another aspect that the field has not 
articulated: the interplay between the social and the economic licenses. The cases will 
also examine this proposition. According to the framework, this joint effect is relevant to 
the environmental performance of the firm in the specific case of the automobile industry. 
The combined action of the two is a crucial element of change that needs to be further 
investigated. As previously indicated, a wide range of interest groups constitute the social 
license, including local communities, national environmental groups, workers, the media, 
non-governmental organizations, academia, consumers and society in general. Social 
stakeholders can also influence the social license as well as the legal license because 
policy makers and regulators can be pressured into imposing stricter regulations.
In the case of the automobile industry, the investigation of the interaction between the 
three licenses to operate can provide an indication of how the response to environmental 
regulation may be shaped. It has been documented that the growth in environmental 
preoccupations in society in general has changed as major corporations are dealing with 
the environmental dimension within the scope of their business model (Fiorino, 2006).
Aware of the need and possibility of change, industry has become more conscious of 
potential non-market strategies and the social licence has become more important 
(Gunnigham, 2006). Shaping the social license is a industry pro-active behaviour and can 
generate private profit.
The importance of the social license has become more prominent at the same time that 
the 'greening of industry' literature has emerged. This follows the rapid expansion in the 
environmental corporate strategy field and the dissemination of environmental ideas into 
society in general. The case studies will therefore investigate if the economic and social 
licenses have become more significant along with the growth of the 'greening of
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industry' field.
3.9 - Conclusions
The analysis provided in this chapter suggests that the environmental performance of an 
industry is shaped by a socially constructed license to operate. The 'license to operate' 
framework indicates that industry must comply with the tacit expectations of social 
actors, the formal impositions of regulators and the economic constraints imposed by 
stockholders. The interpretation of these socially constructed licenses depends on the 
management style that determines the industries’ environmental performance 
(Gunningham et al., 2003, 2004; Howard-Greenville, 2005; Howard-Greenville et al. 
2007).
The framework also indicates that the licences to operate are not simply imposed on the 
industry. The industry has, at least, partial influence over some of the licence terms, 
including not only the social license but also the legal one (Elderman et al, 1999) and 
(Hoffinan, 1999). This presents important lessons for industry. The industry’s political 
activity is supported by the fact that industry has more information with regard to what is 
technically possible and to what extent the present business model of the firm can be 
extended with incremental innovation. Environmental issues have been identified as 
being of crucial political salience as the present business model of the automobile 
industry is particularly vulnerable to future environmental regulations. As a result, it is 
rational to assume that the automobile industry has a considerable interest in shaping both 
the legal and the social licenses to operate.
Since the fundamental query in this thesis is the relationship between environmental 
regulation, the technological development of the auto industry, commercial imperatives 
and wider social benefits, it is important to comprehend the central characteristics of the 
automobile industry so that linkages can be established between these variables in the
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context of the 'license to operate' framework. The contextualisation of the problem has 
provided important insights into what can potentially be developed in the 'greening of 
industry' literature. Certain characteristics give the business model of the firm a low 
profitable reality, including the reliance on the internal combustion engine and the all- 
steel-body structure, in addition to the growing pressure from environmental and safety 
regulations and the market fragmentation that has been observed in more recent years. 
These important features help to build the fundamental drivers of change and modify the 
licenses to operate. However, the industry is well positioned to actively seek to influence 
regulators and pressure the formation of the legal license. The industry has large barriers 
to entry due to high sunk-costs, and possesses few international groups that are operating 
in the market. This has important consequences for the potential pro-active political 
action over regulators and corporate political strategy. Moreover, a more detailed 
understanding of the business of the industry enriches the debate regarding the influence 
of environmental regulation, this being a key area for the development of the industry. 
This issue indicates the high political salience of the industry as the increasing scope and 
severity of environmental and safety mandates enhance the pressure over the limits of 
incremental improvement in the existing technologies, and as a consequence limit the 
social, economic and legal licenses.
The researchable propositions of this research indicate two aspects which have been 
overlooked by the 'greening of industry' body of literature. Firstly, there has been a 
systematic absence of factoring for the economic license in the discussions about 
regulation. Most of the discussion has been concerned about what is possible in relation 
to the technology and not to what is possible for the industry under a constrained 
economic state, where large sunk costs exist for the production of the internal combustion 
engine and the all- steel-body structure. Secondly, the interplay between the economic 
and social licenses may pose significant limitations for the environmental performance of 
the firm. It may therefore be more relevant for the industry to deal with the aspects of the 
license to operate, since they could drive the formation of the legal license.
The next chapter will present the methodology adopted to investigate the central 
researchable positions that have been contextualised in the automobile industry and the 
selection of case studies taken to investigate these issues.
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Chapter 4 - Methodology
4.1 - Introduction
This chapter provides a description of the methodology that has been used to conduct this 
investigation. The research design, alongside the justification for the selection of the case 
study method as the central research strategy, is discussed. The chapter also addresses the 
selection of the case studies and presents a case study protocol.
4.2 - Research Design
An open systems approach, followed in this research, has been widely applied in the 
environmental policy arena. Positivistic research that isolates variables thought directly to 
be the manifestation of cause and effect relationships is considered inappropriate for a 
case-study research project, while a more qualitative approach may be able to provide a 
wider set of assumptions more grounded in real life problems (Saunders et al., 2000). In 
this sense, the epistemological position of this research design can be classed 
conceptually in between empiricism and rationalism, following philosophical traditions 
close to Kant (1781) and Popper (1935). The intent of this thesis is to use empirical 
research to enhance understanding of the 'greening of industry' and contribute to the 
body of knowledge in this area (Bryman and Bell, 2003).
In order to illustrate the various alternatives available to a researcher Saunders et al. 
(2004) devised the ‘research onion’. This diagram, presented in figure 4.1 below, displays 
the various philosophies, approaches, strategies, choices and techniques that can be 
followed when researching social sciences. It is important to notice that there are large 
overlaps between each of these different social research strategies, despite the didactic 
separation between them.
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Figure 4.1 -  The research onion
Positivism
Realism
Deductive Philosophies
Interpretivism
Experiment
ObjectivismSurvey Approaches
Mono method
Case
studyCross-sectional Strategies
Data 
collection 
and data 
analysis
Action
researchMixedmethods
Choices
Pragmatism■rounded
theoryLongitudinal
Time
horizonsMulti-method Ethnography Functionalist
Archival research Interpretive   Techniques and
procedures
Radical
humanist
Inductive
Radical structuralist
Source: Saunders et al. (2004).
In terms of the research onion framework, the research philosophy that underpins this 
work is critical realism. The selection of critical realism is a fundamental step in the 
process of methodological arrangement, as it orientates the selection of strategies and 
research procedures. The case study method has been selected as the main research 
strategy, along with the deductive approach and the critical realist perspective. The 
critical realism allows for usual language that can be used to describe the world, and 
therefore, philosophical positions can be judged in pragmatic terms, in terms of beliefs. 
According to Easton (2010):
“Critical realism is particularly well suited as a companion to case research. It justifies
the study of any situation, regardless of the numbers of research units involved, but
only if the process involves thoughtful in depth research with the objective of
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understanding why things are as they are.” (Easton, 2010, ppl 19).
According to the critical realist tradition, important aspects of research are reflexivity and 
the dynamic nature of the world. The rationale behind the causal relationships is central 
stage. It is a dynamic way of conducting research that looks at the world and rethinks 
researchable propositions built not by a tested hypothesis per se, but as a consequence of 
the way that the approach used leans towards the deductive approach.
Following the language of critical realism, the cases have been conducted under specific 
external contingencies (Sayer, 2000)5. The use of case studies in critical realism demands 
an explanation of the cause of events; this is particularly relevant for this research as it 
aims to understand relationships. Critical realism alongside a case study strategy is 
conducted with mixed methods and cross-sectional time horizons. The next section of 
this chapter presents a more detailed examination of the case study research strategy. The 
characteristics with respect to behavioural events and their chronological dimension as 
commented by Yin (2003) are also highlighted.
Yin (2003) focuses on the importance of the central research questions, as they guide the 
selection of the most appropriate research modes. The broad-spectrum research question, 
presented and discussed in Chapter 1, is as follows:
• What is the relationship between environmental regulation and auto industry 
technological development, commercial imperatives and wider social 
benefits?
5 Critical realism distinguishes context and contingency: context is a very general concept. In the
case of critical realism the entity should focus not only be defined but to form causal relationships. 
Therefore, it is understood as contingency.
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4.3 - The case study
The case study has been selected as the central research strategy to investigate the 
appropriateness of the research propositions presented in Chapter 3. According to Easton 
(2010, pp. 119) case research can be defined as a “...a research method that involves 
investigating one or a small number of social entities or situations about which data are 
collected using multiple sources of data and developing a holistic description through an 
iterative research process.”
As the question is concerned with the relationships between environmental regulation, 
technological development, commercial imperatives and wider social benefits in the 
context of the automobile industry, operational links in time are important. According to 
Yin, case study research is more suitable when “ ...questions deal with operational links 
need to be traced over time, rather than a mere frequency or incidence.”(Yin 2003,
pp. 18).
Case study research can provide the opportunity for the researcher to disentangle a wide 
range of complex causal factors and relationships. It also provides the flexibility to adapt 
the researched issues to specific researchable propositions. Case study research strategies 
can be combined with other research strategies, such as archival analysis, to maximize 
the potential explanatory power of the research. Bryman and Bell (2003) suggest that for 
the qualitative approach, a combination of methods is the best strategy. Other authors 
such as Yin (2003) and Saunders et al. (2000) also present this as a common practice in 
qualitative research. In this respect, this study has made use of a multitude of data 
collection methods to strengthen the analysis, and maximize the research results on the 
cases selected, which has been broadly termed triangulation.
The case study method and historical analysis allow a broader understanding of the
relationships between environmental regulation, technological development, commercial
imperatives and wider social benefits in relation to the automobile industry. The case
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study is more appropriate to uncover the meaningful characteristics of ongoing events, 
while the historical approach, combined with archival analysis, seems more adequate for 
past events. History and case studies can overlap, and a combination of the two is a 
feasible arrangement. Historical studies are the preferred strategy when there is no access 
or control. The historical method, in this sense, deals with the past (Yin, 2003). The case 
study provides a richer source of evidence, as there is direct observation of the events 
being studied and the use of interviews of individuals that have been involved in the 
process (Yin, 2003). In conclusion:
“.. .the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that 
it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented and with what result.” (Yin, 2003:pp.l2).
4.4 - The case study design
The research strategy of this work has been framed under the methodological structure 
presented by Eisenhardt (1989), with elements from Bryman et al. (2003) and Saunders et 
al. (2000). The work of Saunders et al. (2000) is orientated towards business studies, 
while Bryman et al. (2003) is more generally applied to other fields of social science. 
This structure has been a fundamental part in the research process. It was designed with 
the intent of providing the necessary framework for robust research with internal and 
external validity (Ghauri et al., 1995).
The methodological approach taken in this research has followed a four-step process. The 
steps have been defined as: the initial phase, the case studies (which include historical 
analysis and case study), the data analysis and the conclusion (Eisenhardt, 1989).
86
4.5 - The methodological tools
The case study combined with historical analysis is the core methodological tool used in 
this research. Understanding the different types of licenses and how they were shaped in 
each of the selected cases, along with the outcomes, is necessary to answer the central 
research questions and to draw trends for future research in the field. Having the ability to 
identify operational links over time is crucial. Therefore, the case studies together with 
historical analysis constitute the best method to understand these relations (Yin, 2003).
Cases with historical analysis are the preferred method to examine contemporary and past 
events such as the effects of legislation. A case study often involves data collection 
through a multitude of information sources, which include: documents, objects, 
interviews and observations (Yin, 2003; Ghauri et al., 1995). This research strategy was 
built around flexible data collection methods that enrich each single case study. In order 
to construct validity, the internal validity is crucial for this research, as it will be 
concerned with the causal relationship between events. The actual data collection 
methods have varied across the three case studies, as the intent was to find the most 
relevant information related to each one of the cases.
Fuchs and Mazmanian (1998) categorise the studies on the ‘Greening of Industry’ under 
the following general themes:
-  Determinants of greening;
-  Technology as a driving force behind greening;
-  Cooperation, product changes as a method to achieve greening;
-  Greening in specific industrial sectors;
-  Greening programmes, and their impact on economics; and
-  Financial performance.
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Of these selected themes the greening in specific industrial sectors is most relevant for 
this work, as the Automobile industry was one of the first key industrial sectors studied 
because of its economic importance and large environmental externalities. Fuchs and 
Mazmanian (1998) point to three major works identified at the time of their review: 
Geffen and Rothenberg (1997), Maxwell et al, (1997) and Orsato et al. (2002) that 
discuss the incorporation of greening ideas in the automobile industry. Other important 
developments in this area are discussed in Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2006). This thesis has 
the intent to aid the discussion of greening in the automobile industry in the context of the 
license to operate.
However, Gladwin (1993) has criticised the available research on the ‘greening of the 
industry’ pointing out the inconsistent methodological structures in most studies and 
consequent lack of robust findings. The greening of the industry perspective has also 
suffered from an implicitly optimistic view that firms will naturally evolve to a beyond- 
compliance state where proactive environmental measures are part of an evolved business 
model adopted by the firm.
The over-selection of successful case studies in the initial development of the field has 
not yet been overcome. The sampling of successful case studies is still a problem that 
needs to taken into account. This optimistic weighting of the field needs to be 
counterbalanced with empirical evidence that is based not only on the most successful 
cases of proactive firms but on general trends in specific industries. This has been 
indicated by Press (2007) who advocates that research based on empirical studies take a 
look at the industry as a whole instead of selected firms. Fuchs and Mazmanian (1998) 
also indicate the need for wider sector-specific research in the field. The present study 
aims to help in filling this gap, providing an empirical investigation that takes a look at 
the entire industry.
Another criticism of the “greening of industry” body of literature is that it tends to lack 
longer observational periods where the short and long terms of certain policies are
already known (Press, 2007). Most of the work initially conducted focused on the 
willingness of managers to tackle narrowly defined environmental issues, generally end- 
of-pipe issues, which could be solved with creative thinking and diverse sorts of 
technological arrangement. However the field could benefit from a more complete 
analysis that understands how regulatory policy has been able (or not) to influence the 
process of greening, focusing not only on environmental impact but also on the business 
implications for firms operating in this market. This research also addresses these issues, 
as the long observation is necessary as the primary and secondary effects are highlighted. 
It is worth noting the ex-post analysis has only been possible recently (Press, 2007).
Fuchs and Mazmanian (1998) whilst providing the research necessities for the 
development of the field indicate the literature on the economic consequences of 
environmental regulation requires further development. They argue that further 
systematic empirical evidence is needed to support arguments on environmental 
regulation and economic growth. Their analysis also highlights the failure to differentiate 
the types of growth of greening, and the factors that would lead a firm to take up 
greening. In this respect, they indicate the path that should be followed by the research 
agenda in the field; their understanding is that new research should focus on variables 
that have been undervalued, including political influence and cooperation between 
regulators and industry.
The next section shows the development of the field in regards to the effects of 
environmental policy on industry behaviour. Initially the first range of studies of the 
'greening of industry' coupled economic with environmental development. The following 
research presents a more detailed and nuanced version of the debate that emerged in this 
area and the most up-to-date discussions available in relevant literature.
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4.5.1 - The selection of cases
A fundamental step in the process of building theory refers to the selection of cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The intent of theoretical sampling is to opt for cases that have the 
potential to provide further theoretical understandings, which would contribute to the 
external validity of the research (Yin, 2003). The selected cases are not intended to 
provide a replication of observational data, as in statistical simplifying, but to give a 
sense of the diversity of regulation in the context of the automobile industry. The 
selection process of the cases has followed the preoccupations underlying this research.
The cases that have been selected constitute significant stepping-stones in the social- 
environmental regulation of the automotive industry. Their selection follows the rationale 
that these categories could be extended to a broad range of industries that have been 
subjected to similar social legislation. Eisenhardt (1989), following a positivistic 
tradition, suggests that there should be between 4 and 10 case studies to provide 
meaningful and convincing empirical data to generalize into theoretical development, 
which is a crucial element of closure success. However, other authors point out that there 
should not be a limit on the number of cases to be included in a study (Ghauri et al., 
1995). Another important element is the trade-off between depth and the generalisability 
of the research analysis, taking into account temporal and structural limitations. As such 
this research has accommodated the need to reconcile depth with generalisability by 
selecting three major cases.
The focus of this research is on social regulation that has environmental implications. 
This broad definition of regulation is relevant when discussing historical regulation 
development as the terminology and discourse can be modified with changes in political 
salience of issues. The environmental preoccupation is nowadays a very important issue 
especially in developed nations. This research is concerned with regulation that has 
significant positive environmental impacts, even if the regulators at the time of were not 
focusing exclusively on the environment. The wider definition of environmental
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regulation is important as regulatory measures that have been established in the past to 
deal with certain issues could be nowadays used to deal with environmental issues. A 
number of regulatory instruments, including regulation, have been initially established 
with other preoccupations aside from the environment. The taxation on petrol for instance 
was initially established as an economic instrument and nowadays could be defined as an 
environmental tax to reduce the aggregate demand of climate change emitting gases. The 
criteria for case study selection has been designed to limit the choice of cases:
1- Regulation must deal with a significant environmental impact generated by the 
automobile industry. The 'greening of industry' is concerned with efforts by 
industry to deal with wider sustainability concerns and the generation of negative 
environmental externalities by industry in general;
2- Ex-post implementation is also relevant to understand the impact of the legal 
license in the context of the 'license to operate 'framework. In this sense, the 
cases must refer to regulation that has already been implemented so that the 
social, legal and economic licenses related to the implementation of the license 
can be identified. Ex-ante or ongoing policy implementations such as the 
European C02 agreement would not respect this criterion and hence would suffer 
from the problems presented by Press (2007);
3- Policies must have required a novel response from the industry in terms of 
significant technological development. Technology development is a central element 
in the research question as it has significant impacts on the economic license to 
operate of the firm. In this respect, there will be identified novel issties dealt with by 
regulators. The case should be the first time that the industry faced the issue under 
those circumstances, so generally regulations that were internationally new constitute 
the central focus. The technological solution adopted also provided positive effects 
for other markets.
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4 -The regulation needs to be officially established by a legal license and automakers 
must be forced to comply with the regulation. As a result voluntary agreements are 
not considered.
5 - The technological advancement concerned is relevant to a more sustainable future 
for the automobile industry. The criteria for sustainability are taken from the concept 
of greening of industry, where every effort incorporated by firms is accounted for.
The following potential cases have been considered:
- Current CO2 European emissions regulations;
- Brazilian biodiesel program;
- United States Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations;
- The European New Car Assessment Programme (EuroNCAP);
- The United Nations Commission for Europe (UNECE) Vehicle Regulations;
- The United States Clean Air Act;
- Early California air emissions regulations;
- The United States ZEV mandate;
- Brazilian ethanol program;
- European Union End-of-Life Vehicle Directive.
Out of these, three that best fit the specific criteria presented in the previous section have 
been selected:
1. California air emissions regulations (including the early California Emissions 
regulations and the ZEV mandate);
2. Brazil ethanol program - PROALCOOL;
3. European Union End-of-life Vehicle Directive.
4.6 - The case study protocol
A case study protocol has been devised to provide a better fit for the case study and the 
proposed theoretical contribution to the 'greening of industry' body of knowledge, as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3; it also enhances the comparability of the case studies and 
facilitate their combination. In this respect, the case study protocol serves as a device to 
enhance the reliability of multi-case study research. Following Yin (2003), the case study 
protocol should have the following sections:
• Overview of the case study project: outlining central issues in the case study.
• Field procedures: how the research will be conducted.
• Case study questions: specific questions that the researcher must keep in mind, 
providing table shells for specific arrays of data and the identification of the 
potential sources of information.
• A guide for the case study report: a proposed outline of the case study.
• The next sections of the chapter follow this division of case study protocol.
4.6.1 - Overview of the case study project
The first case study selected is the State of California air quality emissions regulations. 
The idea was to analyze the historical process of regulation from , the pioneering 
regulations of the 1950s to the present day in order to gain an understanding of the 
evolution of these sets of rules. The initial group of mandates was strict command-and- 
control laws that forced the industry to take environmental-related measures that directly 
affected the way vehicles were designed. Another important measure that was established 
was the ZEV mandate that required the increase in Zero-Emission Vehicles (ZEVs) to be
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offered by automobile manufacturers in the State of California. The mandate was 
eventually reviewed but it constituted an important signal to the industry of what sort of 
products would ideally suit future regulation. This case also provides very rich material in 
illustrating the dispute between the seven big automakers operating in California and the 
regulatory body -  the California Air Resources Board. The emissions standards pioneered 
in California during this case became the basis for similar legal regulatory mandates in 
the United Sates and the rest of the world.
The second case study selected is the Brazilian programme to foster the use of ethanol -  
the Proalcool. In 1978, after the second world oil embargo, the Brazilian government 
decided to explicitly foster the use of sugar-derived ethanol fuel (ethyl alcohol) as a 
substitute for imported oil. Sugarcane-derived ethanol had always been produced in 
Brazil as a secondary product from the sugar industry. As Brazil had been the world’s 
largest producer of sugar for centuries it had a large supply of this by-product. In 
technical terms, the ethanol programme displayed an incremental innovation from the 
petrol-fuelled internal combustion engine. The impact on the emerging automotive 
industry in Brazil was important both from a market and technological point of view. The 
Brazilian market had been closed to imports as the government tried to encourage the 
establishment of the automotive industry in the country by substituting imported vehicles 
with locally produced ones. This was part of a larger strategy to industrialize the country. 
The automakers were faced with the difficult task of developing ethanol-only vehicles 
based on petrol-fuelled internal combustion engines. In theory, not much had to be 
changed in the engines, aside from the nylon derived fuel lines. However, in practical 
terms, the first experiments with E l00 (100% ethanol) proved to be problematic in terms
v .  '
of cold start, vehicle performance levels and component maintenance. These new market 
conditions were important factors in the emergence of a new product that provided 
significant market shares for the first movers that were able to gain a competitive 
advantage.
The Proalcool -  the Brazilian national programme to establish the use of ethanol is not
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per se an environmental regulation6. It was part of a larger strategy aimed at tackling a 
series of issues simultaneously by encouraging the use of a locally produced crop instead 
of imported petrol. However, for the research purposes of this study, the program will be 
looked as a technology-inducing mandate that focused on the adoption of an alternative 
locally produced fuel in contrast to the traditional imported petrol fuel. The social 
regulatory nature of the program is important, especially in regard to the policy 
instruments utilized. Moreover, the environmental impacts of the use of ethanol were 
significant and very positive for the populated cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro that 
had historically suffered the effects of automotive emissions. The Brazilian experiment 
also provided important insights for the debate that emerged in the 2000s, in Europe and 
the United States, around the use of ethanol as an environmentally friendly fuel.
The last case that will be analyzed in this research is the European Union End-of-Life 
Vehicle directive. This piece of legislation is not only novel in its focus on the last part of 
a vehicles’ life cycle but is also fundamentally innovative in the way it has introduced the 
‘producers extended responsibility principle’ to the automotive industry. According to the 
European mandate, vehicle manufacturers are legally and financially liable for vehicles 
till the end of their lives. As a result free collection and treatment of the vehicles must be 
offered to the last owner. The ELV directive also provides important elements for the 
incorporation of sustainable development concepts into its policy making. This holistic 
perspective found in the EU ELV directive expands the relationship between firms and 
consumers beyond sales and delivery and incorporates into the cost function of firms the 
final destination of the product once it is no longer usable by the consumer.
The ELV directive has a wider preoccupation with material use that incorporates more 
complex thinking around the relationship between industry and the environment. It can 
still be argued that the final preoccupation is with human health; however the reasoning 
behind the legislation derives from a deeper environmentalist rationale. The ELV
- One aspect o f the ZEV mandate was also not environmental. The idea would be to out 
competition the Japanese competition as they seemed to be behind in terms of EV technology.
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regulation has the potential to incorporate in the regulatory system a deeper 
understanding of sustainability. The mandate impacts directly the design and production 
stages, as the vehicles need to be appropriately dismantled and treated in the ELV phase. 
The implications for automakers are profound, as they have to control the materials used 
and how the vehicles are assembled.
The cases are in this respect complementary, as they are able to provide a historical 
account of the evolution of the regulatory process for a specific industry and for the 
stakeholders involved in the process. Additionally, the case studies are illustrative of the 
flexibility of regulation, especially how environmental regulations can be adopted 
differently in specific political and local environments. They are also representative of 
three different regions of the world at continuous time frames where the use of the 
automobile has constituted an environmental and socially relevant issue. In all cases a set 
of regulations has been applied to correct what regulators and society perceived as market 
failures at that time.
From the business point of view, this is a very important issue. The global market for 
automobiles is run by multinational firms who tailor their products to specific regional 
markets (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003). The selection of vehicles offered in every 
national market diverges depending on several variables including: the regulatory regime, 
international trade agreements, taxation issues, consumer tastes, road settings, climate 
conditions, prices, types of fuels and local cultural aspects (Williams et al., 1994). Global 
companies with factories distributed in a wide variety of regions are able to select which 
is the most appropriate and potentially profitable group of cars for each local market. The 
vehicles offered vary according to size, engine, options and body colours. There is a 
considerable difference between vehicles in Europe, United States and Latin America, 
which are the key markets for this research. American cars are generally larger with more 
powerful engines, automatic transmission and softer suspension systems, which are 
perceived by the American public to be more adequate for the characteristics of 
American roads and traffic. European cars, on the contrary, are generally smaller and
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more agile; and are more likely to be diesel, and carry manual transmission. These are 
more suitable for European cities with narrower roads and limited parking space. In Latin 
America, vehicles are generally an older generation of those offered in Europe. However, 
several firms have designed and produced specific models that are sold only in the 
region, such as the Volkswagen Gol, which for several years has been one of the top 
selling vehicles in South America (Anfavea, 2007).
Figure 4.2 -  Case Studies Selected
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Figure 4.2 presents a schematic view of the case studies selected and their principal 
focus. These three regulatory mandates are all concerned with the different environmental 
effects of the automobile. Despite the fact that they originated in different parts of the 
world, there is a tendency for countries to benchmark successful regulatory experiments 
and incorporate foreign achievements in their own environmental regulatory systems. 
The historical notion that can be gained from the analysis of these regulations is 
important from a strategic point of view for regulators and the industry. For regulators, 
each different piece of legislation is put together to tackle a market failure that can 
presumably be corrected. Regulators can reference the most advanced legislation in  order
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to learn from past experience. For the multinational firms, this issue seems most relevant 
as firms that have successfully thrived in one market could influence regulators to adopt 
similar regulations in other parts of the world. Also, ideally firms may search for similar 
standards, which could provide economic and competitive advantages in market 
fluctuations and sunk cost distribution related to design, development and machinery.
The historical development of the selected cases also reflects the broader sustainable 
development concerns regarding the environmental impact of the automobile. It is a 
reflection of the change in environmental policy making that started with basic end-of- 
pipe measures, based on simple command-and-control measures and evolved towards a 
larger systems perspective (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998).
A historical perspective on the development of automobile regulation can be gathered 
from the case studies selected. The development from the early command-and-control 
measures established in California, USA to the broader environmental preoccupations 
that look into a wider life cycle perspective of the product, such as the European end-of- 
life vehicle directive, are an important element of this research. On the left side of Figure 
4.2 the central concerns of these regulations are presented; these have evolved from direct 
human health preoccupations to wider sustainability concerns that include concern for 
human health, energy use, toxic emissions and material use.
4.6.2 - Field procedures
The data collection strategy has been developed to facilitate a response to the central 
research question. The theoretical and practical features of each of the selected methods 
are presented along with a brief statement on the rationale behind the choice, along with 
the strengths and weaknesses of each one of them (Bailey, 1994). Aside from the critical 
literature on the greening of industry, a collection of data relating to each one of the case 
studies was carried out.
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Marshall and Rossman (1989) point out a vast list of potential information sources for the 
case study which include amongst others: documents, interviews, direct observations, 
participant-observations, physical objects, films, photographs, videotapes, histories and 
others. Table 4.1 presents the summary of Yin’s (2003) suggestions on data collection 
instruments.
Table 4.1 - Six sources of evidence: strengths and weaknesses
Source of 
evidence
Strengths Weaknesses
Documentation Stable, unobtrusive, exact.
Can provide broad coverage, span long 
periods o f time, many events, and many 
settings.
Issues with retrievability; open 
to reporting bias.
Archival records Same as documentation. 
Precise and quantitative.
Same as documentation.
Issues with accessibility due to 
privacy reasons.
Interviews Focuses directly on case study topic. 
Insightful, provides perceived causal 
influences.
Response bias.
Inaccuracies due to poor recall. 
Reflexivity, interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants to hear.
Direct
observations
Reality, covers events in real time, 
contextual, covers context of event.
Time consuming.
Selective, reflexivity, costly.
Participant
Observations
Same as direct observations.
Can provide insight into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives.
Same as direct observations.
Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events.
Physical
Artefacts
Can provide insight into cultural 
features and technical operations.
Selective, and issues around 
availability.
Source: Yin (2003).
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The data collection strategy has been divided into three parts following the separation 
that was prepared in each of the selected case studies. Table 4.2 presents a summary of 
the cases and the major instruments and protocols that were used in each of the cases. 
The first case study conducted was the EU End-of-Live Vehicle Directive. The data 
collection for this case began in January 2005, with a visit to a recently established ELV 
facility in the Basque Country, Spain. The purpose was to gain a broader understanding 
of the functionality of the end-of-life vehicle sector. Therefore, using personal contacts, 
an open -ended interview with the facility manager was conducted. The firm called Car 
Recycling S.A. is the second largest ELV facility in Spain and, according to the 
managers, was at the time the most efficient one in terms of dismantling speed. This first 
visit was important to understand the mechanics of car recycling, including the process of 
dismantling, decontamination and shredding. Since this was a recently established facility 
several issues regarding the system were still being discussed with local governments and 
the automakers.
Table 4.2 -  The data collection strategy
Data collection strategy
Case 1 -  the EU ELV directive ELV facilities (Spain)
Ford/ Cartakeback.
EU Government
Key Stakeholders: European government, 
automakers and recyclers
Case 2 -  The Brazilian Ethanol 
Program
Visit to Ethanol Facility (Ethanol process) 
Brazilian Government 
Ethanol Producers
Key stakeholders: Central government and 
ethanol producers, automakers
Case 3 -  the CA Emissions 
Regulations
CAL EPA 
UC Davis ITS
Key stakeholders: Automakers and CAL EPA.
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After this prospective visit to an important ELV facility, the rest of the research in this 
case was conducted in the United Kingdom. A strategy was formulated following an 
interview with the ELV European Manager of Ford Motor Company and the company 
that had been contracted to take care of the Ford ELVs in this country -  Cartakeback. 
This firm is of particular interest to the research as it signed an agreement with Ford 
Motor Company to collect and treat Ford brand vehicles in the United Kingdom, which 
included Ford, Volvo, Mazda, Land Rover, Jaguar and Aston Martin. Ford Motor 
Company is one of the most important vehicle manufacturers in the UK market. Another 
important point that could be observed during the visits is the similarity between the 
issues that seemed relevant for the recyclers in Spain and Britain. Interviews with 
managers at the Ford Motor Company and Nissan Europe were also conducted. In order 
to gain a further understanding of the regulatory process behind the formation of the 
European legislation in this area, interviews were also conducted with European officials 
that were involved in the creation of the ELV law.
The second case study is the Brazilian experience with ethanol. A visit to Brazil was 
undertaken with the intent to collect data for this case study. Using a personal contact in 
the Brazilian government, interviews were scheduled with technicians and policy makers 
that were able to provide an in depth and authoritative analysis of the development of 
ethanol fuel in the country. A prospective visit was also scheduled to a Petrobras biofuels 
refinery in the state of Bahia, Brazil in order to understand the process of refining the 
fuel. Open-ended interviews with policy makers were conducted in Brasilia, where the 
central government of Brazil is located.
The third case study was carried out in 2007 at the Institute of Transportation Studies 
(ITS) at the University of California, Davis. During this time, information was gathered 
with UC Davis and UC Berkeley academic and research staff. At the ITS, open-ended 
interviews were conducted with professors and researchers that had conducted 
consultancy work for the California government on air emissions regulation and those
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who had significant publications in the area. The Director of the ITS, Professor Daniel 
Sperling, was the main contact, and provided valuable information on the relationships 
between policy makers and the automobile industry. He is presently a member of the 
California Air Resources Board. Other important sources of data included the California 
Environmental Protection Agency in Sacramento and the archival records of the 
California Air Resources Board.
4.6.2.1 - Open-ended Interviews
One of the tools used in each case study has been the open-ended interview. Specialists, 
industry representatives, governmental representatives, academics and other stakeholders 
have been targeted. After key individuals had been selected they were invited to take part 
in the research. A short list of specific questions was tailored to each case study and a 
pre-structured questionnaire was used to foster discussion of the specific topic. However, 
the interviewees were prompted to provide further information or add new aspects they 
felt were important for the research. In this sense, the interviews provided understanding 
from the perspective of that stakeholder and how they are able to comprehend the process 
in which they have expertise (Saunders et al., 2000).
The research has not been mainly concerned with the epistemological position of the 
interviewee - that is the analysis of the use of language and construction of discourse. It is 
relevant to note how environmental language or jargon has been incorporated into the 
vocabulary. The ontological position, in this sense, is more important to comprehend the 
understanding and interpretation that the interviewees make of environmental regulation.
It is important to be aware of the limitations of the semi-structured interview method. The 
characteristics of the interviewer has an impact on the responses of the interviewee. Also, 
the response sets play a very important role in the interviews especially in regard to the 
social desirability effect of each one of the stakeholders involved. For instance, managers
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may portray their company as environmentally responsible and investing in cutting-edge 
pollution prevention and recyclables, which could seriously affect the validity of the 
responses. Therefore, it is important to be aware of this fact while analyzing and 
crosschecking the information (Bryman et al., 2003).
The list of interviews is displayed in the appendix tables at the end of the thesis. The 
intent was to cover a range of stakeholders. An important aspect regarding the research 
ethics of the interview process has been the privacy of the subjects interviewed. The 
principle of informed consent was respected. Guarantees of confidentiality and 
anonymity have been offered (Frey and Oishi, 1995). However, some of the respondents 
have waived this privilege and agreed to have their names displayed for the academic 
purposes of this study.
4.6.2.2 - Quantitative data
In order to gain further understanding of the processes taking place in each case study, 
quantitative data will be utilized. Quantitative data can function as an additional source of 
data to enhance the information provided by the qualitative analysis (Saunders et al., 
2000). Industry data, car fleet data, environmental quality data will be collected in order 
to give a more detailed picture. Despite the fact that it constitutes a challenge to collect 
new data from past events, the intent was to search for records and information available 
in environmental agencies, government records, automotive associations and libraries in 
general.
4.6.2.3 - Document analysis
The analysis of documents is a fundamental factor for a researcher utilizing a historical 
approach to business research. Since two of the selected case studies took place in the
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1960s and mid 1970s finding individuals that took part in the implementation of these 
regulations was not possible. The initial discussions regarding Californian air quality 
emissions are somewhat conserved in the Air Resources Board Library, in the California 
Environmental Protection Agency in Sacramento, CA. Library archives have been used 
as well as some of the documents of the time that described the smog problem in the Los 
Angeles Metropolitan Area and the initial response from the authorities. The library also 
has the records of the Air Resources Boards Meetings and the regulatory events that led 
to the constitution of the air quality emissions regulations. The most relevant documents 
have been recently available on line: www.arb.gov.ca/librarv/. Other important sources of 
documents for the research were the Transportation libraries of the University of 
California, Davis and the University of California, Berkeley. Since this issue has caused 
tremendous impact on local research on the air quality standards.
With regard to the Brazilian ethanol case, several libraries in Brazil were consulted: the 
University of Brasilia Library, the Livraria do Congresso, Biblioteca do UniCeuB, and 
IPEA library. Some of the earliest documents that talked about the use of ethanol for 
vehicles were uncovered along with the initial studies proposed by the commission that 
originally suggested the plan to subsidize the fuel on a large scale. These documents have 
been taken from the ANFAVEA Association, which is the Brazilian association of 
automotive producers. The ELV directive case study has mainly been researched using 
material available online and from the Cardiff University library on European sources, 
which has a wide variety of materials regarding environmental policy in the European 
Union.
4.6.2.4 - Validity and reliability
Following Yin’s (2003) work, business management research can make use of four kinds 
of validity tests: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.
These tests are presented in Table 4.3 that presents the case study tactics of the design
/
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tests.
Construct validity refers to the response to the initial questions presented in the thesis. 
This type of comparison has been popularized by the explanation if what has been 
measured was actually what was initially intended in the beginning of the research (Collis 
and Hussey 2003). The research questions displayed in Chapter 1 are at centre stage in 
this research methodology and the theoretical development proposed in this study seeks 
to find plausible answers to them. Some authors describe this as being ‘face validity’ 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003) others as internal validity (Bryman and Bell, 2003), yet others 
as measurement validity (Saunders et al., 2000).
Table 4.3 - Case study Tactics for four Design Tests
Tests Case study Tactic Phase of research it will 
occur
Construct validity Use of multiple sources of 
evidence
Establish chain of evidence 
Have key informants review draft 
of the case study report
Data collection 
Composition
Internal validity Do pattern -matching 
Do explanation building 
Address rival explanations 
Use logic ipodels
Data analysis
External validity Use replication logic for multiple- 
case studies
Research design
Reliability Use case study protocol 
Develop case study database.
Data collection
Source: Yin (2003).
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Bryman and Bell (2003) point out that the internal validity of a piece of research can be 
verified by the explanatory power of the dependent variable regarding the exogenous 
variables. The internal validity refers to answering the initial questions with the data that 
has been collected and treated. External validity is also a crucial element in business 
research since the investigation will be applied to other contexts and situations. In this 
respect, this research has been tailored to analyze the historical evolution of 
environmental policy design and implementation applied to the automotive industry. The 
conclusions have a much broader application to other regulations applied to specific 
industries and generalize the implementation and design of environmental regulations to 
other industry. Reliability ensures that the steps undertaken in this thesis could be 
potentially replicated by other researchers, following the same research strategy. 
Reliability, in this sense, minimizes mistakes and personal bias that could have been 
inflicted in the research collection processes and analysis by the researcher.
4.6.3 - Case study questions
The following questions have been used to guide each one of the cases:
- How important is the legal license to steer the industry towards sustainability?
- What have been the social and political factors that have led to the implementation 
of this policy measure?
- What technology was necessary to be applied to achieve technical advancement?
- How has the economic license been affected by the implementation of the legal 
license?
4.6.4 - Case study report guide
As part of the discussion of the relationship between environmental regulation, auto 
industry technological development, commercial imperatives and wider social benefits, in 
the context of the license to operate framework, it is important to contextualize the 
formation of the legal license. In the context of the 'license to operate', the formation of
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the legal license is directly influenced by the social license and, in certain cases, may be 
influenced by changes in the economic license. In this sense, it is argued that it is 
important to clearly define the terms of each ‘licence to operate’ that the industry has 
faced in the implementation of a specific environmental policy. Therefore, the historical 
background is crucial to give a rich contingency.
• Relevance of the selected legal license:
• The legal license: the investigation of the legal license in itself is also important 
and the legal aspects that have been established may impact on the relationship 
between environmental regulation, automobile industry technological 
development, commercial imperatives and wider social benefits.
• The economic license: elements that have influenced the behaviour of industry 
towards the implementation of the regulatory mandate, including relevant aspects 
related to costs of research and development and impacts on the business model 
of the firm.
• Social license: aspects that have influenced regulators to establish regulation are 
significant. The main stakeholders will be identified, along side their position in 
relation to the implementation of the legal license. It is expected that different 
cases will have diverse stakeholders as the central ones in the discussion.
• The effects of legal license: the effects of the legal license are important to 
understand how corporate environmental performance has been modified by the 
changes in the legal license to operate. The effects of the legal license can take the 
form of social, environmental, economic or innovation effects.
4.7 - Conclusion
This chapter has presented the methodological approach that was used in this research. It 
points out how a combination of data collection methods was selected as the most 
appropriate strategy to gather information regarding the relationship between corporate
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firm strategy and environmental regulation. It also justifies the use of case studies, within 
the framework of critical realism. The selected cases- to be discussed in the following 
chapters- have been the California emissions regulations, the Brazilian experience with 
the ethanol industry and the European Union legislation on end-of-life vehicles.
This research has the intent to understand more fully the relationships between 
environmental regulation, auto industry technological development, commercial 
imperatives and wider social benefits. As a result automotive environmental regulation is 
the focal point of the research and has been identified as the central element and unit of 
analysis.
The four underlying principles of good social research have been respected. Firstly, the 
analysis during the case study conduction has tried to gather as information in the 
selected cases. Secondly, the analysis has taken into consideration alternative approaches. 
Thirdly, the research looks at the most significant aspect of the cases selected and uses 
that information to feed into the theoretical testing process. The multiple case studies will 
have to show relevant information for the most relevant issue. In this sense, keeping the 
focus on the main important issues is fundamental to avoid going into less important 
aspects of the research (Yin, 2003). Fourthly, and most importantly, expert knowledge 
has been used to design and implement the case research methodology presented in this 
study. Awareness of the most up-to-date theories and the intent to build bridges between 
different social disciplines to create a holistic and encompassing multidisciplinary study 
has been used. Therefore, previous knowledge regarding the structure and the mechanics 
of the design and implementation of environmental policy has been very important. 
Additionally, the peculiar characteristics of the automotive industry and the product itself 
have also been relevant for this research.
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Chapter 5 - US Emissions
5.1 - Introduction
This chapter provides a historical account of the emissions regulations in the United 
States. Two major legal licenses are discussed: the initial air emissions regulations in 
California from 1950 to 1990 and the Zero Emissions Vehicles (ZEV) mandate. Both 
were pioneering regulations at the time that forced the adoption of novel technologies for 
the automobile industry and hold relevant lessons for the discussion provided in this 
work. The chapter follows the basic structure of the case study report as presented in the 
methodology; it is also divided in two major parts which refer to of the regulatory 
periods. The first one has a larger time frame and refers to several legal regulations 
imposed on the industry; it will also be analysed under a single license to operate for the 
period. The second part of the chapter discusses the ZEV mandate and the implications of 
this regulatory mandate in the context of the license to operate framework. The chapter 
finishes with implications for the central research question and the development of the 
'greening of industry' body of knowledge.
5.2 - The relevance of this case study
The California approach to dealing with air emissions from motor vehicles is central to 
this research. California was the birthplace of air emissions regulations due to a 
combination of geographical characteristics, rapid motorisation and the enormous interest 
of the public authorities in solving the significant pollution episodes observed in the 
region (Grant, 1995). It was also the first place where motorisation started to be 
questioned on environmental grounds (Brilliant, 1989). The large metropolitan areas of 
Los Angeles and San Francisco have historically suffered greatly with smog problems,
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and this is still a current environmental concern in the state because of its health 
implications (Brunekreef and Holgate, 2002). However, the modem air emissions 
problem has been improved with wider sustainability concerns being aligned with local 
air pollution strategies (Steiner et al., 2006). Figure 5.1 portrays the automobile 
environmental externalities directly addressed by the literature. The California emissions 
regulations have focused on local and regional air emissions from vehicles, including 
exhaust pipe and other emission sources, and some of the regulations that addressed more 
advanced engine management systems also had a significant impact on noise.
Figure 5.1 - Automobile externalities tackled by the Emission Regulation in California.
Air Po l lu t ion
A u to m o b ile
Externalities
Source: Adapted from Delucchi (2003).
The pioneering action taken by Californian regulators has had important consequences 
for automobile firms and regulators from the United States and other countries. The 
original set o f measures implemented in the state constitutes the foundation of automobile 
environmental regulation since the 1940s as it was benchmarked by not only American 
federal regulators but also by other countries. This leading role continues to the present 
day with the ZEV regulation and the low-carbon fuel standards (Farrell and Sperling, 
2007). Voguel (1997) named this phenomenon of importing higher environmental quality 
standards and specific regulatory measures the 'California effect'.
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The regulatory model adopted in California is also illustrative of the government’s role in 
dealing with negative environmental externalities from motor vehicles, having an 
important effect on both firms and consumers. Aside from the environmental leadership 
locus, California also constitutes a significant market for automobile firms operating in 
the United States. The combination of advanced environmental requirements, economy 
size and highly demanding consumer preferences has made the state the testing ground 
for product development and consumer acceptance of new products (Professor Daniel 
Sperling, personal communication, 24 March, 2007). In more recent years, environmental 
awareness has also become an important factor shaping consumer demand, as this 
behaviour may stimulate a significant spill-over to other markets (Heffner et al., 2007).
5.3 - The legal license to operate in California (1950 -1990)
In 1947, the Air Pollution Control Act was established authorising the creation of an Air 
Pollution Control District in every county of the state (Grant, 1995). This was based on 
the Los Angeles’ Bureau of Smoke Control that had been established two years earlier by 
the Health Department. After the first smoke attack, initial assessments indicated that the 
source was a large Butadiene plant. The Air Districts tackled the smog problem by using 
measures to limit the sources of large visible air emissions. The main targets were the 
petrochemical refineries, coal power plants and the burning of waste. Following this, less 
visible sources were targeted, including paint shops, gasoline stations, boilers and 
incinerators (California Air Resources Board, 2008a).
Despite these measures, the smog problem persisted and the automobile became the next 
target of regulation. In 1950, the first legal license directly aimed at the automobile 
industry was established. Rule 50A was introduced which limited smoke based on the
111
Ringelmann System7 and in 1959 pollution was legally typified as a health hazard 
(Killion and Ferrier, 2004). California’s Department of Public Health was able to institute 
acceptable air quality levels for humans and in the following year, the Motor Vehicle 
Pollution Control Board was established, with the objective of establishing air emissions 
standards for automobiles (Krier and Ursin, 1977).
The legal license became tighter with the implementation of the Positive Crankcase 
Ventilation8 requirement of 1961 that came into effect on domestic passenger vehicles for 
sale in the state (Killion and Ferrier, 2004). The first automotive emissions control 
technology in the nation, Positive Crankcase Ventilation9, was brought in by mandate by 
the California Motor Vehicle State Bureau of Air Sanitation to control hydrocarbon 
crankcase emissions. This was established for domestic vehicles sold in California in 
1963 (California Air Resources Board, 2008a). In 1964, the Chrysler exhaust control 
system was approved by the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board and four other 
independent companies also received approval. On the federal level, the 1963 Clean Air 
Act provided enforcement power over interstate pollution (California Air Resources 
Board, 2008b).
In 1966, tailpipe exhaust emission standards for Hydrocarbons - HC and Carbon 
Monoxide - CO were adopted by the California Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board 
and exhaust control devices on all new cars were required. A year later, the California 
Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board and the Bureau of Air Sanitation and its 
Laboratory were merged, creating the California Air Resources Board - CARB. Professor 
A. J. Haagen-Smit, after his pioneering academic work on air emissions (Haagen-Smit, 
1950; Haagen-Smit et al. 1952a, 1952b), was appointed Chairman of this Board by
7
- The Ringelmann system was developed by the French Professor Maximilian Ringelmann. It consists of a scheme where 
shades of grey are presented in five phases that can be reproduced by means of a rectangular grill of black lines o f definite width and 
spacing on a white background (US Bureau o f Mines, 1967).
8 - Positive Crankcase Ventilation : relates to a means for ventilating the crankcase of an internal combustion engine, and
more particularly, to a system connected between the crankcase and inlet manifold of an internal combustion engine whereby fumes 
and vapors within the crankcase are drawn into the system, filtered by the system, drawn into the inlet manifold and ultimately passed 
into the combustion chambers o f the engine where the fumes and vapors are oxidised (Roper, 1965).
9
Positive Crankcase Ventilation withdraws blow-by gases from the crankcase and returns them with fresh air and fuel 
mixture in the cylinders (crankcase blow-by produced 25 percent of the engine's hydrocarbon emissions at this time).
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Governor Ronald Reagan and the first meeting of the State Board was held in Sacramento 
on February 8, 1968 (California Air Resources Board, 2008a).
Table 5.1: California and Federal Exhaust Emission Standards for Passenger Cars (g/mi)
Year HC CO NOx
Fed Cal Fed Cal Fed Cal
uncontrolled 8.7 8.7 90 90 3.4
1966 4.3 44
1967 4.3 44
1968 4.1 4.3 34 44
1969 4.1 4.3 34 44
1970 4.1 2.2 34 23
1971 4.1 2.2 34 23
1972 3.0 1.5 28 23 3.0
1973 3.0 1.5 28 23 3.1 3.0
1974 3.0 1.5 28 23 3.1 2.0
1975 1.5 0.9 15 9 3.1 2.0
1976 1.5 0.9 15 9 3.1 2.0
1977 1.5 0.41 15 9 2.0 1.5
1978 1.5 0.41 15 9 2.0 1.5
1979 1.5 0.41 15 9 2.0 1.5
1980 0.41 0.41 7.0 9 2.0 . 1.0
1981 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 1.0
1982 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1983 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1984 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1985 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1986 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1987 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1988 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1989 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1990 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1991 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1992 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1993 0.41 0.41 3.4 7 1.0 0.4
1994 0.41 0.25* 3.4 1.7-3.4* 0.4 0.2-0.4*
1995 0.41 0.231* 3.4 1.7-3.4* 0.4 0.2-0.4*
1996 0.41 0.225* 3.4 1.7-3.4* 0.4 0.2-0.4*
1997 0.41 0.202* 3.4 1.7-3.4* 0.4 0.2-0.4*
1998 0.41 0.157* 3.4 1.7-3.4* 0.4 0.2-0.4*
1999 0.41 0.113* 3.4 1.7-3.4* 0.4 0.2-0.4*
2000 0.41 0.073* 3.4 1.7-3.4* 0.4 0.2-0.4*
2001 0.075* 0.07* 1.7-3.4** 1.7-3.4* 0.2-0.4** 0.2-0.4*
2002 0.075* 0.068* ' 1.7-3.4** 1.7-3.4* 0.2-0.4** 0.2-0.4*
2003 0.075* 0.062* 1.7-3.4** 1.7-3.4* 0.2-0.4** 0.2-0.4*
*- Fleet average of non-methane organic gases (not total hydrocarbons)
**- Emissions standard varies depending on certification levels TLEV, LEV or ULEV. 
Source: Chen et al. (2004).
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The Federal Air Quality Act of 1967 was then enacted which established a framework for 
defining ‘air quality control regions’ based on meteorological and topographical factors. 
California, being at the forefront of the regulatory pressure, was allowed by the federal 
government to enforce its own standards (California Air Resources Board, 2008a) and in 
1969, the first state Ambient Air Quality Standard was promulgated by California for 
total suspended particulates, photochemical oxidants, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide 
and carbon monoxide.
According to Crandall et al. (1986), the federal legislators established a 95% reduction 
goal for hydrocarbons, compared to the pre-1968 model and a 90% decrease for nitrogen 
oxide emissions from the 1970 model by the time of the 1976 model year. An amendment 
to the 1970 Clean Air Act allowed for further reductions and enabled the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to set standards for new automobiles and other motor vehicles 
concerning pollutants. However, the automobile industry went against the 
implementation of the legal license, and requested several delays (Gerard and Lave, 
2003). These are discussed in the next section. Table 5.1 provides a comparison between 
the federal and the Californian standards, showing the stricter standards of the latter.
The introduction of the oxidation catalytic converter in 1975 helped to improve fuel 
economy as well as to reduce emissions, and electronic engine control later added another 
layer o f technology (California Air Resources Board, 2008a). Additionally, the first two- 
way catalytic converters came into use as part of the Motor Vehicle Emission Control 
Program of the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and in the following year, ARB 
limited the amount of lead that was present in gasoline which was highly pollutant.
The 1980/81 standards required a minimisation in the nitrogen oxide, which made a 
drastic difference to the automotive manufacturers’ costs. The converter had to operate 
using a more complex system to keep the composition of the exhaust gases within the 
close range of the efficiency levels. Designing new pollution prevention features for a 
new engine is more efficient than adapting existing ones; the addition of extra features to
an old engine creates cost increases, but by incorporating the equipment as part of the 
entire cost, such costs can be diluted (Crandall et al., 1986).
Crandall et al. (1986) also indicated that the ARB rapidly realised that the strategy of 
regulating only new vehicles was flawed as there was a lack of a proper assessment 
systems to control emissions, there being no compulsory inspection or maintenance 
measures that the owner of the vehicle had to comply with. In this sense, the regulatory 
system made the manufacturers focus on the improvement of the new vehicle and not on 
its long-term reliability. Hence, in 1984, California instigated the Smog Check Program, 
which was designed to spot on-going vehicles with emissions problems by establishing 
regulatory control. However, the smog check program was called a failure as it failed to 
reduce the expected emissions (Glazer et al., 1995). Lawson (1993) indicates that part of 
the failure of the overall reduction in air pollution caused by the smog check programs 
was because of the oversights regarding human behaviour; motorists have taken steps to 
pass the test and high-emitting vehicles idle-emissions performance and tampering rates 
in the roadside surveys are unaffected by the Smog Check test (Lawson, 1993).
The Phase I California exhaust standards were also followed at federal level. However, 
the federal government (under the administration of George W. Bush) explicitly opposed 
the California Phase II exhaust standards for 1996. Therefore, the regulatory focal point 
switched from cars to fuel so that alternatives including reformulated gasoline, methanol, 
ethanol and natural gas started to be discussed. The industry along with the federal 
government also proposed specific vehicles that could be offered for transportation in 
larger cities (Professor Daniel Sperling, personal communication, 08 March, 2007).
5.3.1 - The economic license to operate (1950-1990)
Automobile firms have taken a general non-cooperative stance towards air emissions’ 
regulation in the State of California and on the federal level. The 1972 and 1975
regulations were fiercely challenged by the three large American automobile firms, 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. The main argument presented by the industry to 
oppose the implementation of air emissions was the recession caused by the first oil 
crisis, and the regulations would impose a prohibitive cost on the automobile firms. The 
new regulations would also require large investments and the loss of already existing 
assets. The firms further argued that the increase in manufacturing costs would have little 
impact on the quality of the vehicles produced, and would not positively influence the 
demand for new vehicles (Chen et al., 2004). The explicit opposition of the industry 
alongside the lobby on the state and federal levels led to a number of delays in the 
implementation of the proposed emissions requirements. Gerard and Lave (2003) provide 
a description of the timetable of delays (see Table 5.2).
In 1975, The Environmental Protection Agency was able to add a one-year delay to the 
standards under the understanding that car firms provided evidence that they had 
attempted to meet the standards. The requested delay, however, was not given as the EPA 
considered that firms could have met the standards by this time. In response, four car 
firm s sued the EPA and the Court of Appeal ruled in their favour, with the result that 
Congress eventually extended the deadline for a further three years in 1977 (Doyle, 
2000).
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Table 5.2 - Timetable of delays
December 31, 
1970
Clean Air Act Amendments direct EPA to set standards and federal 
test procedures
June 23,1971 EPA sets standards for the 1975 Model Year
January 1,1972 NAS issues report suggesting technology to meet standards is not 
yet available
March 13,1972 Volvo requests delay of standards. Other automakers follow suit, 
including the Big Three on April 5
May 12,1972 EPA denies extension
December 18-19, 
1972
D.C. Court of Appeals hears automakers appeal and remands the 
case back to EPA for further investigation {International Harvester 
v. Ruckelshaus)
December 30, 
1972
EPA issues supplement to Decision of the Administrator
February, 1973 D.C. Court of Appeals again remands (I.H. v. Ruckelshaus)
April, 1973 EPA delays in HC, CO standards
June, 1973 EPA delays NOx standards
June, 1974 Congress extends interim HC, CO standards to 1977 and NOx to 
1978
February, March 
1975
EPA extends interim HC, CO standards to 1978 in response to 
concerns about sulphate levels
August, 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments push interim HC to 1980 and CO, NOx 
standards to 1981
Source: Gerard and Lave, 2003.
The opposition of the car firms was also due to the fact that they had been able to operate 
in a free market for many years and were suddenly faced with environmental pressures
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from regulators to adapt their product to a reality that the vehicles were not originally 
designed for. For the car firms, regulators did not take into account the product planning 
cycle, which ranged from five to seven years at this time (Chen et al., 2004). Chrysler, 
the smallest of the American firms, was the most outspoken about the negative economic 
effects of environmental regulation on their business model. Several public releases were 
sponsored by the firm, which considered that the adoption of identical standards for all 
firms was unfair as they would have to pay a larger proportion of the costs (Chen et al., 
2004).
Despite the opposition and relative gain with the delays, the industry was not able to stop 
the implementation of the requirements. In order to meet the new standards, car 
manufacturers chose to add mechanical complexity to the already existing engines10 and 
the catalytic converter was the chosen solution, as it could be used with the existing 
engine technology. This also contributed to the fuel economy, which was an important 
issue at the time, and by 1975, 85% of new vehicles were fitted with the equipment11; 
when the NOx requirement was introduced in 1981, the three-way catalytic converter was 
also introduced (California Air Resources Board, 2008a).
At this time, the American automobile fleet suffered an important transformation since 
the dominance of the American firms started to be threatened by foreign competition. The 
Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) had traditionally focused on larger and 
heavier vehicles and their business model was based on low compression engines and 
automatic transmissions. However, this product line-up only made sense where there 
were cheap oil prices and, significantly, the environmental effects of these vehicles were 
largely ignored, as the industry mainly opposed any limits on exhaust emissions. In 
addition to this, foreign competitors (mainly from Japan and Europe) began to offer 
smaller, lighter and more economical vehicles. These problems, along with the
10 - Other strategies could have been the use of lightweight materials to reduce the overall weight of 
the vehicles or to incorporate other elements. An exhaust pipe measure was perceived as the most 
appropriate technical solution at the time.
11 - The rest used rotary -  Mazda, or stratified charge engine - Honda (Chen et al., 2004).
118
consequences of rising of oil prices in the 1973 and in 1978, had a drastic economic 
effect on American car firms and brought about a huge reduction in demand in US-made 
vehicles which provided additional pressures over the economic license to operate 
(Mondt, 2000).
5.3.2 - The social license to operate (1950-1990)
The first smog incidents in the Los Angeles metropolitan area were registered in 1940. 
Smog is characterised by yellow and grey polluted air that causes eye irritation and has a 
negative visual effect12. In the summer of 1943, the city of Los Angeles experienced the 
first harsh incidents, the “gas attack”. This episode constituted a major event in the state 
that directly influenced the formation of the social and the legal licenses. Here, public 
authorities were pressured by the population and media to remedy the situation.
A large percentage of people that lived in LA had moved from other parts of the 
country after the World War II searching for favourable labour opportunities and 
living conditions. The weather was part of the Californian Dream. The reality, 
however, presented itself in a very different picture. (Professor Robert Kagan, 
personnal communication, 12 April 2007).
Kagan understood that the public pressure to have clear air alongside the visible health 
effects for the population of California provided the necessary social pressure for policy 
makers to initiate the constitution of legal licenses. The social pressure to have clean air 
also generated academic research which eventually identified the automobile as one of 
the main sources of air emissions (Kagan, 2001).
Professor John Middleton showed that the damage to plants was not caused by exposure 
to SO2 and the atmospheric processes occurring involved oxidation not reduction
12
- The term ‘smog’ was originally defined in 1905 by Dr. H.A. Des Voeux of London’s Coal 
Smoke Abatement Society as a combination of Smoke and Fog.
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(Middleton et al., 1950; Middleton et al., 1961). This was a feature that was specific to 
California, making this type of smoke different form other studies on London smog 
(Gaffney and Marley, 2009). Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit along with colleagues from Caltech, 
pioneered academic investigation into the problem, and defined the chemical composition 
of smog. According to their conclusions, nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons exposed to 
sunlight produce the photochemical smog, which was measured by the damage to 
vegetables. They exposed plants to photochemical products of nitrogen dioxide (N02) 
and gasoline exhaust containing hydrocarbons in laboratory reproducing the causes of the 
smog problem (Haagen-Smit, 1950; Haagen-Smit et al., 1952a, 1952b). The main feature 
of the Los Angeles smog is that is a ‘photochemical smog’ such as the solar photolysis 
(Stephens, 1987).This investigation was central to the development of various emissions- 
control technologies and was used to back up the ARB rule making.
The general public gradually became more concerned with wider sustainability 
preoccupations. Initially, the concern with environmental degradation was linked to direct 
human health and aesthetic issues. (Brillant, 1989; Mondt, 2000). However, this 
preoccupation did not challenge the rise o f the automobile as a modem icon and 
California has been very influential in forming the modem culture of automobility. The 
automobile therefore represented part of the modem cultural identity that influenced 
other American states and regions of the world (Sacks, 1992). However, with the 
development of the environmental movement in the States, the public became more 
concerned with wider environmental issues and more prone to supporters of stricter 
measures on the automobile industry. In the 1960s, the social license was shaped by 
books of critical journalism that informed the public of the dangers of the automobile, 
including safety preoccupations (Nader, 1966) and pollution issues (Edelson and 
Warshofsky, 1966). These books on the negative externalities of the automobile followed 
the same line of criticism pioneered by Carson (1962).
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5.3.3 - The effects on the environmental performance of the industry from the 
early emissions regulations.
The emissions regulations, from 1940 to 1900 produced significant positive 
environmental benefits. In the State’s most populous area, Los Angeles’s South Coast Air 
Basin, carbon monoxide, NOx emissions, volatile organic compounds, alongside ozone 
levels, declined sharply. The positive effect had been noticed by the amount of smog 
alerts observed. In 1977, the South Coast Air Basin had 121 Stage 1 smog alerts13. The 
number of Stage 1 alerts dropped to 66 in 1987, one in 1997 and there have been no 
Stage 1 alerts since 1997. There have also been no Stage 2 alerts (.35 PPM ozone) in the 
South Coast Basin since 1988, when there was just one. Most other areas of California 
have also made significant progress in reducing smog. However, smog is still a problem 
that has not been completely tackled (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).
Table 5.3 -  Reduction in air pollutants in California highways
Source category 1970 1980 1990
Highway vehicles Carbon Monoxide - (million short 
tons)
163.23 143.83 110.26
NOx Emissions from Highway Vehicles (million short 
tons)
12.64 11.49 9.59
Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds from 
Highway Vehicles 
(thousand short tons)
16,911 13,869 9,388
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2008).
13 A Stage 1 smog alert is called when ozone levels reach .20 parts per million (PPM).
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5.4 - The Zero Emissions Vehicles Program (ZEV) legal license.
In September 1990, the California Air Resources Board established the Zero Emissions 
Vehicles (ZEV) Program, also called the LEV-I legislation (California Air Resources 
Board, 1990). The regulations stipulated that a minimum percentage of the new vehicles 
sold in the State would give no air emissions. The ZEVs were identified as vehicles that 
would have: ‘No tailpipe emissions, no evaporative emissions, no onboard emission- 
control systems that can deteriorate over time and no emissions from gasoline refining or 
sales’ (California Air Resources Board, 1990).
The original ZEV program was initially intended to be applied to the 1994 model 
vehicles in California. In order to do this, various emissions categories were established 
not only for passenger cars, but also for light duty trucks14. Automobile producers had to 
comply with several levels of stringency that were directly proportionate to sales and the 
fleet average emission rates. The original mandate set up a minimum of 2% ZEVs by 
1998, with growing percentages for the years of 2001 (5%) and 2003 (10%) respectively. 
Tradable credits were also established with a US$5,000 fine for each vehicle not made 
available for sale (California Air Resources Board, 1991a).
Regulators set up legislation in such a way that reasonable flexibility was offered on how 
the ZEV requirements could be attained. In this respect, legislators did not pick a fuel or 
power-train technology since several options were available to automobile firms, 
including: battery-powered electric vehicles, fuel-cell vehicles, compressed air vehicles 
and any other technology that could be classed as ZEVs. However, the electric power­
train technology was generally considered the most feasible alternative at the time. 
General Motors (GM) for instance, possessed a fully operational version of a battery- 
powered electric plug-in vehicle -  the Impact. Several other models were in the initial 
stages of development by the US Department of Energy -  DOE hybrid/ Electric program. 
In fact, GM announced the intention of producing the Impact before the LEV-I legislation
14 ARB defined the types of cars as: passenger cars, light duty trucks and heavy trucks. The
analysis of this thesis is based on passenger cars, as the proposed studies are focused on passenger cars.
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had been established in California (Shnayerson, 1996). This suggested to CARB that a 
ZEV was possible. However, the American automotive industry reacted negatively to the 
LEV-I legislation; the automobile firms claimed that the technology related to electric 
cars was not economically feasible and a great deal of research and technology 
development was still necessary to make the ZEVs a competing alternative to the 
intemal-combustion engine (Sperling, 1995). In order to enhance the economic feasibility 
of electric vehicles, another business model based on car leasing instead of direct car 
sales was implemented. Automobile manufacturers also argued that there was not a 
strong demand for such products. As a consequence, the automotive industry directly 
opposed the LEV-I legislation and sued the California regulators (Collantes, personnal 
communication, 13 May 2007).
Following the planned biannual review of the LEV legislation and the opposition of the 
automakers in 1996, the ARB eliminated the ZEV sales requirements for the model years 
1998 and 2001. This had been a change in psotion for CARB that took a less 
confrontational approach (Kemp, 2005). The ZEVs requirement was retained for 2003 
with an exchange of a Memorandum of Agreement between the ARB and seven big 
automobile firms (General Motors, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, Honda, Mazda, Nissan and 
Toyota). In the agreement, the automobile firms agreed to increase the research and 
development of ZEV-related technologies, and to produce a minimum of 3,750 battery 
electric vehicles from 1998 to 2000 (California Air Resources Board, 1996).
In 1998, further modifications were set up with the introduction of a new category of 
ZEVs - the P-ZEV. These were defined as very low emissions vehicles powered by 
compressed natural gas, gas-electric hybrid and methanol fuel cells. The introduction of 
this category added more flexibility to the automakers’ portfolio as 6% of the 10% 
requirement of the ZEVs could be compensated with the PZEVs (Collantes, 2006).
In 2001, greater flexibility was implemented and the minimum requirement of pure ZEVs 
was reduced from 4% to 2% of total sales (California Air Resources Board, 2001). Aside
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from this, legislators also instituted the following modifications:
• P-ZEVs could account for one fifth of the 10% requirement;
• ZEVs credits could be given to demonstration projects (including the California 
Fuel Cell Partnership);
• Other types of vehicle, such as SUVs, pick-up trucks and vans, could also count 
for the ZEV requirement;
• The ZEV requirement would be increased to 10% in 2003 and 18% in 2018.
In 2002, the automakers filed another lawsuit against the board. The preliminary federal 
injunction prohibited the Board from enforcing the 2001 ZEV amendments with respect 
to the sale of new motor vehicles for the model years 2003 and 2004. In response, the 
board offered to introduce a new set of modifications to the regulations and the minimum 
technical requirements, and the automobile firms agreed to end the litigation (California 
Air Resources Board, 2003).
As a result, the CAL Environmental Protection Agency staff proposed additional 
modifications. Following the data gathered in a major technology symposium with all the 
stakeholders involved and a report of an independent expert review on the status of ZEV 
technologies, changes were recommend for the 2009 model years (California Air 
Resources Board, 2010).
The new set of modifications was approved by the board at the March 2008 hearing and 
these affected the 2009 and 2015 model years. Table 5.4 introduces the timetable of 
delays.
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Table 5.4 - Timetable of delays in the ZEV mandate
1990 Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Program was introduced by the California Air 
resources board. The original requirement predicted in 1998 was that 2% of the 
vehicles that large manufacturers produced for sale in California had to be ZEVs, 
increasing to 5% in 2001 and 10% in 2003.
1996 The ZEV mandate had its first modifications as the “ramp up” was eliminated. 
The 10% ZEV requirement for 2003, and again in 1998 to allow partial ZEV 
(PZEV) credits for extremely clean vehicles that were not pure ZEVs.
2001 The 2001 modifications allowed large manufacturers to meet their ZEV 
requirement with 2% pure ZEVs, 2% Advanced Technology PZEVS and 6% 
PZEVs.
2002 Due to a lawsuit filed against the Board, a federal district judge issued a 
preliminary injunction that prohibited the Board from enforcing the 2001 ZEV 
amendments with respect to the sale of new motor vehicles in model years 2003 or 
2004. Once the Board adopted the 2003 Amendments to the ZEV regulation, the 
parties to the lawsuits agreed to end the litigation.
2003 Modifications to the ZEV regulation were introduced to address the preliminary 
injunction and better align the program requirements with the status of technology 
development.
2006 A Technology Symposium was held at CARB. An Independent Expert Review 
Panel submitted their report on the status of all ZEV technologies assessing the 
present level and cost of technological development.
2007 The Board determined that staff should recommend changes to the regulation for 
the 2009 and subsequent model years, following the conclusions from the 
Technology Symposium and the Independent Expert Review Panel.
2008 The CARB adopted further modifications in the March 27, 2008 hearing. The 
Board also directed staff to redesign the ZEV Program so it would affect the 
2015+ model years.
2009 The 2008 amendments to the ZEV Regulation became effective. A second ZEV
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Technology Symposium took place in September, and an informal update to the 
Board was conducted by the staff in December.
2010 Staff could return to the Board with regulatory changes to the ZEV Regulation.
Source: California Air Resources Board, 2010.
The 2008 amendments that became effective in 2009 are displayed in Table 5.5. The new 
arrangement was based on more ZEV categories, which included a new type of AT 
PZEV - the enhanced AT PZEV. This is a vehicle that uses hydrogen or electricity as an 
energy source. Examples of this category are the hydrogen internal combustion engine 
vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. In addition, the board also lowered the 
number of required ZEV vehicles for 2012-2014 and set the Enhanced AT PZEVs to 
meet a portion of the ZEV requirement. Enhanced AT PZEVs can now be used to meet 
up to 70% of the requirement from 2012 to 2014 and up to 50% from 2015 to 2017 
(California Air Resources Board, 2008b).
The categories of ZEVs have been divided into 6 types according to the powertrain 
technology and mile range. Table 5.6 shows the ZEV types predicted by the legislation 
along with the core definition and example of the vehicle.
/
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Table 5.5 -  Categories of vehicles for the ZEV Legislation (March 2008).
Category Acronym Technology Number of Vehicles placed 
( between 1994 and 2006)
Gold ZEV Battery,
Hydrogen Fuel cell
Fuel cell 160
ZEV Battery electric 4,400 
Neighbourhood electric 
26,000
Silver Plus Enhanced 
AT PZEV
AT PZEV using a ZEV fuel 
such as electricity or 
hydrogen. - are hydrogen 
internal combustion engine 
vehicles and plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles.
>
Silver AT PZEV Hybrid, compressed natural 
gas, methanol fuel cell
Hybrid, or Compressed 
Natural Gas 109,000
Bronze PZEV Extremely clean conventional 
vehicle with extended 
warranty
and reduced evaporative 
emissions
Conventional 672,000
Source: California Air Resources Board (2008b)
One of the most visible indicators of the growing flexibility that was offered to the
automobile firms is the new credit system that was used to calculate the minimum
requirements with which each automobile firm has to comply. The firms can opt to adopt
one or a combination of types of ZEVs. The credits area - which is directly proportionate
to the type of vehicles - is displayed in Table 3. The Air Resources Board (2008b) has
also offered an illustrative example for the 2012-2014. According to this, the gold
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requirements can be met with IV ZEV type (25,000 vehicles) or a combination of IV 
ZEV (7,500 vehicles) and Enhanced AT PZEVs (58,333). These projections are based on 
estimated sales of 1.4 million cars per year.
Table 5.6 - Categories of Zero Emission Vehicles - ZEVs.
ZEV Type Definition Example
Type 1 Electric Vehicle with 50-75 mile range Limited range battery EV
Type 1.5 Electric Vehicle with 75-100 mile City Electric vehicle
Type II Electric Vehicle with 100-200 mile range Full Function Battery EV
Type III 100+mile electric vehicle with fast 
refuelling or 200 mile battery mile battery 
EV
Fuel Cell or Battery EV
Type IV 200+mile electric vehicle with fast 
refuelling
Fuel Cell
Type V 300+ mile electric vehicle with fast 
refuelling
Fuel Cell
Source: California Air Resources Board (2008b)
5.6 - The economic license to operate
Since the Zero Emissions Vehicle Mandate -  (ZEV mandate) was part of the larger Low 
Emission Vehicle Program-LEV15, the attention of the automobile industry was focused 
on the discussion of LEV requirements. The Zero Emissions Vehicle Mandate -  ZEV 
requirement would only be established at a later date, in 1998, which would give the 
industry time to come up with a debate over the requirements of the legal license.
- The ARB first adopted LEV standards in 1990. These first LEV standards ran from 1994 through 2003. LEV II 
regulations, running from 2004 to 2010, represent continuing progress in emission reductions.
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However, it is important to indicate that the general perception of the industry was to 
fight the regulatory intervention, but some firms in the American industry perceived that 
the regulation could be an opportunity (Sperling, personal communication, 10 March 
2007).
The main automobile firm that understood the opportunity for a good negotiation with 
ARB was General Motors (GM). The latter had been involved in the development of 
battery electric vehicles since the first government-led initiatives that started with the 
Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Development and Demonstration Programme (EHVDD) and 
was sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1974. This program later evolved 
into the U.S. Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC) and the Advanced Lead-Acid 
Battery Consortium (AJLABC) was later formed in 1991 and 1992. The development of 
advanced batteries was the key technological constraint for automobile applications 
established by the Department of Energy (United States Department of Energy, 2006).
The management of General Motors was very optimistic about the potential 
developments that could be achieved in the battery technology. For them, General Motors 
would mass-produce electric vehicles by the time ARB established the regulatory 
necessity profitably (Shnayerson, 1996). At the time GM had the electric impact 
program, which was a development of the 1987 Sunraycer that won the first 2,000 mile 
solar car race in Australia. GM’s Chairman, Roger B. Smith, publicly announced that 
GM was pushing the research and technology still needed to mass produce the electric 
vehicle (Risen, 1990). In January 1990, GM publicised that their prototype accelerated 
from zero to 60 m.p.h. in 8 seconds and was equipped with a 124-mile range between 
battery recharging, making the electric car comparable to the internal combustion 
counterparts (Los Angeles Times, 1990). In a scenario without the mandate, GM 
perceived that 0.5% of the market could be captured with the Impact vehicle. GM also 
noted a competitive advantage with other car makers that needed to reach the 2% target. 
This at the time was not an easy task to achieve especially because the others were behind 
in R&D for this niche market. However, GM realised that the figure of 2% was still high
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and could be further reduced in the biennial reviews already planned in the ZEV proposal 
(Collantes, 2006).
General Motors also perceived that there was relative leverage with regard to 
opportunities to negotiate specific requirements of the legal license. Thus, GM accepted 
the negotiation on the regulation with the various sales-weight averages, the lead time 
and the biennial reviews that were part of the regulation (Johnson, 1999). The publicity 
gathered by GM with the Impact16 was very important and part of a strategy to gain larger 
market in the US. Showing technology leadership was a key attribute that GM wanted to 
display to consumers and to be recognised, since the GM management wanted to re­
invent its business model. The new electric vehicle program brought fresh business 
thinking in the form of alternative ways of integrating the various parts of the company 
and different business models to bring about more profit (Johnson, 1999). Within General 
Motors, certain divisions welcomed the ZEV mandate, as the ARB requirement would 
justify the investments in R&D in unproven technology (General Motors USA 
Representative, Personal Communication, 04 May, 2007).
In 1996, GM finally launched the Impact vehicle under the name of EV1. The car was a 
two-seater sports compact. The performance levels were acceptable with 0-60 mph (0-97 
km/h) acceleration time at less than 9 seconds and a top speed of 80 mph. In ideal 
conditions, the range of the electric pack was 90 miles on the motorway and 70 miles in 
city traffic. Despite attempts to use alternative materials and body structure design, the 
weight was 2,970 pounds with 1,175 pounds of battery (General Motors Corporation, 
1997). Initially, the learning experience phase was launched and the vehicles were given 
to particular utilities firms to test drive the vehicle in real life situations (Johnson, 1999). 
From them on until 2000, the EV1 was leased in Saturn dealerships, but only in the states 
of California and Arizona and around 600 vehicles were leased.
- Early GM “Impact” prototype was later renamed the EV1. General Motors built about 1,100 vehicles. Nearly all have 
now been destroyed, with a handful held by GM for test purposes and a small number of non-functioning models donated to various 
universities and museums in North America.
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The other two large American firms had a different position. For them, the environmental 
pressures with the perceived technological leadership of GM in the field of battery 
electric vehicles development led to their full-blown opposition to the LEV and ZEV 
Mandate. Some even noted that the Impact had been oversold to the ARB, who did not 
have any other information aside from the optimistic vision of some of the GM 
executives. These firms also saw that the mandate had a strong political appeal in 
California, which was using some of the press releases of GM indicative of the 
technological development achieved with the Impact. CARB gained confidence and 
realised that the mandate had feasible targets, and could be defended politically. 
Moreover, the Impact was the centre of attention of many newspapers (Collantes, 2006).
CARB had taken a unilateral move toward regulation. The approach had traditionally 
been based on technology forcing, but automobile makers would have preferred to build a 
collaborative approach where the technological information would be negotiated between 
them. The automakers were also not satisfied with the approach of establishing a new 
technology alongside the volume and schedule. The three elements were perceived as 
harsh (CARB, personal communication, June 2006).
The industry perceived that there could be other ways of achieving the reduction in air 
emissions as dictated by the ARB, with alternative measures that did not break away 
from the traditional business model of the firms as the cost effectiveness of the ZEV 
mandate was not quantified, and other options had not been assessed (Collantes, 2005). 
The industry therefore indicated that the resources spent on the development of battery 
packs could be better spent in further developing the internal combustion engine 
(Professor Allan Lloyd, personal communication, 15 May 2007).
California Air Resources Board followed the perception that certain General Motors 
managers had pushed the mandate forward. In fact, ARB did not take the time to analyse 
the detail of the economic feasibility of electric vehicles (GARB Staff Representative,
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personal communication, 11 June 2007). Additionally, the cost of technology 
development and vehicles to the public, the performance limitations that the technology 
would impose to the consumer and other relevant issues had not been properly assessed. 
Furthermore, the ARB did not know whether the Californian consumer would be willing 
to pay a premium to have all-electric cars and accept lower levels of performance and 
range.
5.7 - The social license to operate
The following social stakeholders have been indentified as forming the legal license: oil 
companies, government agencies, government, public entities/energy entities, the 
electric-drive industry, environmental NGOs, academia and consumers.
The oil companies had a direct influence against the implementation of the ZEV. Calef 
and Goble (2005) indicate that the basic strategy taken was through monetary 
contributions of the oil companies to legislative candidates. The oil industry lobbied 
several state assembly members and senate members to pressure the air resources board 
and presented a paper to fight the ZEV mandate. This paper was submitted by ARCO and 
indicated the problems of fostering electric vehicles.
In the 1996 biennial review, there was evidence of the oil industries’ investment in the 
policy process. WSPA joined forces with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
opposing the mandate, arguing for the elimination of the ZEV requirement for 2003. 
They opposed any subsidies for the formulation of subsidies for electric vehicles as well 
as subsides for specific products or industries (Western States Petroleum Association -
v .  >
WSPA, 1996). The oil industry also questioned the ARB’s statuary authority to regulate 
emissions standards, and queried the economic and technological feasibility of the 
measures. It was against subsidies for battery electric development, and claimed that 
there would be negative effects on the state- level economy. ‘WSPA does not oppose the 
manufacture and sale of electric cars which are developed in a free market.. .but there is
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no justification for ARB to mandate technologically unproven EVs which are neither 
competitive nor cost-effective, and which rely on subsidies to be marketable’ (WSPA, 
1996, pp. 3).
The environmental community did not have a direct influence on the initial stages of the 
ZEV mandate. However, in 1998 a ZEV alliance was officially constituted. This was 
composed of the American Lung Association, the California League of Conservation 
Voters, the California Public Interest Research Group, the Coalition for Clean Air, the 
Natural Resources Defence Council, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Planning and 
Conservation League, the Kirsch Foundation and the California Electric Transportation 
Coalition, and had the goal of promoting the use and commercial supply of zero 
emissions vehicles (Collantes, 2006).
The consumer has been an important stakeholder in the social license. The Californian 
consumer at the time was not willing to pay a premium to have a limited range electric 
vehicle, with very restrictive levels of performance and a smaller vehicle. Significantly, 
the number of electric vehicles leased by the California and Arizona consumers was 
much lower than anticipated by GM management. Eventually GM decided to collect and 
crush the EV1 vehicles and after 2000, the consumer was also key in the success of the 
hybrid vehicles in the state, especially with the demand for the Toyota Prius vehicle 
(Byrne and Polonsky, 2001).
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5.8 - The effects of the ZEV legislation
5.8.1 - Short term effects
Burke et al. (2000) identify several secondary benefits of the ZEV Program, including:
• Growth in electric vehicle research measured by the increase in number of patents 
related to electric vehicles;
• The constitution of government/industry consortia to support EV development17;
• Advanced vehicle developments, which include several of the categories proposed 
by the ZEV legislation (intemal-combustion engine vehicles, hybrid-electric 
vehicles, fuel-cell-powered cars and the use of lightweight materials);
• The development of low-speed electric transportation, including several types of 
EVs for city and neighbourhood EVs, electric bikes and scooters.
The secondary benefits include the economic benefits to California of the primary ZEV 
programme and new and improved technologies/products attributable to the programme. 
The legislation also favoured more research into other types of zero emission vehicle 
technologies, which included the emergence of hybrid electric vehicles. This specific 
issue is analyzed in section 7.
- Electric utilities’ use of advanced energy storage technologies, industrial and consumer 
applications of EV advanced battery technologies (including large prismatic nickel metal hydride and 
lithium batteries, electrochemical capacitors (ultracapacitors), pulse power batteries, improved lead-acid 
batteries, zinc-air batteries, zinc-bromine batteries, battery test equipment and monitoring systems).
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Figure 5.2- Annual number of EV-Related Patents and all US Patents Granted from 1980 
to 1998 (indexed to 1980).
■ o —
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Source: Burke et al. (2000)
Burke et al. (2000) indicate the direct correlation of the ZEV legislation and the rise in 
the number of patents in the United States related to EV applications. This is indicated in 
Figure 5.2, which provides a comparison between the annual number of EV- patents in 
contrast to the index of all United States patents granted from 1980 to 1998 (indexed to 
the year 1980). The exponential growth in the EV patent index is a direct consequence of 
the future expectation that the automobile firms, automobile suppliers and other related 
firms created with the introduction o f  the ZEV legislation in California. However, it is 
not only the private sector which has researched and developed alternative technologies 
for the automobile industry; a large part of this was led by government-owned research 
centres and institutions, and some o f these were in conjunction with private firms. The 
next section will therefore address this crucial issue.
5.8.2 - Long term effects
The introduction of hybrid models in California was directly fostered by the 
implementation of the ZEV legal license. These two firms were able to offer products 
that were more suitable for the requirements of the ZEV mandate. The first model to be
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offered, in 1999, was the Honda Insight, a two-seater compact car that resembled a sports 
car. However, the most important vehicle that has dominated the market for hybrid 
vehicles in the United States has been the Toyota Prius. This was launched in 2000 as a 
more practical 4-door hatchback more suitable for the compact segment in California.
In 1993, the American government did not invite Toyota Motors Company and Honda 
Motor Company to take part in the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles 
(PNGV) program (Sperling, 2001b). As a result, the firms perceived that they would be at 
a competitive disadvantage if  they did not increase expenditure in Research and 
Development in the area. Other firms also increased expenditure in advanced internal 
combustion engines and other alternative technologies (Professor Joan Ogden, personal 
communication, 10 May, 2007). The story of how the Prius was created can therefore 
provide valuable insights into the American policy to foster the development of fuel 
efficient vehicles.
The Toyota Prius represents a tremendous success for Toyota Motor Company as the first 
large-scale hybrid (petrol-electric) vehicle to be supplied to the global market. Regardless 
of the fact that the Prius only represents a very small percentage of Toyota’s sales in the 
United States, it constitutes a great technological development in terms of fuel 
consumption, which directly affects CO2 emissions and a unique marketing opportunity 
to showcase an innovative product. For a company which had been regarded in the past 
as a one which followed the market, this pioneering experience not only projected an 
image of an environmentally conscious firm, but also one as a technological leader in the 
global market (Toyota USA Representative, personal communication, 23 May, 2007).
The Toyota Prius is unquestionably an development from the single, internal gasoline 
combustion engine, as it is equipped with a traditional petrol-fuelled engine and an 
electric motor. Toyota also developed a system, called The Hybrid Synergy Drive system, 
that automatically switches between the electric motor and the internal combustion 
engine depending on the power needed to move the vehicle. The concept is to rely less on 
the petrol fuel engine at low speeds and to use its full capacity when more power is
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needed. The system allows the vehicle to have very low consumption when compared to 
standard vehicles of the same size (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2006).
The origin of the Prius can be traced to an internal committee created by Toyota Motor 
Company to forecast the future perspectives in the automotive industry for the 21st 
century - the G21 in September 1993. This committee was set up to provide a response 
for Toyota not having been invited to participate in the PNGV. Sperling call this 
phenomenon the 'PNGV boomerang effect' (Sperling, 2001a; Sperling 2001b). The 
initial committee that identified the necessity to provide a market response for the 
advances that were being made in the United States was a key element in the 
developmental process. Despite previous research funds that had in the past been used to 
develop joint projects with the Japanese government on electric vehicles, powertrain and 
batteries, the research and development investment was completely taken by Toyota 
itself, which makes this figure different from the previous analysis of the Brazilian 
Proalcool programme. The committee established a project with the guidelines to develop 
an extremely economical mid-sized family car based on new production methods. Here, 
the initial goal was to have an internal combustion engine vehicle with a fuel 
consumption of 47.5 miles per gallon, this being less demanding than the original PNGV 
goals.
In the first stages of the project, engineers believed that by solely improving the internal 
combustion engine they would bring about the necessary fuel economy. However, in due 
course it became clear that additional measures would have to be taken in order to reach 
the proposed targets. The group therefore decided to attach an electrical motor to the 
petrol-fuel engine. It has been argued that Toyota benefited from joint research with the 
Japanese government on the battery powered Electric Vehicle, the MITI. Nevertheless, 
this did not meet the initial goals, but set the technological basis for the Hybrid Engine 
Vehicle platform (Ahman, 2004).
For the 1995 Tokyo Motor Show, Toyota prepared a concept car with the hybrid system,
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presenting it as Toyota’s vision of the future (Taylor, 2006). The feedback the company 
received at the Motor Show was critical for the decision to produce the hybrid vehicle. 
Regardless of the additional costs to the initiative, Toyota calculated that the car could go 
into production if the fuel economy was enough to compensate for the additional cost and 
the complexity that came with the addition of an electric engine. In addition to this, it was 
clear that further development could be achieved in the battery technology. The battery 
powered electric engines/batteries were something novel with great development 
potential (Taylor, 2006). Consequently, the Californian market presented the desired 
environment to launch this type of vehicle, since there was growing pressure from the 
California Air Resources Board.
The Prius was officially launched in Japan in October 1997 and sales began in December. 
However, during the first two years the generation I Prius was only sold in Japan. These 
initial years were necessary to carry out further development in the hybrid system and in 
the batteries. The launch of the cars in their national market therefore provided the 
necessary marketing feedback and consumer acceptance of the product so that it could be 
globally available and California eventually became a very attractive market due to the 
combination of legislation to enforce high efficiency in its vehicles and the environmental 
awareness of its population.
Global sales started in 2000, when the company developed the Generation II model. The 
American market started to receive the first models in 2000 and the success of the vehicle 
was staggering, especially in Japan and the North American market. More progress was 
made with the batteries, which became smaller and lighter, and the vehicle became more 
powerful; at the present time, the Prius is in its third generation. The vehicle has also 
experienced an increase in power from both the internal petrol fuelled engine and the 
electrical engine. It is equipped with a traditional DOHC 16 valve 1.5 litre petrol engine 
that produces the maximum output of 76 bhp and an electric motor that can produce 67 
bhp. It also has a nickel-metal hydride battery that has a 201.6 nominal voltage. In 
addition to this, the vehicle has 104 g/km emissions on a combined cycle and the fuel
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consumption of 65.7 litres/lOOkm (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2006). (Table 5.7 
demonstrates the developments in battery electricity in each of the four Prius 
generations).
The penetration of the Toyota Prius into the California market has come about as a result 
o f the combination of the requirements of the ZEV legislation, higher oil prices and 
greater environmental concerns by consumers. Toyota indicates that the initial sales are 
in niche markets as the vehicle would appeal solely to a specific type of consumer. 
Consequently, the successful launch in these niche markets led to an expansion of the 
hybrid technology into other models. Toyota now offers the hybrid option on 6 models in 
the United States: Toyota Prius, Toyota Highlander, Toyota Camry, Lexus LS600hL, 
Lexus GS 450h and Lexus RX 400h.
Table 5.7 -  The Generations of the Toyota Prius
Prius Type Generation I Generation
II
Generation III Generation IV
Year 1997-1999 2000-2003 2004-2009 2009- present
Petrol Engine 
(Hp)
58 70 76 98
Electric motor 
(Hp)
40 44 67 80
Combined Power 
kW(hp)
58 (78) 72 (97) 82(110) 100 (130)
Battery-Pack 
Weight (kg)
57 52 45
44
Operating voltage 
-  Motor engine
288 273 500 650
Source: www.toyota.com
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Lave and Maclean (2002) investigated the economic aspects for the consumer of the 
Prius; they considered under which conditions the purchase of the Prius would make 
economic sense, compared to the Toyota mid-size counterpart, the Corolla. They also 
found that the Prius may not be economically efficient when taking into account the price 
of fuel, the average distance travelled and the reasons for the market success of the Prius, 
which go beyond the crude economic calculations and are linked to others issues such as 
image and environmental perception.
When the federal government proposed the PNGV, the cooperative consortium 
represented an important alliance for the American automakers as they could indirectly 
receive a considerable amount of public resources to develop technologies that would 
offer them competitive gains over foreign based firms. Aside from this, since the next 
generation of vehicles were going to be developed as part of a govemment-industry 
cooperative effort, the firms could also influence how regulations would be shaped.
Regulators on the other hand, in proposing to invest in research and development in the 
area and in putting forward flexible options on how automobile firms could comply with 
the requirements of the ZEV mandate in California, added a considerable amount of 
flexibility. In Figure 6.4, the combination of the investments in Research and 
Development though the PNPG and the flexibility that was added to the ZEV mandate 
are represented by the PNGV on the regulator’s side.
On the company’s side, the PNGV boomerang effect shows the difference between the 
initial investments required by the Japanese and the American firms. Because the 
Japanese wanted to counterbalance the government-funded PNGV, the private 
investments have been larger and as a consequence the automobile industry was more 
cooperative towards the initial goals of the ZEV mandate. However, during the 
implementation process of the LEV-1 legislation, all the automakers were hostile to the 
level of stringency required by the original ZEV legislation, which also included the 
Japanese (Sperling, 2001b).
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5.8.3 - Effects on industry environmental performance
The following table shows the significant reduction in emissions regulations observed in 
the total emissions of carbon monoxide, NOx emissions and volatile organic compounds. 
The reduction has been significant but regulators still consider that air pollution is a 
significant problem in the state (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).
Table 5.8. Total emissions in California of C02, NOx and EVOs
Source category 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2006 Percentage of 
1970 
reduction
Highway vehicles 
Carbon Monoxide - 
(million short tons)
163.23 143.83 110.26 83.88 68.06 54.10 53.8%
NOx Emissions from 
Highway Vehicles 
(million short tons)
12.64 11.49 9.59 8.88 8.39 6.39 50.55%
Emissions of Volatile 
Organic Compounds 
from Highway 
Vehicles (thousand 
short tons)
16,911 13,869 9,388 6,749 5,326 4,078
24.11%
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008.
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5.9 - Conclusions
Environmental regulation has been a very important determinant in automobile 
technology development in the United States. California was the birth place of air 
emissions regulation in the 1950s and is still in the forefront on air emissions with the 
ZEV mandate. The case study has indicated how the license to operate has mandated the 
use of specific technologies. California requirements were later followed on the federal 
level and influenced other parts of the world.
In the context of the license to operate framework, the history of automobile air 
emissions in the United States is also an account of an ongoing dispute between 
regulators and automobile firms that opposed the 1975 catalytic converter and the three- 
way catalytic converter in 1981. In this respect, all the regulations analysed in this 
chapter show how the legal license has been influenced by the industry, through a wide 
range of non-market strategies, especially direct lobby and legal disputes. In fact, 
automobile firms in the United States have argued about the large costs involved in 
adopting such technologies. Due to the resistance of the industry, less stringent standards 
were implemented, with many extensions of the original deadlines. The American legal 
system has certainly contributed to this adversarial scenario, but the approach towards 
regulation by corporate environmental strategy is also a determinant factor in this 
relationship.
The ZEV mandate however, portrays a different picture. The case is representative of 
how policy makers can lose sight of the social and economic licenses, and focus on the 
formation of the legal license. The wide process of delays and changes to the initial 
mandate indicated a slow and cumbersome legal process and the economic and technical 
feasibility of some of the ZEV requirements were not fully considered. Moreover, since 
the original targets were not accomplished, the California Air Resources Board has failed 
in its original goal of 10% ZEVs by 2003.
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CARB took a unilateral move toward regulation as the board followed the vague 
perception of some of the General Motors’ managers who believed they would have a 
commercially feasible full electric automobile. However, a detailed analysis of the 
economic license to operate electric vehicles had not been carried out. Here, several 
aspects of the economic analysis should have been considered, including the cost of 
technology development, the cost of vehicles to the public, the performance limitations 
that technology would impose on the consumer and other relevant issues had not been 
properly assessed.
The Air Resources Board also failed to include an analysis of the social license to operate 
that the industry would be facing. The consumer was largely excluded from the debate as 
regulators did not know how the Californian consumer would respond to electric vehicles 
that had considerable less performance and lower practicality than traditional petrol- 
fuelled vehicles.
The failure of the General Motors electric vehicle and the consequent review of the ZEV 
mandate opened the market for hybrid vehicles. Here, the Japanese firms Toyota and 
Honda have been the most successful in launching commercially successful hybrid cars 
which reviewed categories of the ZEV mandate.
The industry, in sum, perceived that that the market was not ready for the ZEVs, and the 
ways of achieving the reduction in air emissions as dictated by the CARB could be 
gained with alternative measures that did not break apart form the traditional business 
model of the firm. Moreover, the cost effectiveness of the ZEV mandate was not 
quantified since other options had not been assessed. The industry indicated that the 
resources spent on the development of batteries packs could be better spent in further 
developing the internal combustion engine. An example of this in the case of the hybrids 
would be to attach an electric engine with a battery pack to the traditional internal 
combustion engine.
The California case study brings about important lessons for the greening of industry 
body of literature. In the license to operate framework, three different licenses influence 
corporate environmental strategy and direct corporate environmental performance. The 
case indicates the imperative of considering the interplay between the three licenses to 
understand how the legal license impacts on industries’ environmental performance. In 
the case of the ZEV mandate, the economic license to operate emerges as the most 
important one. Therefore, policy makers need to take into account the three licenses 
together in order to have a more precise influence over the industry’s environmental 
performance.
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Chapter 6 - The Brazilian Experience with Ethanol18
6.1 - Introduction
This chapter looks at the Brazilian experience with ethanol. It describes the first large- 
scale attempt to implement an alternative fuel as a substitute for traditional petrol. The 
chapter begins with a description of the importance of the case study for the empirical 
development presented in this thesis. The historical description of the government-led 
initiative to foster the wide adoption of ethanol fuel for vehicles -  the Proalcool - is 
therefore introduced to comprehend the formation of the legal license. Hence, the 
analysis focuses on the establishment of the legal and economic licenses. After this, the 
initial research and development required for the adaptation of the ethanol-fuelled 
internal combustion engine are described, along with an examination of the government’s 
role in the process. Then, the primary and secondary effects of the program are analysed, 
and the chapter concludes with on discussion about bio-ethanol fuel.
6.2 - The relevance of this case study
As shown in Chapter 2, the case studies in this thesis have been selected for their 
illustration of the impact of the license to operate on innovative technological 
development. They deal with novel environmental problems generated by the extensive 
use of the automobile that have required a new set of responses from automobile firms. 
The Brazilian Proalcool program case study has also demonstrated a pioneering 
regulatory measure and has been very important from an environmental point of view. 
The Proalcool was the first successful, large-scale government program intended to
18 A modified version of this chapter has been published at the Business Strategy and the
Environment Journal: Zapata, C. and P. Nieuwenhuis (2008) Driving on Liquid Sunshine - The Brazilian 
Biofuel Experience: A Policy Driven Analysis, Business Strategy and the Environment. Published 
Online: 26 Aug 2008.
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substitute traditionally imported petrol fuel with a locally produced alternative source. 
Aside from the economic benefits, the use of ethanol has produced a significant number 
of positive environmental externalities vis-a-vis the use of traditional petrol fuel 
(Goldemberg et al., 2008).
The case study also shows the crucial role played by government, the Brazilian 
dictatorship of the time being the main force behind the initiative. The government 
played a vital role in providing support for the research and development of new ethanol- 
only engines, fostering the early adoption of new ethanol-only vehicles. The various 
instruments adopted by the policy have shaped the economic license to operate, to make 
the initial costs competitive with those of petrol. This case study also shows the important 
role of the consumer as well as the automobile firms involved in the process, both of 
which are analysed separately.
The use of biofuels as automobile fuel was not a novel idea in Brazil. Biofuels have 
always constituted a feasible fuel alternative for the automobile industry, as many early 
experiments with the internal combustion engine involved ethanol-derived fuels. These 
were relevant to even the most iconic of early automobiles - the Ford Model T. In fact, 
the U.S already possessed a suitable ethanol program during the 1920s and 1930s (Hunt, 
1981). However, ethanol was eventually sidelined, as petrol emerged as a cheap and 
abundant alternative after World War II (Lincoln, 2000). In the initial development phase 
of the automotive industry, environmental concerns were almost non-existent or favoured 
the car as a clean replacement for the horse (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 1997). Inexpensive 
and plentiful fossil fuels, therefore, became the reason for the growth of the automobile 
industry. However, the use of biofuels can, in theory, minimise several of the negative 
environmental externalities observed with the use of traditional petrol fuel. Figure 6.1, 
initially presented in Chapter 1, gives a graphic description of the major automobile 
environmental externalities which were the object of previous analysis in the literature. 
Biofuels have the potential to provide positive benefits to several areas of environmental 
interest, including: oil dependency, air pollution and infrastructure costs.
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Figure 6.1- Automobile externalities tackled by the Proalcool.
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Source: Adapted from Delucchi (2003).
The primary negative environmental externality that can be curbed with ethanol is the 
overall reduction in the dependency on imported petrol fuel. In the case o f Brazil, the use 
of a locally produced crop to the detriment o f imported petrol fuel was one o f the main 
arguments used to support the large state intervention in the fuel market. The substitution 
of imported fuel represented an important macro-economic tool to strengthen the balance 
of payments of the country. The dependency on foreign petrol oil was perceived by the 
military government as a key national development hurdle that needed to be overcome 
(Rotstein, 1979).
Biofuels can also limit the local and global air pollution caused by automobile emissions, 
including both tail-pipe and crankcase emissions (Goldemberg et al., 2008). Because 
ethanol is extracted from biological sources, the plant growth absorbs CO2 . Aside from 
CO2 , ethanol use has also resulted in the reduction o f several other pollutants.
The use of ethanol, in contrast to other alternative fuels or powertrain technologies, has a 
further positive economic effect as regards exploiting the investments already in place for 
the traditional petrol infrastructure. Therefore, the investments that have been made in
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pumping stations, with logistical systems and even production distilleries and distribution 
centres, can be used with minor changes. Additionally, the sunk costs are already in place 
to develop, construct and maintain these large infrastructures. Other alternative fuels such 
as hydrogen, and even electric vehicles in certain areas, need large infrastructure 
construction or adaptation. In some cases, the necessity of building new infrastructures 
may render the adoption of an alternative fuel or powertrain technology uneconomical.
6.3 - The legal license to operate
In 1973, the Brazilian government initiated a programme called the National Alcohol 
Program - Proalcool, which constitutes the most successful large-scale biofuel initiative 
in the world (Leite, 1990). This demonstrated the technical and economic feasibility of 
bio-ethanol as a substitute for traditional petrol fuel. In order to understand how the legal 
license was formed, it is important to appreciate the economic and political situation of 
Brazil at the time. Brazil in the 1970s was a country that was marked by a severe 
macroeconomic crisis due in part to the drastic rise in petrol fuel. At the time, Brazil 
imported 77% of all the petrol used. The internal agricultural sector was also in crises due 
to the growth in competition from other nations (Magalhes et al., 1992).
Since the 16th century, Brazil had been the world’s largest producer of sugar and this 
economic activity played a prominent role in the agro-industrial development of the 
country. In the political sphere, the rural sector had a strong political influence on the 
central dictatorial government which consequently favoured this sector, especially the 
sugar producers. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the internal sugar sector was in clear 
decline, as the international price of sugar had reached a historical low, there having been 
a large production expansion in Asian countries. The price severely declined from 
US$1,237 per ton in November 1974, to an average price of US$172 per ton in 1978 
(Mello, 1981). In addition, the sugar crisis had a severe impact on numerous other 
activities linked to sugar production, thereby causing high unemployment. In this
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economic climate, fostering the sugar sector was very desirable politically (Magalhaes et 
al., 1992).
Another key factor in the implementation of the Proalcool programme was the oil crisis 
of 1973. Since a large proportion of the oil consumed in the country was imported, the 
macroeconomic effects of the Arab oil embargo were extremely harsh. The internal 
spending on oil imports rose from US$600 million in 1973 to US$2.5 billon in 1974 
(Pamplona, 1984). The impact on the commercial balance of payments was devastating, 
causing rapidly rising inflation.
Since the early days of motoring in Brazil in the 1920s, ethanol had been thought of as a 
potential source of energy and had been a by-product of sugarcane production, this being 
used to manufacture other chemical materials. The first experiments with ethanol-fuelled 
vehicles had been carried out by 1925, with the development of the Ford Model T based 
prototypes. In 1935, a minimum blend of 5% ethanol to gasoline (E5) was introduced. 
However, it was not until the World War II period that ethanol was used on a wider basis. 
The north-eastern states were forced to use mixtures of up to 42% of ethanol and 
automobiles were only used in cases of an emergency. At that time, there were around 44 
ethanol distilleries producing 76.6 million litres of ethanol a year (Pamplona, 1984). The 
automobile fleet was mainly concentrated in the southern states, which were richer and 
had larger populations.
Therefore, in 1975, the military dictatorship government of General Ernesto Geysel 
launched the Proalcool programme to aggressively increase the demand for sugarcane- 
derived ethanol (Moreira and Goldemberg, 2000). This would simultaneously strengthen 
the Brazilian economy, boosting the agricultural sector and thereby creating a new 
biofuels sector, whilst reducing the country’s dependence on imported oil, and would 
reduce significant emissions in the large city centres of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. 
The programme had the ultimate goal of substituting all imported oil with locally 
produced ethanol, which could potentially make the country self sufficient in energy. The
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Brazilian government referred to it as a programme as it incorporated a series of legal 
mandates alongside various changes in the economic license to operate of the automobile 
industry, including changes in the tax system and other sorts of subsidies to ethanol. 
Energy independence was a long-term ambition of the military government, who 
perceived the lack of this as a crucial impediment to the long-term development and 
national security of the country (Leite, 1990).
The role of the dictatorship was crucial in the implementation of the Proalcool project. 
The central government had strong control over the economy, which included price 
fixing, and the state-ownership of several companies, including the only national oil 
petrol company - Petrobras. Notwithstanding this however, the implementation was 
troublesome. Different stakeholders in the process tried to gain control over the 
programme and bargained in their own interests (Sperling, 1987). These included 
Petrobras, which had a monopoly in oil exploration in Brazil, the government regulator, 
Instituto do Agucar e do Alcool -  IAA, the sugarcane and ethanol producers, and the 
automotive industry, which had been chosen by the government of Juscelino Kubitschek 
to lead the industrial process of import substitution and historically had received both 
direct and indirect incentives. Brazil had followed a policy of promoting local automotive 
suppliers, while encouraging foreign automotive assemblers to build the actual cars. This 
process was part of the wider development strategy established by President Kubistchec -  
known as the ‘substitution of imports’. In this way, the country benefited from foreign 
vehicle design expertise, whilst promoting technology transfer to local suppliers 
(Nieuwenhuis, 1988).
Several studies divide the Proalcool program into three phases, including those of 
Goldemberg et al. (2003), Leite (1990), Moreira and Goldemberg (2000) and Magalhaes 
et al. (1992). In the first phase in 1975, the government established an E22 blend to 
utilise spare capacity in sugarcane plantations and to foster the expansion of production 
with new ethanol refineries. This initial stage was essential to test the mechanical 
capabilities of existing engines and to understand the economic short-term effects of the
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initiative (Goldberg et al., 2003). This was also crucial for the government policy makers, 
who saw this as a take-off stage for the next, more radical phase. A crucial element of 
this phase was the strong support given to the Research and Development of the new 
ethanol-only engines. A government strategy to develop this initiative was devised at the 
state owned research institute Centro Tecnologico Aeronautico- CTA. (Section 4 
describes in more detail the government’s role in the research and development of 
ethanol only engines.) These were a benchmark in the modem automobile industry as it 
was the first time that modem internal combustion engines ran solely on ethanol.
A second phase started in 1979 with the goal of launching ethanol-only vehicles, 
designed for using E l00 (100% ethanol fuel). This was a novel approach which greatly 
promoted the demand for sugar-cane. As a result, there was a large expansion in 
production as well as in the development of other industries in the ethanol supply chain, 
including the internal chemical industry, agricultural machines and the research and 
development o f new sugarcane varieties by the state-owned company Embrapa. In this 
period, ethanol production flourished, reaching its peak in 1986 with 96% o f new 
vehicles sold being E l00 versions (ANFAVEA, 2007).
At the end of this phase, ethanol vehicles constituted most of the vehicles sold in the 
country. The supply chain was mature, as producers and distributors were operating fully, 
while the initial technical problems of ethanol engines had been solved. These included 
cold starts, high consumption and the excessive corrosion of plastic components. At this 
point, the ethanol government initiative in Brazil was hailed as a great success.
The third and final phase o f the alcohol programme started in 1987, when the subsidies 
were gradually reduced until the program officially came to an end. According to the 
governmental documents o f the time, the ethanol market was mature and did not need 
further financial subsidies. The legal license was also changed as automakers could 
supply merely petrol-fuelled vehicles. The government had other priorities which 
required large investments. After 1987, the price of petrol had also decreased
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significantly, which placed in question the economic feasibility of the ethanol production 
levels.
In the three phases o f the program, the consumer demand for new ethanol vehicles and 
for ethanol was directly influenced by the economic benefits of using ethanol. The public 
perception o f the new technology included several variables, such as the running costs, 
the reliability o f ethanol cars, the availability of ethanol at gas stations and the resale 
value o f ethanol-only vehicles. Another important issue that was accounted for by the 
consumer was the availability o f conversion kits that could be used at a relatively low 
cost to transform gasoline vehicles into ethanol ones. During the first and second phases 
o f the program, ethanol-only vehicles surged as the dominant automotive product sold in 
Brazil, following a large marketing campaign to foster the use of the fuel. However, the 
demand for new ethanol-only vehicles was particularly responsive to the variations in the 
supply o f ethanol and the policies implemented to foster the use o f ethanol, including the 
initial marketing campaign based on nationalist arguments. However, during the third 
phase o f the programme, the demand for E l 00 vehicles reached a historic low.
According to a study conducted by Moreira and Goldemberg (2000), the crisis in ethanol 
use and production in the third phase was the result of a combination of economic factors 
and the consumer reaction to some of the system inefficiencies. The government 
gradually decreased the subsidies o f ethanol production, not only reducing benefits to the 
producers but also removing the tax waiver for new ethanol-only vehicles. The demand 
for new ethanol vehicles was particularly elastic in relation to the supply and price of the 
fuel at the pumps, rapidly shifting from ethanol to gasoline vehicles, as the price of 
ethanol was approximately 80% o f gasoline prices.
This change o f preferences was also sparked by the large ethanol shortage in the internal 
market, as the international price o f sugar rose significantly. Many ethanol producers 
decided to produce sugar instead, which forced the national oil company, Petrobras, to 
import ethanol. The ethanol production decline was also promoted by low petrol prices 
resulting from cheaper oil worldwide, which made the economic feasibility of ethanol
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production uncertain. The international price o f petrol plummeted from US$72.40 a 
barrel in 1980 to US$21.85 by mid-1986 (adjusted for inflation to 1999 US dollars), and 
remained relatively flat until the beginning o f the Gulf War in the 1990s (Energy 
Information Administration, 2007).
The stability o f petrol prices during this period directly affected the prices of gasoline 
sold in Brazil and consumers rapidly abandoned ethanol-powered vehicles in favour of 
petrol cars. Petrol began to be considered a more reliable fuel as its price had remained 
constant for many years and it appeared to be less susceptible to price fluctuations than 
ethanol. In addition to this, petrol was known to be constantly available at every fuel 
station, which became less true for ethanol as demand slipped and production volumes 
followed suit.
Even today, this continues to be an important issue. The cost of Brazilian ethanol is about 
$35 per barrel, which means that the oil price needs to be above about $40 per barrel for 
it to compete with oil (Eggar, 2007).
It was not until 2003 that ethanol demand recovered with the introduction of flex fuel 
engine systems. These engine management systems, developed in Brazil by Bosch and 
Magneti Marelli, enable a vehicle to function with ethanol, gasoline or any mixture of the 
two19. This also eliminates consumer risk, there no longer being the uncertainty that was 
previously related to the purchase o f a vehicle which had to be either gasoline fuelled or 
ethanol fuelled. Consumer risk was dramatically reduced as the chance of running out of 
the right fuel and the risk o f mis-fiielling were significantly reduced. Consumers now 
tend to opt for ethanol whenever ethanol is at least 75% of the price of petrol, as it 
provides enhanced performance and this is a well-known reason for its use in motor 
racing. The introduction o f the flex engine combined with high oil prices and the rising
19 - Sperling indicates that the flex fuel engines were initially developed and offered in the American
market in the early 1990s. Flex fuel engines were widely available in small trucks. However, few 
consumers actually used the ethanol capabilities due to the lack o f infrastructure in the US. This situation 
changed after 2005, when there was a concentrated effort from the central government to developed ethanol 
fuel (Sperling, personal communication, 08 March 2007).
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demand for cars in Brazil has sharply driven up domestic ethanol demand. By November 
2005, flex fuel variants represented 70.9% o f Brazil’s total vehicle sales (ANFAVEA 
2007). Figure 1 shows the evolution o f gasoline, ethanol and flex-fuel vehicles sold on 
the Brazilian market between 1975 and 2005. After 2003, flex-fuel vehicles are included 
in the ethanol group. Figure 6.2 shows the fluctuations in the demand for ethanol-only 
vehicles for new car sales.
Figure 6.2 - New car sales according to type o f fuel.
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Source: ANFAVEA (2007).
6.4 - T h e  eco n o m ic  licen se  to  o p e ra te
In March 1975, the first internal documents supporting a national set o f measures to 
promote bio-ethanol for transportation purposes emerged in the Brazilian Federal 
government. Active groups that voiced their early support for a national plan included 
industry associations and sugar cane producers. In response, the Ministry o f Industry and 
Trade established a study group to examine the benefits and costs o f a national program 
to make ethanol a widely-used fuel in the country (Roststein, 1979).
154
One o f the key barriers for the use o f bio-ethanol as a fuel alternative was the lack of 
mass-produced ethanol engines which would perform as petrol counterparts. The 
Secretary o f Industrial Technology, Jose Walter Bautista Vidal, invited Dr. Urbano 
Stumpf, who was a professor o f mechanical engineering at the University of Brasilia, to 
lead the government research team that would ultimately develop ethanol-only engines. 
Professor Stumpf was given the task o f putting together a research team that would be 
responsible for assessing the necessary technical measures required to develop internal 
combustion engines running on ethanol. The team was based at the Centro Technological 
Aeroespacial - CTA in Sao Jose dos Campos, where Professor Stumpf had conducted 
research on engine development in the early 1950s.
The initial task o f  the research team was to prove that bio-ethanol could be combined 
with gasoline. At the time the results indicated that a mixture of up to 15% could be 
safely used with the existing engines. However, the goal was to establish the 
development o f engines that would run solely on bio-ethanol.
In order to accomplish this, the Brazilian government used a mixture of command-and- 
control (C&C) measures and market-based instruments- MBIs to foster the increase in the 
demand for the new fuel. The incentives were gradually modified, taking into account the 
market reaction at each stage o f the program, and involved the following:
•  The Brazilian state-owed Petrobras was forced to purchase a minimum 
amount o f ethanol, so that ethanol producers would have a guaranteed minimum 
demand for their product. Petrobras also had the legal and financial responsibility for 
distributing and offering ethanol in every one o f the 29,000 filling stations in the 
country (Professor Goldemberg, personal communication, 18 December 2006);
•  Subsidies in the form of low interest loans were specifically designed for and 
provided to companies willing to enter the ethanol production market (from 1980 to 
1985);
•  The common price fixing instrument used as a macroeconomic tool to curb
inflation was taken as the basis for making ethanol prices competitive with gasoline.
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Ethanol prices at the pump were established at 59% of the gasoline price. This was 
intended to make the use of ethanol more appealing to the consumer, as ethanol 
engines consumed an average o f 30% more;
•  Gasoline received an additional tax. A part o f this tax was used to finance the 
subsidised loans that were given to the ethanol producers;
•  In order to enhance the demand for ethanol-only vehicles, a differentiated tax 
system was established for new vehicles. Under this system, ethanol-only cars were 
in a smaller tax bracket, while gasoline cars paid more tax. Additionally, ethanol 
taxis and commercial vehicles were exempt from paying the new vehicle tax.
The country also received external aid for the initiative. The World Bank perceived the 
macroeconomic importance o f the initiative as a tool to balance the external balance of 
payments and to produce positive effects on inflation. It therefore provided a conditional 
loan o f US$ 200 million to support the program (Goldberg et al., 2003).
The role o f the automotive industry in the process should be highlighted as a fundamental 
factor for the successful introduction o f ethanol in Brazil. In the initial stages of the 
ethanol program, there was some controversy among the car manufacturers, who publicly 
questioned the government’s commitment (Roststein, 1979). Some of these regarded the 
initiative simply as a short-term political stunt to satisfy the sugar-cane lobby. The issue 
o f using agricultural land for feeding cars rather than people was also questioned, Brazil 
being a country with many poor people. The most vocal of these manufacturers was the 
independent Brazilian car producer Gurgel (Nieuwenhuis, 1988).
This negative attitude towards the initiative progressively changed as the government
provided extensive indirect subsidies to the industry in the form of tax credits and direct
financial support for the development o f the technical modifications needed to adapt the
existing petrol-fuelled intemal-combustion engines. Some fundamental mechanical issues
had to be addressed before each car manufacturer was able to fully adapt the CTA’s
engine developments to their production systems, which meant that the car producers had
to believe in the government’s ethanol proposal and invest their own resources in
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research and development for the new engines. In fact, in 1979 the large-scale 
manufacturer had difficulty complying with the technical targets that had been set up by 
the CTA for the new engines. There was an excessive increase in fuel consumption and 
several technical problems in relation to cold starts and the corrosion of parts.
The extraordinary relationship that the automobile firms operating in Brazil had with the 
government is a key factor to understanding the major instruments utilised by the 
government. This relationship was a reflection o f the historical provision of financial 
privileges to automobile firms, since during the 1960s they were perceived as important 
instruments o f economic growth. At the time the largest players in the Brazilian market 
were Volkswagen, Ford, General Motors (Chevrolet) and FIAT and they had a protected 
market because imports were limited by high import tariffs. In addition, they received 
significant fiscal and financial benefits for producing vehicles in Brazil.
Aside from these four large factories, other smaller automobile firms also participated in 
the Brazilian market. These included Gurgel and Puma, which supplied the small 
segment o f niche and sports car components. Mechanically they were based on the 
Volkswagen beetle and used a carbon fibre body. However, from 1975 to 1982, the 
market for new vehicles sold in Brazil changed significantly. High oil prices and the 
introduction o f ethanol-only vehicles caused the Brazilian consumer to be more interested 
in smaller and fuel efficient cars.
The demise o f the Brazilian Chrysler was also a significant factor in the modification of 
the market for new vehicles and the change in the tastes of the Brazilian consumer hit 
manufacturers specialising in cars with V8 engines especially hard. Chrysler ceased 
production o f the three models that were produced in Brazil -  the Dodge Polara, the 
Dodge Dart and the Dodge Le Baron in 198120. However, the most important market
20 - In 1979 Volkswagen purchased 67% o f the Brazilian Chrysler. In 1980, the demand for the Dodge V8 
was only 388 vehicles, and the factory had no orders for the more powerful Charger R/T. In the same year, 
Volkswagen purchased the remaining 33% o f Chrysler. In 1981 the factory ceased production o f the Dodge 
models as the demand was practically zero. The Old Chrysler plant was eventually used for the production
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entrant in the Brazilian market was FIAT, which started to produce small and compact 
vehicles in the Minas Gerais factory in 1976. One employee interviewed had the 
following to say:
Fiat has been a pioneer in the Proalcool program. There was a clear force behind the firm 
strategy to help developed products that would be suitable for ethanol... the technology 
development in FIAT, made the 147 one of the best cars at the time in Brazil. This was 
quickly recognised by the consumer. (FIAT do Brasil Representative, personal 
communication, 19 December 2006)
Fiat was the first large-scale automobile manufacturer to produce ethanol-only vehicles, 
which it did in 1979. The firm had always been interested in launching ethanol-only 
vehicles and in 1976, when the first manufacturing plant in Brazil was opened, there was 
a public exhibition o f the Fiat 147 ethanol prototype. However, the firm only launched 
mass-produced vehicles after the government provided economic guarantees (Veja, 
1979). Notwithstanding the pioneering market release by FIAT, other manufacturers 
soon followed in their footsteps, including Volkswagen, Ford and General Motors. All of 
these were already strong firms in the Brazilian market and merely adjusted their product 
line-ups to better suit the demands o f the ethanol engines (Veja, 1979).
The tradition o f heavily subsidising the automobile sector continued with the Proalcool. 
The program was designed with a large participation of industry representatives and the 
government knew that the success o f such a large initiative also had to involve economic 
benefits for the stakeholders involved in the process, especially the consumer and the 
automobile companies. Ford calculated an increase in the price of the new vehicles sold 
due to the investment in the new technology (5,000 to 10,000 Cruzeiros being around 5% 
o f the final price o f the car), which was almost all passed on to the consumer, as the 
elasticity of demand for new vehicles was relatively inflexible (Veja, 1980).
o f Volkswagen ethanol-powered trucks that used an updated version of the Chyrsler 318 V8 engine.
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Automobile producers possessed a great deal o f influence over the central government 
and effectively lobbied the federal government to set up several policy instruments, 
including direct subsidises for the production of ethanol and the use of research and 
development programs to form the economic license to operate. Consequently, the 
industry could move towards producing ethanol-only vehicles without changing the 
traditional business model o f the auto industry and still rely on the internal combustion 
engines and the all-steel-body frame structure.
During the years o f the Proalcool, the model line of Brazilian cars changed dramatically 
and the large American-based vehicles were replaced by smaller ones. At the end of the 
Proalcool programme, the Brazilian market was changed by the participation of the 
newly established FIAT and the demise of Dodge. The other car manufacturers also 
changed their product lines considerably. The vehicles were now based on smaller, 
European-based models, instead o f the larger American vehicles. For example, in the mid 
1970s, Ford was producing the Maverick, which was replaced by the Del Rey, a smaller 
car that had been produced under the Corcel platform.
6.5 - The social license to operate
In the context o f the license to operate framework, the social license to operate is shaped 
by a variety o f stakeholders. The requirements o f the social actors which the firm must 
comply with belong to a wide range of interest groups, including: local communities, 
national environmental groups, workers, media, consumers and society in general.
In the case o f the ethanol engines, the consumers and the Brazilian society in general had 
initially been identified as the central stakeholder which governmental policy had to 
focus upon. In order to gain the public support for the initiative, the ministry of trade and 
industry decided to market the new technology with learning demonstrations. In 1976, the 
CTA team possessed fully working prototypes which were ethanol-only based for the 
Volkswagen Fusca engine (Volkswagen Beetle). The next step was to present a working 
demonstration o f ethanol-only engines.
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The research team presented the idea of a national rally. This would demonstrate the 
technology that had been developed by the CTA and would provide a public display of 
the possibilities. This would allow for further research funds and would present to the 
Brazilian society the results that were visible in the labs. (Representative Ministry of 
Trade and Commerce, personal communication, 15 December 2006)
In 1976, a widely-marketed public demonstration was launched under the name of The 
First National Integration Circuit for the Integration of Alcohol Vehicles. The route was 
planned to take in more than 8,000 kilometres in 23 days (Veja, 1979). The vehicles that 
took part in the rally were as follows:
• A Volkswagen Fusca 1300: this was the most popular and cheapest vehicle 
available on the Brazilian market. The CTA prototypes used Fusca 1300 engines;
•  A Gurgel Jipe Xavante that was on loan from Joao Conrado do Amaral Gurgel, 
the owner o f the Brazilian automotive firm Gurgel; this vehicle was also powered 
by a Volkswagen 1300 engine:
• A Chrysler Dodge 1800: Chrysler was the first large-scale manufacturer to be 
interested in the ethanol project. The Dodge 1800 was a two-door version with a 
large engine from the British Hillman Avenger. It was launched in 1973 and its 
name was changed in 1976 to the Dodge Polara (Samata, 2003).
The vehicles left de Sao Jose do Campos and had scheduled stops in Sao Paulo, Manaus, 
Cuiab£, Porto Velho, Vilhena and Manaus. The last leg of the rally from Vilhena to 
Manaus was on more than 1000 kilometres o f unpaved roads in the rough tropical 
conditions o f the Amazon Forest (Veja, 1979). This initiative received considerable press 
attention at the time, and the local populations gathered to see the rally pass through the 
selected towns (Veja, 1979).
The successful outcome of the learning demonstration proved that the ethanol-only 
engines could be used in real life situations. Following this, a set of policy measures were 
established by the federal government to foster the use of ethanol engines. Government-
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owned firms became the early adopters of the new developments, thereby giving a wider 
exposure to the technical feasibility o f the engines in real life situations, and this helped 
to advertise the initiative, with several state-owned firms being given new ethanol retro­
fitted gasoline vehicles. These vehicles had large logos displaying that there were fuelled 
with the new home grown fuel. The government at the time had several firms that could 
provide general services in large cities and the purchasing power of the public sector was 
used to enhance the initial market penetration o f ethanol-only vehicles. The government 
became an early adopter o f the technology, buying the first 750 vehicles to be retro-fitted 
under the CTA’s supervision.
The early use o f ethanol-fuelled vehicles was restricted to government owned companies 
or taxi firms, and only authorised drivers could fuel their vehicles with ethanol in the 
pump stations. The Sao Paulo government-owned phone company -Telesp - received the 
first 25 vehicles in August 1977 as part o f the first CTA prototypes; after its successful 
initial use, a subsequent batch o f 400 Volkswagen Fuscas was received in 1979. These 
cars were used in Sao Paulo as maintenance vehicles and were driven on a 24-hour basis 
(Veja, 1979). In total, the CTA supervised the ethanol conversion of 731 Fuscas, this 
being carried out by the private firm, Majorit; they also set the technical standards for the 
engines and the bio-ethanol fuel that was to be produced in the following years.
The public display o f the technology development was key to gaining media attention for 
the new fuels, as well as providing the validity o f the new fuel as a feasible alternative 
and making the population aware o f the fact that the performance level of the cars would 
not be affected. The national rally was therefore a very strong market signal for 
automobile firms, auto-part suppliers and consumers.
This enhanced the phase o f the learning demonstrations and the made the public aware 
that the technology would actually work. The demand by the government was also a 
strong signal that this initiative was not a temporary measure and that it needed to be 
seriously considered by the automobile firms.
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6.6 - The effects of the program
6.6.1 - Short term effects
It is important to emphasise that the greatest concern about the program was the 
economic outcome. Several authors have applied distinctive methodologies to calculate 
the macroeconomic value o f this program. According to Nastari et al. (2005), between 
1976 and 2004, the use o f ethanol for automotive fuel purposes provided savings of up to 
US$60.74 billion (in constant dollars of 2005) for the Brazilian government. If the 
external debt interest rate is included in the calculations, the figure adds up to US$121.26 
billion. These figures support the initial economic arguments for sustaining the program. 
Ashford (1989) provides different figures that are less optimistic, but his outcome is still 
positive. According to his analysis, between 1975 and 1989 the savings were US$10.4 
billion, with government subsidies of US$9 billion. These figures corroborate the initial 
idea that Proalcool was a macroeconomic tool to correct distortion in the international 
balance o f payments, as it substituted imported oil for locally produced ethanol fuel. In 
addition, the generous subsidies to the sugar sector and to the distilleries reflected 
positively in generating aggregate national wealth, and this directly affected the national 
economy.
Another factor that should be considered is that the renewable nature of biofuels impacts
positively on the economic rate of return in ethanol production. In fossil fuel extraction,
additional investments are needed on a regular basis in order to sustain a constant
extraction rate and these are dependent on the number of years each reserve can offer.
With biofuels, sunk costs can be amortised over a very large number of years as the same
area can provide production indefinitely, allowing for adequate crop rotation and
agricultural management. However, the use of agricultural chemicals may be an issue.
For example, the growing feedstock for biofuels has been linked with increased
emissions o f nitrous oxide as a result o f the use o f nitrogen fertiliser. The global warming
potential o f nitrous oxide is about 300 times that of carbon dioxide (Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament (CEC), 2007, p.9) and is therefore a potential
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problem. Nevertheless, current research suggests that on a wheel-to-wheel basis, 
Brazilian bio-ethanol from sugar cane has one of the best greenhouse gas saving 
potentials o f any biofuel, which has been estimated up to 90% compared with petrol 
(CEC, 2007, p. 11). This compares with a more modest 50% for bio-diesel from palm oil 
and 30% for bio-diesel from soya bean production (CEC, 2007, 11). The ethanol 
production learning curve also reveals that the cost of ethanol falls sharply as experience 
is accumulated in ethanol production (Goldenberg et al., 2003). This provides a 
competitive figure for the $ to tonne o f carbon saved.
6.6.2 - Long term  effects
In the initial discussions about the Proalcool programme, along with the economic value 
o f this policy, the government put forward several socio-economic objectives which were 
fundamental not only to justify the program on economic grounds, but also on ethical 
grounds, it being a developing country with a high divergence of income levels. The 
social objectives included: the reduction o f regional income disparities, the reduction of 
individual income disparities - especially between rural and urban areas- and the creation 
o f a large number o f new jobs. Whether or not these goals can be achieved, however, is 
questionable (Sperling, 1987).
An essential aspect o f the programme was that it was able to create approximately a 
million jobs directly and several million indirectly, mostly in the deprived rural areas of 
Brazil (Magalhaes et al., 1992); this was in line with the initial goals of the program. 
Estimates calculate that in order to produce the same amount of energy, ethanol in Brazil 
generated 152 times more jobs than oil production (Magalhaes et al., 1992). However, 
this argument has to be weighed by the quality of the jobs created. Most of these were 
low-wage workers, the so-called ‘boias-frias’. This term signifies the lowest class of 
workers, who were hired to perform specific and relatively unskilled tasks on a temporary 
basis. The term comes from the Portuguese expression ‘cold meal’, as these poor workers 
had to bring their own food with them and had no means of heating it before eating. The 
working conditions of those workers could have been improved significantly, especially
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in relation to working hours and pay; however, the government was only able to 
effectively intervene in this area after the introduction of the 1988 constitution.
6.6.3 - The effects on industry environmental performance
The Proalcool program was created based primarily on economic arguments. However, 
the environmental dimension had always been a preoccupation of the program. The initial 
working group set up at the ministry o f trade and industry, indicated as one of the main 
arguments for the implementation of the program, the enhancement of the quality of air 
in major Brazilian city centres:
The air quality of the large city centres of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte, 
will significantly increase following a gradual switch to ethanol fuelled engines. This will 
produce a positive impact on the quality of life of the people living in these cities. (Free 
translation) (Brasil, 1976)
The document also indicates that without the benefits to various areas, a large program 
would not have been backed up by ministries and governmental agencies. Despite, this 
positive view o f the member o f the working group, Brazilian society had concerns 
relating to pollution that could be caused by the expansion of sugar cane plantations. At 
the beginning of the program, the general public perceived gasoline as a cleaner 
alternative to the local sugar cane production. Not only were there preoccupations 
relating to the waste produced by the sugar cane plantations, but also because the 
producers traditionally burned the sugar cane plantations after harvest (Rotstein, 1978). 
In 1979, there was no clear consensus in the Brazilian press about the effect of ethanol on 
the environment (Copersucar, 1989).
Gasoline engines release carbon monoxide which is highly pollutant but is not as visible 
to the population. The ethanol engine, however, does not emit this substance, but does 
produce a large quantity o f aldehydes. This is a polluting substance that has several 
adverse health effects on humans, such as eye redness, sore throat and skin irritation.
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However, in the second phase, the environmental agenda started to play a more 
prominent role since ethanol had many beneficial chemical and physical properties in 
contrast to the gasoline used at the time. These included: lower toxicity, better 
combustion and lower exhaust emissions, no sulphur emissions, lower emissions o f 
photochemical smog precursors, biodegradability and a higher octane rating (up to 120, 
compared with 85-95 for most types o f petrol). Figure 6.2 shows some of the first results 
with E l00 fuel in Volkswagen and Ford engines.
Figure 6.2 - Gasoline engine emissions compared to E l00
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The city o f  Sao Paulo, which had a traditional problem with smog and toxic emissions 
from automobiles, experienced a significant improvement in air quality and after the 
introduction o f E l00 (100% ethanol fuel), emissions were drastically reduced. Figure 6.3 
presents the reduction in global emissions observed in the city o f Sao Paulo. The figures 
relate to ethanol free gasoline (pre-1980), gasoline C (E22), and ethanol (E l00) and 
compares gas exhaust emissions for new vehicles from pre-1980 to 1994.
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Figure 6.3 - Total emissions verified in the City o f  Sao Paulo.
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Source: Confederacao Nacional da Industria (1990).
The CNI Association also calculated the environmental impact o f the ethanol in the city 
o f Sao Paulo; according to this analysis, if  the entire automobile fleet had been totally 
converted to E l00 fuel, there would have been a total decrease o f 65% in C 02 emissions, 
58% in HC emissions (although the precise mix of hydrocarbons varies e.g. higher 
formaldehyde levels, cf. Nieuwenhuis et al., 1992, p.96) and no significant modification 
in NOx emissions. As these benefits translate into each individual vehicle running on 
ethanol, it highlighted the contribution ethanol-fuelled vehicles made to the city o f Sao 
Paulo in terms o f air quality improvement (Confederacao Nacional da Industria, 1990).
It is true that sugar cane monoculture over the years has had a series of negative impacts 
on Brazilian biodiversity. This was especially so in the establishment of the sugar cane 
farms in the 17th and 18th centuries as it was carried out at the expense o f virgin forest 
(Padua, 2002). The production o f sugar cane has also created a number of negative 
environmental consequences in the country. The most important ones are related to the 
monoculture nature o f the plantations which need to be cultivated in very large areas. 
These plantations have directly impacted on local biodiversity, with the potential loss of 
several vegetable and animal species. However, if  the period o f the Proalcool is focused
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on in isolation, the negative externalities o f  ethanol production relate to the production 
process o f the sugar cane derived fuel and not to deforestation and loss of biodiversity.
Figure 6.4 - C 02  emissions reduction due to the implementation of ethanol
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Source: Confederacao Nacional da Industria (1990).
The most polluting sub-product o f sugarcane production is vinhoto, which has been 
carelessly discarded in rivers for decades, thereby causing water contamination. This by­
product must be properly treated and can be transformed into fertiliser. Nowadays, 
vinhoto is mainly used as a fertiliser and provides an extra income for sugar cane 
producers. In fact, in Brazil sugar cane production is considered one of the cleanest and 
most efficient agro-industrial production systems (Representative of the Ministry of the 
Environment, personal communication, 11 December 2006). Another negative 
environmental externality was the traditional practice o f burning sugar cane plantations 
after the cane had been extracted. This causes polluting emissions, soil nutrient loss and 
erosion. According to the Brazilian Ministry o f the Environment, these practices are 
disappearing in the country, with very few exceptions in isolated areas in the north­
eastern states (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente (MMA), 2003). However, it is known that 
these practices still occur, especially in more isolated states that do not have a well- 
enforced system o f fire detection (interviews).
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6.7 - Conclusions
The Brazilian ethanol program is a case o f partial innovation, and has different 
characteristics from the previous two cases presented in this thesis.
The environmental dimension was not a central element of political salience at the time in 
the Brazilian society. However, significant elements have been indentified that indicate 
the environmental importance o f the program. In fact, these environmental effects had 
been indicated in the first document that proposed the constitution of a large scale policy 
to promote the use o f locally produced ethanol to the detriment of imported petrol fuel.
In the context o f the license to operate framework, the government had been able to shape 
the economic, social and legal licenses simultaneously, providing support for the 
modification in the industries’ environmental performance. The successful adoption of 
mass-produced ethanol-only engines was only possible because of the right combination 
of shapes o f licenses. The interplay between the different licenses has produced a positive 
environmental effect as the industry has successfully switched from gasoline-fuelled 
engines to ethanol, so generating significant environmental gains.
The chapter also shows that the government has been the central force steering industry 
to launch ethanol-only engines. The combination of the legal and the economic license 
have lead to the commercial launch o f ethanol-only engines. The automobile industry had 
already indicated the technical capability and willingness to make ethanol-only engines. 
However, the industries only embarked on the ethanol initiative after the economic 
license to operate had been in shaped in their favour. The industry used its excellent 
relationship with the military government to actively shape the economic license, and 
obtain several advantages, including: the organisation of the supply chain of ethanol, the 
process o f R&D and the creation o f an appropriate economic environment with a
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combination o f market-based instruments and command-and-control measures for ethanol 
to become cost-competitive. The government was also able to directly influence the social 
license, as a large marketing campaign was conducted to convince the Brazilian consumer 
o f the qualities o f the ethanol-powered vehicles.
In this respect, the case study indicate an important area that the 'greening of industry' 
field has not paid attention to, namely the interplay between the licenses to operate as a 
crucial element to understand the relationship between environmental policy, 
technological development, market imperatives and social benefits. Therefore, the 
modifications that have been observed in the industry’s environmental performance have 
been the consequence o f the joint modifications observed in the three licenses, and not in 
the industries corporate environmental strategy.
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Chapter 7 - The European Union End-of-Life Vehicle Directive
7.1 - Introduction
The following chapter analyses the European Union End-of-Life Vehicle directive (EU 
ELV) directive in the context of the 'license to operate' framework. It provides the third 
case study presented in this thesis and addresses the negative environmental externality of 
waste generation which has been a significant issue in Europe. This has been driven by 
pressure from landfill and the expense o f dumping waste, particularly in Italy, France and 
Germany (Institute for European Environmental Policy, 1996). These specific issues had not 
been systematically addressed by any other previous environmental regulation and 
required a novel approach.
The chapter begins with the implementation of the EU ELV directive and introduces the 
conceptual framework o f Extended Producer Responsibility, which is the core theoretical 
notion o f the legal license. Following this, the main elements of the EU ELV directive are 
presented. The chapter also discusses the economic and social licenses and the short-term 
effects o f the directive.
7.2 - The relevance of this case study
The EU ELV directive is a distinct case study from the two automobile regulations of an 
environmental nature previously analysed in this work. It tackles a different kind of 
negative externality and has been more recently implemented, which limits a more 
detailed ex-post analysis. It does not come into full force until 2015. Figure 6.1 represents 
the negative environmental externalities that have been addressed in the literature. The 
highlighted area represents waste caused by the inappropriate displacement of end-of-life 
vehicles, or ELVs. The leakage o f oils in landfields and rivers also constitutes an 
important environmental issue that is tackled by the EU ELV directive. ELVs also impact
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on the use o f  land for landfill space and produce the contamination o f metals and other 
chemicals besides oil (Bontoux and Leone, 1997). These negative externalities are perhaps 
not as evident as those addressed by the air emission regulations, and their impact is more 
indirect. This explains why the waste generated by ELVs was not considered a relevant 
environmental issue in the early days o f motoring. Perhaps, as with air pollution, it is a 
question o f  numbers. As the population o f ELVs grew, so the disposal problem came to 
be one o f increasing significance. Automobile Shredder Residue (ASR) is classified 
nowadays as hazardous waste, but perhaps also like air pollution earlier it was not 
sufficiently appreciated how much of a problem scrapped cars really were (Gonzalez- 
Femandez et al. 2008).
Figure 7.1 -  Automobile externalities tackled by the EU ELV Directive
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By the time the ELV directive was established in Europe, the directive had helped to 
address the annual creation o f around 9 million tonnes of waste in 15 members o f the 
European Community (Institute for European Environmental Policy, 1996).
The EU ELV directive constitutes an important landmark in the environmental regulation
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applied to the automobile industry. Not only is the directive a pioneering attempt to 
tackle material waste from vehicles in the last stage of their life cycle, but it also 
constitutes a novel legal concept, that of the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) 
principle (Lifset, 1993). The European Union has taken the leadership in dealing with this 
specific negative externality which has become a major problem in large cities in Europe, 
where space has a significant value for society (Bontoux and Leone, 1997). The next 
section discusses the legal license to operate according to the collection, treatment, reuse 
and recovering o f targets.
7.2 - The legal license to operate
The European Union legislation for the treatment o f end-of-life vehicles was established 
by the EU Directive 2000/53/EC. The main goal o f the directive was to prevent the waste 
from vehicles in the last stage o f their life cycle and to foster the reuse, recycling and 
other forms o f recovery o f end-of-life vehicles and their components. In order to do so, 
the directive indicated the reduction o f materials that are simply disposed of and used for 
landfill. Economic incentive instruments support the market for ELVs that deal with the 
end-of-life o f vehicles, which include dismantlers and recyclers of old cars21.
The Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) principle is the central legal principle that 
permeates the EU ELV directive (Johnson and Wang, 2002). One of the first definitions 
o f the EPR was developed by Lindhqvist (1992), this being:
The directive provides definitions o f the following terms: vehicle, end-of-life vehicle, producer, 
prevention, treatment, reuse, recycling, recovery, disposal, economic operators, hazardous substance, 
shedder. dismantling operation. Following the elements presented in the directive, the main legislative 
points are divided into specific articles that deal with the following: prevention, collection, treatment, reuse 
and recovery, coding standards/dismantling operation and specific procedures, such as entry into force and 
other technical requirements.
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[A] policy principle to promote total life cycle environmental improvements of product 
systems by extending the responsibilities of the manufacturer of the product to various 
parts of the product’s life cycle, and especially to the take-back, recovery and final 
disposal of the product. Lindhqvist (2000, p. 154)
This concept provides a systemic understanding o f the various ways businesses impact on 
the environment, as it incorporates the theoretical basis of life cycle thinking. In this 
respect, there is a change in perspective of firm accountability with regard to their 
products (Kibert, 2004). The legal and financial responsibility that is imposed by the EU 
ELV directive, invites firms to widen the analysis of the business model of the firm and 
move towards a more sustainable production system (Toyo, 2004). The EPR principle 
implies that the firm should take into account the life cycle of their product, including the 
last stage o f the life cycle o f the product. This is a significant step for the automobile 
industry that has become legally and financially responsible for waste management 
(Crotty and Smith, 2006). The other major environmental policies applied to the 
automobile industry (presented in Chapters 5 and 6) have not addressed the end-of-life 
phase, as the focus has until now been on the production and use phase.
Providing an economic instrument that makes the producers legally and financially 
responsible to collect, dismantle, treat, recycle their product and use it for landfill in the 
end o f the life cycle, may impose life cycle systems thinking on regulated firms (Toyo, 
2004). In the case o f the automobile industry, these issues have only recently been taken 
into consideration. Hitherto, the centre of attention has been on production, with the 
addition o f incremental end-of-pipe measures to solve specific problems, for instance the 
adoption o f the catalytic converter to solve air emission problems (Zapata and 
Nieuwenhuis, 2010).
Gerrard and Kandlikar (2007) present a time line of the ELV legislation, with the most 
important events concerning the establishment and implementation of the ELV directive.
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Table 7.2 — The EU ELV time line.
Year Major Facts
2000 ELV (ELVD) directive passed.
April 2002 Deadline for Member State transposition of ELV directive into 
national legislation (unmet by various countries).
June 2002 Amendment to ELVD Annex II.
Feb 2003 EC Decision establishing coding standards based on the ISO.
July 2003 ELVD ban on heavy metals comes into force.
March 2004 Proposal for Directive on Approval of Vehicles w.r.t. design 
for 2015 recovery targets -  COM (2004) 162 final.
Dec, 31st, 2005 Re-examination o f 2014 targets before this date.
2006 ELVD Target: 85% recoverability and 80% recyclability/re­
use.
Jan 2007 Free Take-back for vehicles put on the market before July 
2002.
2008 Estimated date for ‘design approval based recycling' 
requirements come into effect (3yrs after directive proposed in 
2004 is enacted).
2015 ELVD Target: 95% recoverability and 85% recyclability/re­
use.
Source: adapted from Gerrard and Kandlikar (2007)
On the 18th o f September 2000, the EU ELV Directive came into force (2000/53/EC). 
April, 2002 was the deadline for member state transposition of the ELV directive into the 
national legislation and the amendment to the ELV directive in June, 2002. In February, 
2003, coding standards were established based on the ISO and in July, the important ban 
on hazardous materials for new vehicles on sale came into force. According to this ban,
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new vehicles sold in the EU would not contain lead, mercury, hexavalent chromium or 
cadmium22.
The directive indicates the measures that need to be implemented by member states in 
order to prevent the generation of ELV waste; it takes a holistic approach as it 
incorporates the prevention concept into the design and production of new vehicles that 
should respect the principles o f dismantling, reuse and recovery. In this respect, it follows 
the general idea that the automobile should be designed with the intention of being 
recycled after the use phase. The directive also addresses certain materials considered to 
be hazardous that should not be used in the production o f new vehicles as of 1 July 2003. 
Some vehicle manufacturers had already carried this out (e.g. Volvo) with a list of 
chemicals to be avoided. There was also a list created by the chemical industry itself 
(Zoboli, 2000).
7.2.1 - The collection of ELVs
The directive directly addresses the collection o f ELVs. It states that the collection of the 
vehicle shall be done in such a way that the last owner or holder of the vehicle will not be 
financially responsible for the delivery of the vehicle to an authorised treatment facility. 
However, the last owner or holder must ensure that the vehicle possesses all the essential 
components, especially the engine and coachwork. Atasu et al. (2009) indicate that one of  
the relevant issues dictating the efficiency of take-back systems is the end-user 
willingness to participate in take-back programs.
The deregistration system demanded by the directive includes national systems for the 
collection o f all the end-of-life vehicles and used parts from repaired automobiles still in
22 A limited number of applications exempted from the provision of this article are listed in Annex
II to the Directive as well as scope and expiry date of the exemption and labelling requirement according to 
Article 4(2)(b)(iv)l
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use. This includes not only the legal aspects, with the introduction of the certificate of 
destruction when the vehicle is transferred to a treatment facility, but also the 
geographical availability o f collection facilities within the territory that are located at a 
reasonable distance.
7.2.2 - The treatment of ELVs
A minimum standard for the storage and treatment of end-of-life vehicles, with the 
minimum technical requirements, was set up in the directive. In order to standardise and 
limit the ELV operation facilities, the directive requires that each member state should be 
issued with a permit for operation facilities that will treat end-of-life vehicles. Inspections 
should be carried out by competent authorities in order to provide permits for the 
recovery operations for end-of-life vehicles; the authorities will therefore look at the type 
and the quantities o f waste to be treated; the technical requirements to be complied with, 
and the safety precautions that will be taken in the facilities (2000/53/EC).
The technical method o f treating end-of-life vehicles must include the stripping o f parts 
before treatment in order to minimise the impact on the environment, and components 
and materials should be labelled, with hazardous materials and substances removed and 
segregated so as not to contaminate the shedding of the vehicle. These authorised 
facilities will be encouraged to incorporate environmental management systems, 
into their business strategy (2000/53/EC).
6.2.3 - The reuse and recovery targets
The reuse and recovery targets o f the directive have been one of the most discussed 
aspects o f the EU ELV directive. The directive indicates that Member States should take 
the necessary measures to stimulate the reuse o f the components when this is possible, 
and to recover components that cannot be reused, so placing emphasis on recycling
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whenever this is possible (2000/53/EC).
Table 8.2 indicates the reuse and recovery targets proposed by the directive. Before the 
directive was established, car recyclers and dismantlers were already reusing and 
recovering up to 70 or 80% o f the vehicle (Funazaki et al., 2003). The directive, however, 
gives a minimum percentage o f 85% for ELV reuse and recovery in Member States. 
These limits were calculated by the average weight per vehicle with effect from January 
2006, to be increased to 95% by 2015. Less stringent limits of 80% and 85% respectively 
were set for reuse and recycling and consideration was given to the review of the re­
examination o f the targets and the establishment o f targets that go beyond 201523 
(2000/53/EC).
Table 7.3 -  EU ELV directive Reuse and Recovery Targets
Date ELV reuse and recovery 
Limits
Reuse and recycling Limits
Before the Legislation 70 -  80 % None -  variable depending 
on the market
1 January 2006 Minimum of 85% by an 
average weight per vehicle 
and year.
Minimum of 80% by an 
average weight per vehicle 
and year.
1 January 2015 Minimum of 95% by an 
average weight per vehicle 
and year.
Minimum of 85% by an 
average weight per vehicle 
and year.
Source: 2000/53/EC.
Material coding standards have also been set up. Dismantlers need to identify materials,
- Less stringent parameters for vehicles produced before 1980 have been set up.
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which can be used for reuse and recovery. Producers have, in this sense, to provide 
dismantling information for each type o f new vehicle that is launched on the market six 
months after the first units appear in the market, where different components and 
materials are used, and the location of all hazardous substances in the vehicle.
Another aspect o f information established by the directive concerns the implementation 
process o f the directive in each member state. A report at three-year intervals is required 
by the commission by each member state. In this report, there is relevant information 
regarding the possible changes in the structure o f motor vehicle commerce, and on the 
collection, dismantling, shedding, recovery and recycling industries that may result from 
the effects o f the competition between Member States. The latter should also require all 
the economic operators to publish information regarding the design of the vehicles and 
their components, the treatment o f end-of-life vehicles, any innovation regarding the 
reuse, recycling and recovery o f end-of-life vehicles, and any progress in the recovery 
and recycling to reduce waste.
These targets are not without criticism. ‘The approach taken to establish the parameters 
has been legalistic and not technical’ (UK Government Representative, personal 
communication, 22 August 2007). The establishment of future parameters have not 
always been technically feasible because the process that led to the implementation of the 
ELV directive was so complex. Lobbying by automobile firms has been an important 
element in this process; although the parameters have been set at 80%, 85% and 95%, the 
intrinsic uncertainty related to R&D and innovation remains as there is no guarantee that 
the targets set for 2015 will be met. Studies have also been conducted on the possibility 
o f meeting the 2015 recycling quotas, upgrading the technologies available for processing 
the light and heavy fraction o f the automotive shredder residue by developing the 
separation technologies and finding recycling possibilities for the products gained from 
the separation (Ferrao and Amaral, 2005). Additionally, extensive research in shedder 
technology requires extensive shredder residue separation and recycling technologies, as 
indicated by Francois (2003) and Vanherpe (2003 ).
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7.3 - The economic license to operate
The history o f how the implementation of the EU ELV came about provides relevant 
elements to understand the formation of the social license. In August 1990, the German 
Ministry o f the Environment (BMU) stated their intention to adopt the Extended 
Producers Responsibility as policy guiding principle for the end-of-life issue which was 
to be applied to car makers operating in Germany. Here, the proposed legislation planned 
to make automobile firms financially liable to collect and treat end-of-life vehicles at 
their own expense.
The automobile firms immediately opposed the direct regulation that would have resulted 
from the command-and-control framework. The strategy of the German Association of 
the Automotive Industry (VDA) was to create a study group to provide further 
information in relation to the issue and present a substitute solution for regulators. A 
study group called ‘Concept for the Future Processing of Old-Vehicles’ was therefore set 
up by the VDA to investigate the recycling and dismantling issues (Orsato et al., 2002).
The complexity o f automobile dismantling and recycling posed a great challenge for 
automakers as the vehicles had been constructed with no concern for dismantling and 
recycling. Therefore, the vast amount of material and number of parts made the entire 
operation a cumbersome activity. Pilot dismantling projects were later established and 
conducted for the creation o f ‘recycling networks* between the dismantling industry and 
the automobile firms (Orsato et al. 2002). These networks focused on larger plastic parts, 
such as bumpers, dashboards and other large homogenous plastic vehicle components; 
plastics were already perceived as a great challenge due to recycling technical limitations 
and the economic costs related to plastic recycling.
In 1991, ' Used-Car Utilization Project o f the German Automobile Industry' (PRAVDA)
was established and focused its efforts on the recycling of end-of-life vehicles. The VDA
elaborated a common concept for the recycling of vehicles, following new proposed
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targets to be established in conjunction with the industry (Orsato et al., 2002). The active 
members o f the group were BMW, Ford, Mercedes Benz, Opel, Porsche and the 
Volkswagen Group. PRAVDA contributed substantially to the draft of a joint recovery 
plan, which included: public information in relation to car recycling, testing material 
cycles, and most importantly, the implementation of large-scale experiments for 
dismantling and material recycling (Bunderministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, 
1999). As expected, the PRAVDA opposed the introduction of the Extended Producer 
Responsibility Principle for ELVs and offered an alternative solution. PRAVDA 
supported shared responsibility among all the stakeholders involved in the end-of-life 
issue and the self-regulation o f the industry in relation to the recycling targets and the 
economic costs of the system. In 1996, the BMU accepted the cooperative agreement.
The same cooperative agreements were followed in France - Accord Cadre and Italy - 
Fiat’s FARE system. Both the Italian and the French automobile industries associations 
proposed voluntary agreements. In the case of the French, the Accord Cadre was a 
consequence o f the ADEME 9, the French state agency for the Environment and Energy 
conservation to develop the policy framework for the European ELV project group. The 
Accord Cadre was an agreement between the government and the French automobile 
producers to reduce ELV disposal and the cooperation among the stakeholders of the 
ELV supply chain (Aggeri and Hatchuel, 1997).
In the case o f Italy, the government followed the lead of FIAT in dealing with ELVs and 
a network was created that was headed by the firm. A national agreement was established 
following the initial operating system of 1992 (Zoboli, 1998). In all these nations, there 
has also been an aspect o f regulatory capture, as national governments had to be willing 
to accept the voluntary proposals o f the home-based industries. The cooperative 
voluntary agreements constituted a positive short-term outcome for firms to escape direct 
strict regulations and for governments to accept a less stringent solutions.
On the EU-level the ELV was incorporated as a priority waste stream in 1989. The
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French were responsible for establishing an ELV Project group, following the experience 
of the Accord Cadre. The group was represented by the various representative 
stakeholders o f the ELV process, and in 1994, a proposed strategy was produced. The 
ELV project Group o f 1994 set up several targets, including the drainage of fluids, the 
recycling o f at least 85% of the total car weight by 2002 and the recycling of 95% by 
2015. In 1996, the European Commission (EC) perceived that the voluntary agreement 
model was flawed since there were substantial differences between agreements at 
national level and it requested parliament to present a proposal on ELVs and to make use 
o f the Producers Extended Responsibility Principle (Zoboli, 1998). The proposal was 
then duly prepared and presented as a directive. The proposal was the result of the ELV 
project group and a wide stakeholders’ consultation process that was carried out in the 
following years.
The use of the directive is based on the necessity to harmonise the ELV policies at EU- 
level. The creation o f a single European market meant that products could be bought and 
used without regard for national boundaries within the European Union. Hence, a 
common approach akin to European Type approval was logical. At the time the 
uncoordinated national efforts would generate negative effects on international 
competition, but harmonisation o f the standards would overcome this issue. The use of 
the directive also allowed for a certain flexibility of the member states in the framework 
o f the binding. The directive was eventually set up following other waste management 
principles adopted by the EU directive, which included the free take-back for the final 
consumer or holder of the vehicle (Zoboli, 1998).
The ELV directive was identified as one o f the first EU priorities on the waste stream 
program. Each member state has had to implement the general aspects of the directive by 
incorporating the directive to the national legislation. One of the most pressing aspects of 
the ELV directive has been the implementation of the directive at national levels. 
Ferguson (2007) indicates the following issues that have affected the implementation of 
the directive on the EU level. The majority of the problems are as follows:
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Export o f second-hand cars before they reach their end of life is an important (and 
possibly growing) feature of the European car market.
• The legitimate second-hand trade masks some illegal activities, such as the 
export o f wrecked or stolen cars.
• A significant number o f cars in some countries are being scrapped by unlicensed 
operators who remove the economically desirable parts.
• Some cars are still abandoned rather than properly scrapped.
• Some end-of-life vehicles are ‘garaged’ rather than scrapped. (Ferguson, 2007)
There is a great variety in the waste disposal arrangements between member states 
(European Commission, 2009). Some o f these were established before the EU ELV 
directive was set up so they have not been structured to comply with the regulations 
foreseen in the Directive. The EU ELV Directive also sought to regulate the cars that 
were already in the market. The negation process was particularly divisive as the 
automobile firms would not support the notion that they would have to take legal and 
financial responsibility for vehicles already in the market (Orsato et al., 2002). In 
addition, the EU ELV Directive did not contemplate the funding of the 2002-2007 period.
However, when the European Commission introduced the ELV directive, the industry 
was forced to follow stricter standards for recycling and more stringent target recycling 
percentages were established for the period to 2016 (2000/53/EC). In fact, the 
Commission has introduced an outcome where the industry has lost in terms of flexibility 
o f implementation as it will be forced to invest in additional research and development in 
order to meet the requirements o f the directive for the year 2016 (Representative Nissan 
Europe, Personal Communication, 03 July, 2007).
It should be indicated that in the first stage the industry hired the already existing 
recycling industry. Here, the nature o f the business is different, as there are levels that 
need to be divided between the dismantlers, the shredder, the extract and remelt of
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metals, as well as the metal suppliers (Mike Rivers, Personal Communication, 25 July 
2007). However, the case study indicates that in order to meet the 2016 recycling 
requirements, automobile manufacturers will have to invest in the research and 
development o f material and dismantling technologies so that the targets can be met.
7.4 - The social license to operate
The EU ELV directive influenced a wide range of stakeholders including automobile 
firms, suppliers, consumers, local authorities, national authorities and the recycling and 
dismantling industry. Recyclers and dismantlers have been operating in Europe for 
decades with a relatively low control over their operations. The dismantling and scrap 
metal industry is composed o f a very large number of firms, with a significant part 
composed o f small dismantling operations (Den Hond, 1998). Figure 7.2 shows the 
stakeholders involved in the ELV market alongside the material flows among the 
stakeholder groups. The life cycle notion that can be gained from the schematic 
representation is important as the EPR principle adopted in the EU ELV directive 
provides a legal framework with the intention of enhancing the material flows between 
these stakeholder groups, and particularly to enhance remanufacturing and reuse.
The implementation o f the EU ELV directive was intended to organise the end-of-life 
phase o f the automobile by setting standards for the dismantling and shredding industry. 
Here, minimum environmental standards and technical specifications have been 
established on relevant • issues, such as dismantling, residue treatment and facility 
operation. For example, the Authorized Treatment Facilities (ATFs) must possess 
concrete floors to prevent the leakage of fluids into the ground (Environment Agency, 
2010). However, the monitoring of the facilities is still a troublesome aspect for the 
environmental authorities as some of these firms are small-scale dismantlers and are 
dispersed throughout large urban and rural areas (ELV industry representative, personal 
communication, 09 July 2007).
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Figure 7.2 -  The ELV processing system
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Zoboli (1998) indicates the reaction of different stakeholders to the proposal o f the 
directive; the reactions o f automobile firms, dismantlers and plastic producers are 
summarised in Table 6.1. The Association des Constructeurs Europeen d'Automobiles 
(ACEA) publicly opposed the proposal (ACEA, 1998). The major points that were raised 
by the ACEA were the preference for mechanical recycling, the restriction on certain 
materials, the future targets for recyclability, the choice of a directive and the free take- 
back proposition. As expected, the dismantlers accepted the free take-back and also 
accepted the quantified targets, the choice o f the directive, and the use o f  authorisations 
and certificates o f dismantling. The plastic producers followed the ACEA’s position in all 
the points o f the ELV directive proposal and criticised the quantified targets, as they 
perceive that they might lose the market to other materials.
Despite the open opposition from automobile firms and the plastic producers, and some 
criticism from the dismantlers, the EU ELV directive was established in 2000. The next
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section provides a more detailed explanation of the EU ELV directive.
Table 7.4 - Reactions by main industrial actors to ELV Directive proposal
Points of the ELV 
directive Proposal
Car producers Dismantlers Plastic Producers
Choice o f a 
directive
Criticised in favour 
ofa V A
accepted criticised
Quantified targets accepted accepted criticised
Authorisations and 
certificates in 
dismantling
Accepted accepted accepted
Preference for
mechanical
recycling
criticised criticised
Restrictions on 
heavy metal and on 
PVC
criticised criticised
Regulations on 
recyclability
criticised criticised criticised
Free take back opposed accepted opposed
Parts’ marking and
dismantling
manuals
accepted
Source: Zoboli (1998)
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7.5 - The effects of the EU ELV directive
This section discusses three specific effects of the implementation of the EU ELV 
directive in Europe. Initially, the cooperative partnership between automobiles firms and 
the Dutch government is presented. This has been a unique system that was adopted in 
the Netherlands and has been indicated by the EU as one of the most efficient recycling 
and recovery national systems. Following this, the establishment o f large recycling 
facilities in Spain as a result of the directive is outlined. This shows how the recycling 
market has been directly affected by the implementation of the EU Directive. Finally, the 
effects on automobile makers are introduced. Data here was gathered at two major 
automobile firms in the United Kingdom concerning design modifications and changes in 
the use of materials.
The adoption o f the Extended Producers Responsibility Principle concept has generated a 
series of distinct yet complementary interpretations. On the one hand, the EPR concept 
has been interpreted as a concept that solely addresses issues related to waste 
management (Shiota, 1999). On the other, a wider adoption of the notion can be depicted. 
The EPR concept also serves as a guide to the environmental production systems 
evolution. The introduction o f the concept permeates business decisions in all the phases 
o f the product and involves other stakeholders involved in the production process (Lifset, 
1993; Lindhqvist, 2000).
Lindhqvist (1992) provides a useful understanding o f the types o f responsibilities 
addressed by the implementation of the concept and which have a direct impact on firms. 
According to his analysis, the EPR concept involves liability, financial responsibility, 
physical responsibility, informative responsibility and ownership. By liability, Lindhqvist 
(2000) means that firms become legally liable for the environmental negative 
externalities generated by their products and services. The EU ELV extends the liability 
of automobile firms for the collection, dismantling, treating and recycling of old vehicles.
Economic responsibility refers to the financial liability of funding the system.
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Manufacturers take on the financial responsibility for the collection, recycling and final 
disposal o f the products. However, it is relevant to point out that the ELV system has 
been adopted differently in each European Member State. The Dutch system, for 
example, operates as a deposit refund system
In the case of the EU ELV directive, manufacturers take responsibility for all these areas. 
In some cases, firms have been contracted to take care of specific parts of the end-of-life 
phase, but the entire system is the manufacturers’ legal responsibility. Figure 6.3 provides 
a graphical representation o f the types of responsibility envisioned by Lindquist, and how 
these different types o f responsibilities interact. The graph shows that informative 
responsibility is the widest option, and encompasses all the other forms of responsibility.
Figure 7.3 -  The Extended Producer Responsibility Principle
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Source: Lindhqvist (1992).
The assimilation of the EPR concept by the EU ELV directive can be used by firms to 
assess their business model in environmental terms (Toffel, 2003). Additionally, the 
informative responsibility leads to a wider accountability by the producer towards the 
consumer (Lindhqvist, 1992). The necessity o f providing information in relation to the
187
product to the consumer is a central element in the implementation of the EPR concept 
with the EU ELV directive.
7.5.1 - The short term effects
The short term effects o f the implementation of the legal license are divided in two major 
areas: impacts on the other stakeholders involved in the process of dismantling and 
collecting old vehicles and the impact on the changes in design and materials.
To have a better grasp o f the effects on the scrapping industry, the example of the effects 
on the Spanish market are taken as representative. The Spanish case is indicative of the 
large impact that the introduction of the ELV directive had on the scrapping industry. In 
1996, an ELV framework agreement was established by the Ministry of the Environment 
and the Ministry o f Industry. The negotiation process that led to the signature of the 
agreement had large stakeholder participation, which included: automobile firms, 
automobile importers, auto-part producers, automobile dealers, automobile insurers as 
well as the dismantling and recycling industry. This framework was responsible for 
governing the situation until 2000, when the EU ELV directive started to be 
implemented. The directive was eventually fully established in November 2003.
The interviews and visit were focused on the implementation of a large facility that was 
established in the Basque Country. A new and large recycling facility that was set up in 
2004 in the north o f Spain is analysed. The facility is a clear indication of how the sector 
has changed due to the incorporation of the Directive at the European level. Significantly, 
Spain has the highest recovery rates in Europe (90%) (SIGRATO, 2008).
The adoption o f the EU ELV Directive fostered the implementation of larger ELV 
treatment centres in Spain. In 2000, around 3,000 scrap yards existed in Spain and
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Portugal. In 2007, 800 had the received approval to operate under the new rules of the 
Directive. Several new and large facilities were established and some of the smaller and 
older operations disappeared. The establishment o f the GCR Car Recycling facility in the 
north of Spain is illustrative of the modifications that occurred in the market. A facility 
with the potential to recycle 25,000 vehicles per year was established in 2004 in the city 
o f Bilbao. After the car recycling firm started its operations, 17 other smaller dismantlers 
closed their businesses. Some of these were not able to adapt their operations to the more 
stringent requirements o f the directive, while others felt that the last owners would prefer 
to deliver their vehicle to larger and newer facilities (ELV Representative Spain, personal 
communication, 05 December 2006).
Nowadays, Spain has 320 authorised recycling facilities and the highest recycling rates in 
the Europe. According to the last assessments of the Spanish Association of End-of- 
Vehicle Treatment (SIGRAUTO), the country has been able to recover and recycle 90% 
of the average weight o f all the vehicles brought to dismantling centres. This is due to 
specific technologies that have been locally developed to recycle glass and other plastic 
composite parts (SIGRATO, 2008).
7.5.2 - The environmental impacts
The ELV policy developments in the United Kingdom started from the involvement of 
industry and government in the activities of the CEST Group and resulted in the 
constitution o f a cooperative initiative, called the Automotive Consortium on Recycling 
and Disposal (ACORD). This involved the car manufacturers and importers (SMMT), 
material and component suppliers, shredders, dismantlers, the recycling industry and the 
Departments o f Industry and of Environment. After a preliminary plan in 1992, ACORD 
launched the implementation plan in 1995. Incineration was included among the possible 
solutions, the targets being the reduction o f ASR by 40% by 2002 and 80% by 2015 
(Ferguson, 2007; den Hond, 1996).
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Following the implementation of the ELV Directive that came into effect in November 
2003, the automobile industry had to adopt several measures to ensure that the 
requirements would be met. Ford Motor Company serves as an illustrative example of 
efforts that were implemented by major automobile firms in Europe.
In the United Kingdom, the strategy of Ford Europe was formed and major steps 
were implemented in all the European countries affected by the Directive. Ford 
UK established collecting and treatment sites to meet ELV Directive requirements 
and Ford signed an agreement with Cartakeback Ltd to provide collection and 
recycling services for the customers o f Ford Group brands sold in the United 
Kingdom at the time, namely for Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover, Volvo, Aston Martin 
and Mazda. Ford ensured free car take back for every vehicle under their brands, 
which included the following conditions for free take- back; the cars should be:
Valid for all passenger vehicles with up to nine seats and up to a permissible total weight 
of 3.5 tonnes; Vehicles must be delivered to a Ford-appointed free take back facility; 
Vehicles must be complete, containing the essential components including engine, 
transmission, coachwork, wheels and catalytic converter (where fitted); Vehicles must be 
free from additional waste (such examples include garden/household waste, additional 
tyres etc) (Ford Motor Company, 2006).
Ford has developed a vehicle recycling program that encompasses 'design-for-recycling 
guidelines', which were initially established in 1991. Amongst the most important pillars 
o f this strategy, the reduction in the number o f parts, the speed to dismantle a vehicle, the 
increased use of recycled material and the reduction of hazardous materials are the most 
relevant. This includes efforts to recover and recycle plastics. The introduction of the EU 
ELV Directive has fostered the establishment of several new technologies in vehicle 
recycling, decontamination and reuse in the ELV supply chain. However, there has not 
been a significant step forward from vehicle manufacturers with regard to the design of 
the vehicles that would be more suitable for the end-of-life phase (Gerrard and Kandlikar, 
2007). The design o f new vehicles is still not fully concerned with the necessity of it
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being dismantled; the need for recycling, treating and dismantling the vehicle has become 
a growing concern amongst automobile designers, but issues such as aesthetic design, 
functionality, manufacturability, economic costs and brand tradition are more important 
(Representative Nissan Europe, personal communication, 03 July, 2007).
Gerrad and Kandlikar (2007) also indicate that there is a considerable time lag between 
the design o f a new vehicle and its eventual production and disposal. Innovations have 
been focused on recycling and not on deeper design modifications. This leads to sub- 
optimal solutions where the system fosters recycling instead of remanufacturing and 
reuse.
In general terms, automotive firms focus their business model on selling and financing 
new vehicles, with the result that other potential areas of business such as 
remanufacturing and reuse are satellites. In this sense, reused parts many constitute a 
secondary business but also take away interest from the main focus of the firm. 
Therefore, commercial agreements with other firms that specialise in collecting, treating 
and recycling end-of-life vehicle has been the best option pursued by vehicle 
manufacturers.
Following the interviews in the sector in the United Kingdom and in Spain, automobile 
firms indicate that an important aspect o f the end-of-life collection system is the 
collection point in itself (ELV Representative Spain, personal communication, 05 
December 2006; Mike Rivers, personal communication, 25 July 2007). According to 
their understanding, the collection point for ELVs must not be next to the new car selling 
points as they perceive both businesses on opposite sides of the scale. Automobile firms 
therefore desire to separate the business of selling new vehicles and the collection and 
treatment o f old cars completely (Mike Rivers, personal communication, 25 July 2007).
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Table 7.4 -  Expectations of the EU ELV directive
Expectations of the EU ELV directive Assessment
Design changes
1. Changes in the material composition of new 
cars
Limited
i. Increased use o f recyclable and 
environmentally beneficial materials
Limited
ii. Increased use of recycled material 
(‘recyclate’)
Verified
iii. Removal of ‘banned’ substances Verified
2. Increased ‘design for disassembly, re-use and 
remanufacture’
Limited
Changes in the extent o f  ELV recovery:
3. Increased levels o f re-use and remanufacture Verified
4. Increased levels o f recycling o f ELV 
materials
Verified
Improved information provision:
5. Provision o f the following information:
a. Part coding standards Verified
b. Disassembly processes, disposal and 
recovery o f vehicle parts
Verified
c. ELV environmental performance, targeted at 
vehicle users/purchasers
Verified
Gerrard and Kandlikar (2007) presented an evaluation framework to understand the 
primary effects of the ELV directive. They accessed five anticipated changes that could 
have been fostered by the implementation o f the ELV directive, including: 1- Changes in 
the material composition o f new cars; 2 - Increased ‘design for disassembly, re-use and
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remanufacture’; 3- Increased levels of re-use and remanufacture; 4 - Increased levels of 
recycling o f ELV materials; 5 - Provision for the following information in relation to Part 
coding standards, disassembly processes, the disposal and recovery of vehicle parts and 
ELV environmental performance targeted at vehicle users/purchasers. Table 7.4 provides 
a summary of the EU ELV expectations. The table is divided in three large sections: 
Design Changes, Changes in the extent of ELV recovery and improved information 
provision. Under each o f these headings there are subdivisions that have been analysed. 
The assessment is the summary of the interviews.
Despite the usefulness o f the framework of Gerrard and Kandlikar (2007), their study is 
limited by the use o f company reports and other media sources to gather information with 
regard to the steps taken by automobile firms, the dismantling industry and governments. 
The conclusions presented in Table 8.4 have made use of information gathered from face- 
to-face interviews.
7.6 - Conclusion
The EU ELV directive constitutes an important landmark in environmental regulation as 
applied to the automobile industry. This case study provides a different angle from the 
two previous ones as it the most recent regulation to be established and has taken a longer 
period for member estates to enact the legal license. In this respect, the ext-post 
information available to conduct a more detailed analysis o f the impacts of the EU ELV 
directive has been more limited as the impacts o f the ELV directive will only be fully felt
i
as automakers design new vehicles and the 2015 targets are put in place. However, the 
introduction o f the EU ELV directive provides a relevant case to understand the adoption 
o f a broader legal license that implements the extended producers’ responsibility 
principle.
This is a significant step towards broader sustainability preoccupations in the license to
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operate, as the concerns have shifted to more complex environmental concerns than the 
simple direct end-of-pie measures. The introduction of the extended producers’ 
responsibility principle (EPR) has the potential to have a significant impact on the 
economic license to operate of the industry, as well as the implications of the business 
model of the firm with regard to the use and waste management of materials. Lindhqvist 
(1992) provides a functional notion of the types of responsibilities addressed by the 
implementation o f the concept which have a direct impact on the firm.
The implementation o f the legal license contributes relevant insights into the relationship 
between environmental regulation and the auto industry technological development, 
commercial imperatives and wider social benefits. Following the pattern of the other 
cases presented in this thesis, the industry has opposed the implementation of such a 
directive. More lenient 'voluntary agreements', were offered by the industry, based on 
shared responsibility between automakers and the recycling industry. However, the 
industry, eventually, accepted the implementation of the Directive at the European level, 
as the EC established the same rule to be incorporated by all the Member States.
In the case of the ELV, scrappage schemes have been set up with recycling incentives, 
and therefore there could be problems with interconnectivity. The industry did however 
agree with the EU on subsidies for the scrappage schemes, as they have given ground to 
negotiate on these agreements. Moreover, the agreed targets on the ELV directive 
potentially helped to defuse criticism of the environmental cost of the scrappage schemes.
The incorporation o f the Directive in different European Member States has had several 
effects on policy. In order to consider these issues, this Chapter has briefly addressed 
these problems in different contexts. Ford Motor Company has served as a portrait o f the 
response by automobile firms. Following the analysis conducted by Gerrard and 
Kandlikar (2007), the following primary effects were identified: changes in the material 
composition o f new vehicles; increased ‘design for disassembly', re-use and 
remanufacture and increased levels of remanufacture and re-use. The effects on the
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recycling industry were illustrated by the introduction of the Directive in the Spanish 
market; this has been a factor in the reduction o f the number of small and uncontrolled 
dismantling facilities and has fostered the establishment of larger facilities that follow 
more stringent environmental standards.
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions
This work seeks to provide a contribution to the body of literature that has been classified 
as the ‘greening o f industry’. As previously indicated at the heart of this study, the 
following research question has served as the main thread of analysis:
What is the relationship between environmental regulation and auto industry 
technological development, commercial imperatives and wider social benefits?
Following the theoretical discussion provided in Chapter 2 and the researchable 
propositions that have been investigated in the case studies, a set of conclusions are 
presented in this chapter to respond to the central research question. The chapter is 
divided into the following sections: the cases studied, the suitability of the license to 
operate framework, the dominance of the commercial imperatives, the auto industry 
technological development (which has merely followed the minimum requirements 
imposed by regulations), extensions of the license to operate framework, implications for 
the 'greening o f industry', implications for industry, implications for policy makers, 
limitations of the analysis, future developments and a portfolio of future research.
8.1 - The cases studied
The cases show how and to what extent regulation has been able to direct corporate
environmental performance in the automobile industry. Here the industry, while
respecting commercial imperatives, has been able to implement various technology
solutions to the legal requirements imposed to deal with negative environmental
externalities, so generating significant social benefits. Here, pioneering regulations that
have affected the automobile industry were selected since they represented new areas of
regulatory pressure at the time; they were also important cases for the investigation of the
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relationship between regulation and automobile industry technological development, 
economic necessities and wider social benefits.
Figure 8.1 shows the negative environmental externalities analysed by previous literature 
on the environmental effects o f the automobile (Delucchi, 2003). The cases selected in 
this thesis focus on air pollution, oil dependency, noise, waste from end-of-life vehicles 
and the improper discharge o f oils, these being direct consequences o f the use o f the 
automobile itself and related to the technical limits imposed by the intemal-combustion 
engine vehicle. Figure 9.1 also presents other areas that have been dealt in the literature, 
but these are not directly addressed in the cases selected in this thesis. Rather, these are 
indirect consequences o f  automobile use and refer to transportation systems as well as 
infrastructure arrangements. It is relevant to mention that Figure 9.1 does not indicate 
climate change as an automobile environmental externality addressed by the academic 
literature; a more complete classification of the effects o f automobile use would include 
climate change as a prominent element.
Figure 8 .1-  Automobile environmental externalities addressed by the academic literature
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Source: Adapted from Delucchi (2003).
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The cases indicate that social pressures have been responsible for shaping the legal 
license with regard to the environmental effects of automobile use; the case studies also 
show that regulations have generated positive environmental benefits to society. For each 
of the cases, new technologies were developed and adopted w ith the main focus of 
fulfilling the requirements of the legal license.
The selection o f the case studies presented in this thesis followed a  historical perspective 
for the social perception o f the environmental impact of the automobile. Figure 8.2 shows 
the cases that have been selected along with the central concerns indicated by the legal 
license at the time. The figure also provides an idea of the development of regulation 
towards wide sustainability concerns, which are relevant for the 'greening o f industry'. 
Although it can be argued that all environmental regulations have human health as a 
central concern, other issues have been highlighted by legislators as the primary focus of 
regulation; these include the reductions in air emissions, energy use, toxic emissions and 
the use of materials and waste management. The cases, therefore, portray a chronological 
development as regards the areas that have been subject to regulatory pressure. These 
changes arise as a result o f improved knowledge and an understanding o f the 
environmental impacts, and from greater vehicle ownership and use. The development 
towards wider sustainability concerns is therefore relevant for the discussion provided in 
this thesis, and for the development of the ‘greening of industry’ body  o f  literature in the 
context o f the automotive industry. As regulation has begun to address wider 
sustainability concerns, corporate environmental strategies need to take the 
environmental dimension into account since the cases have indicated a direct link to the 
business model of the industry.
The selection of the cases follows the concern o f the field to understand the 'b ig  picture 
of corporate greening (Kallio and Nordberg, 2006). In this sense, the relationship between 
environmental regulation, auto industry technological development, commercial 
imperatives and wider social benefits has been investigated in cases o f  environmental
regulation, these having been brought out for auto industry technological development.
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The cases are complementary in this respect, as they are able to provide a historical 
account o f the evolution of the regulatory process for a specific industry and for the 
stakeholders involved in the process, and add to the discussion on the 'greening of 
industry'. Additionally, the case studies are illustrative of the flexibility of regulation, 
especially on how environmental regulations can be adopted differently in specific 
political and local environments. They are also representative of three different regions of 
the world in continuous time frames where the use of the automobile has constituted an 
environmental and socially relevant issue.
Figure 8.2 - The central concerns of the case studies
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The air quality emissions regulations in California and the European Union End-of-Life
Vehicle directive are classic cases o f environmental regulation. In both instances,
regulators implemented the legal license to deal with specific negative environmental
externalities produced by the automobile. In the California case study, the process of
regulation from the pioneering regulations of the 1950s to the present day was studied.
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The initial group of mandates constituted strict command-and-control laws that forced the 
industry to take environmental-related measures which directly affected the way 
vehicles were designed. Another important measure to be established was the ZEV 
mandate that required an increase in Zero-Emission Vehicles (ZEVs) to be offered by 
automobile manufacturers in the State of California. The emissions standards pioneered 
in California then became the basis for similar legal regulatory mandates in several parts 
of the world.
The European Union End-of-Life Vehicle directive was innovative in introducing the 
‘producers extended responsibility principle’ to the automotive industry: according to the 
European mandate, vehicle manufacturers are legally and financially liable for vehicles 
until the end o f their lives. The ELV directive also provides important elements for the 
incorporation o f sustainable development concepts into its policy making. Further, it has 
a wider preoccupation with material use that incorporates more complex thinking around 
the relationship between industry and the environment. In addition to this, it can still be 
argued that the final preoccupation is with human health, yet the reasoning behind the 
legislation derives from a deeper environmentalist rationale. Here, the ELV regulation 
has the potential to incorporate in the regulatory system a deeper understanding of 
sustainability.
The case study on the Brazilian proalcool programme presents a case of an auto industry 
technology-inducing mandate with positive environmental benefits. Here, the proalcool is 
not <a classic case o f the 'greening of industry' as fostered by environmental regulation. 
Despite the fact that environmental benefits are mentioned in the initial document of the 
programme, the main focus was initially on energy security. In 1978, after the second 
world oil embargo, the Brazilian government decided to explicitly foster the use of sugar- 
derived ethyl alcohol fuel as a substitute for imported oil. This provided an important 
lesson on how the nature of the license to operate can evolve. The case shows where the 
classic case o f the 'greening of industry' has been reached via a different route, and 
provides an important lesson in the field, as it has been shown that the 'greening of
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industry' can be achieved through non-traditional routes and with diverse regulatory 
forms. The environmental benefits provided by the use of ethanol were particularly 
significant for the highly populated cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which had 
historically suffered the effects of automotive emissions. For its part, the US has 
replicated this concern with energy security as regards the support of corn-derived 
ethanol, but in Brazil the emphasis is now on the environmental aspect of the program. 
The Brazilian experiment also provided important insights concerning the debate that 
emerged in the 2000s, both in Europe and the United States, around the use of ethanol as 
an environmentally-friendly fuel.
8.2 - The suitability of the 'license to operate' framework
The initial contribution o f this work was to test the suitability of the 'licence to operate' 
framework in order to respond to the issues regarding environmental regulation and 
technological development associated with economic imperatives and wider social 
preoccupations in the context o f the automobile industry.
The 'license to operate' framework has been used to unveil how the relationships 
between environmental regulation and auto industry technological development, 
commercial imperatives and wider social benefits come about in each of the selected 
cases. According to the 'license to operate' framework, multi-faceted legal, economic and 
social licenses simultaneously motivate and constrain the actions of industry, so 
producing a relevant effect on the environmental performance of the industry 
(Gunnigham et al., 2003, 2004; Hoffman, 1999). A wide range of stakeholders influence 
licenses simultaneously, and the interaction between the terms of the three licenses 
produces a combined effect over the management style of the industry. How stakeholders 
perceive the negative externalities produced by industry is highly dependent upon the 
type o f industry and the interplay between the three licenses since the net result o f the
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interactions between stakeholders is context specific (Gunnigham et al., 2003). The 
framework therefore requires a rich description of the external contingency of the events 
which have led to the constitution o f the legal license and determines how the three 
licenses interact with each other so that the relationships between the key elements of the 
main research question can be depicted.
The 'license to operate' framework has also been used to discuss issues in other industrial 
sectors, such as the chemical, paper and mill industries, but it has not been used to 
examine concerns in the automobile industry (Hoffman, 1999). This industry was 
selected because it constitutes a very important global industrial sector and has significant 
implications for the environment (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003). The automotive 
industry has also served as a benchmark for other industries undergoing similar 
regulatory pressures (Delucchi, 2003). In this sense, it has the potential to contribute to 
the development o f the 'greening of industry' body of literature.
The 'license to operate' framework is also flexible, as it can be applied to an entire 
industry or to individual firms. Moreover, the malleability of the framework has desirable 
properties with which researchers can discuss industry-related problems. However, as 
indicated by Gunningham and Grabosky (1998), a good description of the external 
contingencies is necessary to provide meaningful insights, based on the empirical 
appreciation o f the formation of the three licenses. Initial studies using the framework 
were concerned with understanding the differences between the leaders and laggards 
(Within the same industry, and establishing how firms facing similar licenses have been 
able to display different environmental performances (Gunnigham et al., 2003). This 
work has taken an alternative route, applying an aggregate framework to specific 
regulations in diverse points in time as well as to historical backgrounds in order to 
understand how the interplay between the different types of licenses influence the 
environmental performance of the firms within the automobile industry. The differences 
observed between the firms are therefore indicative of the diverse interpretations o f the 
macro-level licences that each firm may have in each of the cases.
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The selected cases were specifically picked to understand the relationship between the 
legal license and technological development, alongside commercial imperatives and 
wider social benefits. These cases show that the relationships are framed for specific 
historical and circumstantial backgrounds, thereby making generalisations complicated. 
The selected cases point to an intricate connection between environmental regulation and 
the economic performance o f the industry, which is much more complex than the initial 
theories o f the Porter and van der Lind hypothesis (1995), for example. According to this 
initially influential perspective, properly designed environmental regulations would have 
a positive competitive effect for firms and regulators would be able to direct firms to seek 
more profitable outcomes. Other developments of the hypothesis have also failed to 
demonstrate the complexity o f the relationships, as detailed by Lanoie et al. (2007). The 
second generation o f the 'greening of industry' studies, criticises the Porter and van der 
Lind hypothesis by presenting a detailed perspective of the dynamic and intricate links 
that need to be accounted for in environmental regulation. These include: consumer 
response, the prices of complementary and substitutable goods, the economic situation of 
the industry, the political environment, market structure, the barriers to entry and legal 
issues (Reinhardt, 2000).
With the use o f the 'license to operate' framework, it can be concluded that the 
relationships in question need to be perceived under a broad framework which can 
account for the influence o f several stakeholders and this must include not only economic 
ejements but also other less quantifiable issues, such as the social dimension. In this 
sense, the 'license to operate' is suitable for understanding the multifaceted relationships 
required in this study and is appropriate to respond to the central research question. The 
framework therefore incorporates a more nuanced understanding of the various elements 
that influence corporate environmental performance as captured by the social, legal and 
economic licenses (Gunnigham et al., 2003). This multi-level analysis is in line with the 
newer generation of studies in the 'greening of industry' body of literature which 
perceives the importance o f accounting for the influence of several stakeholders in the
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process o f regulation so that a more flexible theoretical framework can be constructed to 
comprehend the big picture of corporate greening (Kallio and Nordberg, 2006).
The cases selected considered the way environmental regulations impact upon the 
environmental performance of the industry. Here, the development in both environmental 
regulation and corporate environmental strategy has been influenced by the growth of 
wider social preoccupations concerning the environmental impact of industry. However, 
despite the relevant role that environmental regulation has played in improving the 
environmental performance of the automobile industry, no drastic environmental 
transformation has been observed due to the limits imposed by commercial imperatives. 
Automobile firms still rely on the all-steel-body structures and the internal combustion 
engine as the core pillars of their business model (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003). More 
importantly, the cases have indicated that the industry has not been able to introduce 
commercially radical technological innovations, such as hydrogen-powered vehicles or 
full electric vehicles because of the restrictions imposed by the economic license.
In this respect, the basic characteristics of the automobile industry, as presented in 
Chapter 4, shape the economic license and make corporate environmental performance 
reactive to the pressures posed mainly by the legal license, and to a lesser extent, to the 
social license. In this sense, the economic license has emerged as the dominant license 
shaping industry corporate strategy. The industry has therefore taken a more proactive 
role in influencing the formation of the legal license and searching for other sorts of 
governmental support, focusing on the present business model of the industry and 
following the non-market environmental strategy defined by Baron (1995). The principal 
action of industry has been to influence policy makers to delay or change the 
implementation of standards or, in more recent cases, to pursue negotiated cooperative 
outcomes that involve direct or indirect subsidies favouring the present business model of 
the firm (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). In this respect, the 'license to operate' framework has 
served as a suitable instrument with which to analyse the interactions between 
environmental regulation and corporate environmental performance in the automotive
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industry, taking into account technological development, economic restrictions and social 
demands from various stakeholders.
8.3 - Commercial imperatives prevail in the response provided by industry
According to the 'license to operate' framework, multi-faceted legal, economic and social 
licenses simultaneously motivate and constrain the actions of industry so having a 
relevant effect on the environmental performance of the industry (Gunnigham et al., 
2003, 2004; Hoffman, 1999). However, the cases have indicated that the response the 
industry has had to social and legal pressures has been restricted by commercial 
imperatives, because o f the economic limits posed by the internal combustion engine and 
the all-steel-body structure. Despite the fact that environmental performance is 
simultaneously shaped by the interaction between the terms of the three licenses, the 
economic license appears as the dominant license, directing the management style of the 
industry. In this sense, it can be concluded that in selected cases, the economic license to 
operate emerges as the prevailing force that guides the relationship between the legal 
license (regulation) and auto industry technological development, and has meaningful 
social benefits.
As previously argued in Chapter 3, in order to understand how the 'license to operate' 
framework can be applied to issues in the automobile industry, it is necessary to provide 
? thorough description of the main features of the industry; this includes the 
environmental impact of the automobile (discussed in Chapter 1) and the business and 
economic characteristics of the industry (presented in Chapter 3). The business of the 
mass-produced vehicle is thus based on the internal combustion engine and the all-steel- 
body structure (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007). These two technological pillars have 
made the automobile a mainstream product and are still the basis of the modem business 
of building cars on a large scale. Consequently, the business model acts to restrict the
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shape of the licenses to operate and the relationship that the industry has with the natural 
environment (Orsato, 2009).
The automotive industry can be characterised as an oligopoly with product differentiation 
(Berry et al. 1995); sunk costs are significant and help to form high barriers to entry for 
new competitors. The industry is therefore composed of a limited number of groups 
which possess a wide number of brands. Some of the larger ones try to compete in 
various markets, offering a vast number of brands to the consumers, including high 
volume , specialist and niche brands. Here, the market division of the types of producers 
is pertinent in order to understand the types of business strategies adopted by the industry 
(Williams et al., 1994). Cost reduction strategy is the most common, where firms rely on 
the economies o f scale to lower the unit cost of each single product. These firms try to 
compete on the general market with very slim negotiation margins. The economic license 
to operate is therefore shaped by the economic limits imposed from the internal 
combustion engine and the all-steel-body structure, as the cost reduction strategy is based 
upon large scale production.
The other business strategy is cost recovery, where the business model of the firm rests 
upon product differentiation (Williams et al., 1994). Specialist and niche producers fall 
into this category and the types of business strategy are also a fundamental factor in 
understanding the potential response that the industry can produce to regulate the 
pressures presented by the legal license. The environmental cost differentiation proposed 
by Orsato (2006) and Reinhardt (2000) would therefore be classed as cost recovery.
i
The industry has particular market characteristics for each country and this 
contextualisation holds important lessons for the analysis of the 'license to operate' 
framework since international groups have global operations but offer different products 
in specific markets. Here, the geographical location of assemblies and factories, currency 
exchange rates and international trade agreements impact on the choice of vehicle line 
ups, which are more suitable for the specific domestic market characteristics.
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Sturgeon and Florida (1999) indicate that the modem automobile industry has made the 
transition from an old model o f competition, characterised by a focus on the domestic 
markets, to a global model, where the production function of the firm is organised on a 
regional and global basis. This distinction has a significant impact on emerging markets 
which have recently evolved from simple adopters of old models and production 
equipment to developers o f R&D. The industry has also changed from an export-led 
industry to a network-led industry, where each major firm carries out production with a 
focus on supplying the major markets, mostly because of modularisation and supplier 
outsourcing (Sturgeon and Florida, 1999).
With this new 'global' model, high volume manufacturers try to maximise investments if  
they can spread the 'sunk costs' in several operational plants around the world 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003). Additionally, comparable global models provide larger 
flexibility to export or import to certain markets, which require additional products. In the 
context o f the 'license to operate' framework, the industry may be interested in pressing 
for harmonised technical and legal standards in diverse markets. If, however, the industry 
perceives that certain countries have older legal licenses and the industry has already 
reached superior environmental performance levels, a harmonisation of standards may be 
promoted to gain a competitive advantage or shape the legal license.
For each specific national market, the competitive structure impacts on how the industry 
can influence the shape o f the three licenses; industry has traditionally forced the 
formation o f the legal license through lobbying. The cases have shown that industry has 
been able to delay the implementation of standards in the case of California, for instance 
(Gerard and Lave, 2003). However, in the Brazilian case study, the industry has had a 
higher influence on the formation of the overall policy, demanding several direct and 
indirect subsidies (Roststein, 1979). In the ELV case study, the industry created a strong 
lobby to persuade regulators to follow the cooperative solution that had been offered by 
ACEA and did not directly change the central business of producing and selling new
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vehicles (Orsato et al., 2002).
From the license to operate framework perspective, the business and economic 
characteristics o f the automobile industry help to shape not only the economic license, 
but also the political proactive strategy. The automobile industry, as an oligopoly with 
product differentiation, has a considerable interest in engaging in an industry-wide 
corporate political activity to influence the formation of the economic license. The case 
studies have also indicated that the different political systems significantly influence 
the effect that the legal license has on the corporate environmental strategy. In fact, in all 
the cases selected, industry has taken a pro-active role in shaping the legal license 
according to a wide range o f strategies.
In the cases, the automotive industry operated as a block to defend their interests, shaping 
several licenses simultaneously. In fact, the only case where a firm was able to gain from 
a proactive environmental strategy that differed from the rest of the industry was with 
Toyota in the ZEV mandate case study. Here, the Toyota Motor Company took a 
proactive environmental product differentiation strategy, the launch of the Toyota Prius, 
which generated positive economic gains for the firm (Reinhardt, 2000). However, 
Toyota joined other automakers when the ZEV mandate was challenged in court. This is 
in line with the Orsato (2006) classification of corporate strategy since the organizational 
processes and products may work independently.
The prominence that has been given to the economic license by the automobile industry 
ia each o f the cases holds important lessons for the development in the 'greening of 
industry' body o f literature. The industry understands that the present business model of 
the firm is constrained by the internal combustion engine and the all-steel-body structure, 
these being, in essence, unsustainable. As previously indicated, technological 
development has been constrained by the commercial imperatives that firms must comply 
with. As a result, automakers have taken the economic constraint as a justification for 
opposing regulation. This economic constraint also dictates the technological solution
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presented, based on end-of-pipe measures or incremental innovations for the present 
business model of the firm. However, due to the fact that the environmental dimension 
has recently become an element o f great political salience, the industry may face growing 
pressures from the social license, and consequently from the legal license, which will 
demand novel technological solutions.
8.4 - Due to the dominance of the commercial imperatives, auto industry 
technological development has merely followed the minimum requirements imposed 
by regulation.
The cases presented in this work indicate that the legal license to operate has been 
essential to foster technological development in the automobile industry and that the 
industry has been able to partially influence the formation of the legal license, as it desires 
to defend the current status of the business model of the industry. The cases have 
therefore been explicitly selected to display the most relevant pieces of regulation under 
the specific criteria presented in Chapter 4.
The Brazilian ethanol case study presents an important example of how the legal license 
to operate has been the central factor forcing the industry to adopt ethanol-only engines. 
Without the government intervention that simultaneously shaped the legal, economic 
and social licenses to operate, ethanol-only engines would not have been established 
(Moreira, and Goldemberg, 2000) even after the industry had already indicated the 
technical possibility to do so. When FIAT S.p.A. launched the first ethanol-fuelled 
vehicle - the FIAT 147 (Veja, 1979), other competitors soon followed, producing similar 
small compact cars. In aggregate terms, very limited market effects can be observed in the 
industry as no firm gained a greater market position because of the implementation of 
ethanol. However, positive environmental and social effects were seen after the ethanol 
engines were introduced to the market.
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An important aspect of the Brazilian ethanol experience has been the significant role 
played by the government in shaping the economic license; this included: the organisation 
of the supply chain o f ethanol, the process of R&D and the creation of an appropriate 
economic environment with a combination of market-based instruments and command- 
and-control measures for ethanol to become cost competitive (Goldberg et al., 2003). The 
government was also able to directly influence the social license, as a large marketing 
campaign was conducted to convince the Brazilian consumer of the qualities of the 
ethanol-powered vehicles (Veja, 1979). In short, the government was able to successfully 
direct the industry’s environmental performance because it could simultaneously 
influence the legal, economic and social license.
The ELV directive case study also supports the idea of the relevant role that the legal 
license played in changing the roles adopted by stakeholders, with potentially significant 
technological effects in terms of material use and the increased use of recycled materials 
(Gerrard and Kandlikar, 2007). The case indicates that the directive was directly 
responsible for enhancing the material use in the new vehicles sold. Moreover, an 
important aspect of the ELV directive was that the legal license was established when 
automobile firms could contract others to physically take care of end-of-life vehicles. 
This makes economic and business sense, as the core business of automobile 
manufacturers is centred on selling new vehicles (Rivers, personal communication, July
2008).
The extended producers’ responsibility principle is a benchmark in the environmental 
regulation o f the automobile industry, as the legal license made the automobile industry 
responsible for collecting and treating old cars (Lindhqvist, 1992). However, the industry 
fought for the adoption of this legal principle and tried to persuade the European 
Commission to take on a solution based on shared responsibility (Orsato et al., 2002). 
Since the industry was already involved with ELV collection and treatment in certain 
countries, it could benchmark the experience. However, when the directive was
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established, the industry adopted measures to ensure the better use of material and a more 
sustainable design.
The case study of California is also representative of the importance of the legal license 
for the technological development in the automobile industry. The case indicates how the 
legal license was responsible for forcing the implementation of several technological 
developments, for instance with catalytic converters (Brillant, 1989). In the second part 
of the case study, the ZEV mandate presents an interesting example where the legal 
license sparked the technological development of electric and hybrid-electric vehicles 
(Collantes, 2006). It is important to indicate here that Toyota was able to gain the first- 
mover advantage for being able to successfully launch the hybrid vehicle in the North 
American market (Sperling, personal communication, 24 March 2006). Nowadays, 
Toyota is the market leader in the hybrid electric vehicle technology and has become the 
benchmark for other car firms in the US; in both cases, positive benefits have been 
observed for society.
In the cases studied, the automobile industry has been concerned with the formation of 
the legal license since this may pose a tremendous threat to the business model of the 
industry. The latter is still based on the traditional business model of the intemal- 
combustion engine and the all-steel- body structure, and the cases presented have 
indicated that the industry has incorporated the changes after considerable resistance. 
Without the imperatives o f the legal license, the adoption of these technologies would 
have taken longer to be developed and implemented on a large scale.
i
8. 5 - Extensions of the 'license to operate' framework
A relevant aspect that emerged in the cases was the difference between the political 
systems in each o f the three geographical areas since the cases were specifically selected 
in three regions of the world and in diverse historical contexts. Additionally, the
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established political systems in place have profound implications for the formation of the 
legal license and the impact that the industry can have in influencing the licenses to 
operate. Here, the interaction between the legal and social licenses depends upon the role 
that social stakeholders can adopt in each political system. Therefore, the political system 
has influence over the way in which the legal license is imposed, and how the 
relationship between industry and policy makers is framed.
The Brazilian study case took place under a military dictatorship regime. At the time, the 
central military government had imposed limits to political freedom on civil society, 
establishing formal restrictions on the press and academia. Government sponsored 
policies were therefore taken very seriously by the general public. However, despite the 
restrictive environment for the population, the automobile industry had an extraordinary 
relationship with the central government; large subsidies and market protection against 
foreign competition had been part o f the industrial policy for the sector over the 
preceding decades (Leite, 1990). When the proalcool programme was designed, several 
subsidies were planned for the industry, including government sponsored R&D for 
ethanol-only engines. Notwithstanding the limited political freedoms in place for society, 
consumer purchasing power was still perceived as crucial for the success of the program 
and a large marketing campaign was officially established to provide consumer support 
for the initiative. More importantly, the federal ministries involved in the proalcool 
program were diverse and each one adopted a different role in fostering the development 
of ethanol.
1 The California emissions case study indicates the larger impact of political activities in 
the formation o f the legal license. The social pressure to reduce the amount of smog, 
especially in the cities o f Los Angeles and San Francisco, was crucial for the initial 
public action to restrict the amount of air emissions from mobile sources such as the 
automobile (California Air Resources Board, 2006). More recently, pressures imposed by 
environmental groups in the California Air Resources Board also supported strong 
environmental regulation. Kagan (personal communication, 30 March 2007) argues for
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the importance o f the legalistic American system to understand the consecutive legal 
disputes taken up by the automobile makers against the establishment of the ZEV 
mandate since this was originally designed by members of the California Air Resources 
Board. It is also important to mention that the approach taken in California was different 
from that of the federal government, which was lagging behind in terms of strict 
mandates.
The ELV case study is also important in order to understand the influence of the political 
system in the negotiation process of the implementation of the ELV directive. Due to the 
fact that automakers did not want to be hit by the producer’s responsibility principle, they 
came together to reach a cooperative agreement and having shared responsibilities with 
the dismantling industry. The cooperative agreements that had been reached in Germany, 
Italy and France served as the benchmark for the negotiation process between the 
European Commission and the car makers (Orsato et al. 2002). However, as the ELV had 
been incorporated as a priority waste stream, the use of a directive emerged as a necessity 
to harmonise ELV polices at the EU-level. The process respected a long stakeholder 
consultation course of action which ended with the imposition of the EU directive 
2000/53/EC going against the wishes of the automobile industry.
For the selected cases, a useful development of the 'license to operate' framework would 
be to unpack the original legal license and to create a 'political license to operate' as such 
political processes are underexplored in the original version of the 'license to operate'. 
The separation between the legal and political licenses recognizes that the forming 
processes are unique. This approach overcomes some of the criticism that may be 
attributed to the original version of the framework which does not allow for a more 
nuanced understanding o f different governmental agencies and bodies. Governments are 
not homogeneous bodies and, as indicated by the cases, have diverse processes in 
different governmental spheres. Politicians, environmental agencies, monitoring 
agencies, data collection agencies, central government and members of congress may
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have diverse objectives and opposing perceptions about how to deal with the automobile 
industry.
Under this more elaborate version o f the 'license to operate', the legal license still refers 
to the combination of several legal requirements and permits issued by environmental, 
health and safety officials necessary for the industry to operate. In the case of the 
automobile industry, automakers are required to act in accordance with minimal legal 
standards which generally follow mandatory technology. As previously indicated in 
Chapter 3, the legal requirements in question are concerned with the automobile 
environmental externalities, as indicated in Figure 8.1.
The political license represents the demands o f political stakeholders, as it is concerned 
with the wider political relevance o f industry. In the case of the automobile industry, the 
political support that the industry possesses has been fundamental for allowing corporate 
strategies that seek to shape the legal license.
Politicians can be very supportive o f the automobile industry due to its economic 
importance for certain regions and countries. Political stakeholders can also have a strong 
influence on the agencies responsible for permit-granting process, and may intervene in 
the negotiation o f standards or provide the industry with compensatory benefits. 
Consequently, the industry must have pro-active political behaviour so that the 
political license to operate can be strengthened and the legal license relaxed. The industry 
may also negotiate compensatory funds if strict legal licenses are imposed and there is the 
perception that the costs relating to the implementation of new technological standards 
‘commercially penalise the industry. This has been shown in the selected cases where 
industry has lobbied for less strict legal licenses or negotiated for subsidies. In this sense, 
the political license is defined by the stakeholders who have a political interest in the 
economic and social benefits provided through the operation of the industry.
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As with the original version of the 'license to operate' framework, the result of the 
interaction between the terms o f the licenses is larger than the actions of each one 
individually because stakeholders are able to influence multiple licenses simultaneously. 
The interaction between the social and political licenses is therefore relevant, as the 
conditions o f some o f the legal license requirements expand the reach and impact of the 
political license by directly empowering political and social groups.
As with the original version of the 'license to operate' framework, the terms of each of 
the licenses are subject to the interpretation o f the main stakeholders who may possess 
different opinions with regard to the activities of industry (Gunningham et al. 2003). 
Hence, the complexity o f the interactions between the stakeholders and the perception of 
the externalities of industry is highly dependent upon the social, historical, political and 
economic contexts o f each one o f the cases.
In order to provide a more detailed depiction of the expanded version of the license to 
operate framework proposed here, Figure 8.3 offers a graphical representation. The 
original version of the license to operate framework, indicated in Chapter 3, represents 
each o f the licenses with the same shape, indicating similar weights. Here, the industry’s 
environmental performance is simultaneously shaped by the economic, social, political 
and legal licenses.
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Figure 8.3 -  The expanded License to operate' Framework
Industry Environmental 
Performance
T he Soc ia l L icen se
The eco n o m ic  
- l i cen se  _
The Legal L icen se The Political License
M an ag em en t  Style
Figure 8.3 recognizes the prominence of the economic license to operate and adds the 
political license to operate to the group of licenses. As previously discussed, the 
economic license to operate has emerged as the dominant force guiding the corporate 
behaviour in the selected cases. Hence, to account for this larger influence, the 
economic license to operate is represented by a larger cylinder around a smaller one that 
represents the management style of the industry. The political license to operate is 
therefore portrayed as an additional license in the group of licenses. Despite the 
prominence given to the economic license to operate, the four different licences (social, 
economic, political and legal) are intertwined, constituting a joint effect in the
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management style of the industry and consequently in the environmental performance of 
the industry.
As previously indicated, the approach used in this work has taken an unconventional look 
at the framework. The aggregate framework was applied to context-specific points in 
time where auto industry technological development was being pushed by legal licenses 
so having a relevant effect on the environmental performance of the firms generating 
positive social benefits. In accordance with the framework, the differences observed 
between the automobile firms in each market are indicative of the diverse interpretations 
of the macro-level licences in the internal management style of the firms.
In all the cases studies, the environmental dimension is an important aspect since the 
environment has a wide impact on the formation of the licenses because it possesses 
profound social, economic, political and regulatory implications. The environmental 
dimension is therefore a central issue that helps stakeholders shape each of the licenses; 
this is because a greater range o f stakeholders monitor and pressure the industry to adopt 
specific behaviour and responses towards the negative environmental externalities 
produced or the natural resources used. Several stakeholders with an environmental 
interest have been indentified, including: green consumers who perceive the importance 
o f sustainable mobility, environmental policy makers who understand the need to 
transition to less harmful and less resourceful sources of transportation, green politicians, 
stockholders who might perceive the rate of return of the investment as being directly 
related to the environmental performance o f the firm, and industry workers who 
understand the necessity of working for a firm that is helping to solve climate change 
issues while contributing to the common good.
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8.6 - The implications for the 'Greening of Industry'
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the 'greening of industry' field has been criticised 
for trusting industry to find long-term, profitable solutions to environmental issues. The 
intrinsic perception has been that pro-active management strategies combined with the 
benchmarking o f successful stories would be able to strengthen the economic license to 
operate and take the industry from a mainly unsustainable condition to a more profitable 
and sustainable one.
The field has been largely influenced by authors who proposed categorisations of a 
corporate environmental strategy that would lead industry to a sustainable path. Orsato 
(2006) offers an important classification where firms would be able to adopt proactive 
green strategies to find market gain sustainability in the products or services offered. 
Reinhardt (2000) also discusses the conditions under which industry could profit by 
perceiving opportunities to gain market positions from environmental regulation. Orsato 
(2009) further shows that environmental thinking has evolved according to a proactive 
proposition o f corporate environmental strategy (Reinhardt, 2000).
From the sustainability view point, questions may be raised as to whether the present
level and pace o f technological development following a pattern of incremental
innovation is sufficient for the industry to move towards sustainability. This observation
is particularly pertinent in the context where, in the future, the requirement may be for
‘larger and more rapid change as environmental pressures increase. Here, the 'greening of
industry' does not allow for radical change, where the terms of the economic license are
fully reshaped in a rapid manner since the main characteristics of the economy or the
economic licenses to operate are not challenged or questioned as regards their
fundamentals. Hence, the licence to operate framework retains an implicit neoclassical
conceptualisation o f business, which keeps its legitimacy and hegemony as the primary
mechanisms with which to control and allocate scare resources. In this sense, there is
considerable reliance on a gradual and incremental transformation as an adequate
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response to the sustainability challenges that society faces.
The case studies in this thesis indicate that the present business model of the industry 
might even be on the verge o f collapse, as the industry appears to be operating at the 
limits o f the economic license to operate. The economic license to operate is the priority 
for the industry since the industry has been struggling for some time. However, this 
license has the potential to be completely reshaped with the advent of electric cars and 
the transition from being an industry that makes cars to one that provides mobility. 
Consequently, the industry is lobbying the political license so that subsidies can be given 
to the industry and the basic pillars o f  the industry can be changed.
In addition to this, the literature o f the 'greening o f industry' has placed little emphasis on 
a scenario o f wider economic constraints which have been observed from 2008 onwards, 
or the issue o f whether, under these conditions, proactive environmental steps are taken 
by an largely unsustainable industry such as the automotive one. More importantly, the 
environmental dimension has recently gained central importance with the realization that 
the world is heading for a catastrophic scenario due to climate change (Smith et al.,
2009). In restrictive economic times, not coping with the economic demands has placed 
additional pressure on the industry to provide solutions that are simultaneously 
sustainable and profitable.
A wide range o f interest groups that construct the social license, also impact on the 
economic license; these include local communities, national environmental groups, 
workers, the media, consumers and society in general. Social stakeholders construct the 
social license and have a direct influence on the formation of the legal license because 
policy makers and regulators can be pressured to impose stricter regulations 
(Gunningham et al., 2003). In the case o f  environmental issues, social stakeholders can 
pressure regulators to impose stricter regulations and restrict the consumption of specific 
products. Social actors also have a significant influence on the formation of the economic 
licence. From this perspective, the combination o f larger constraints on the economic
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license and the social licenses to operate pose a relevant challenge for the development of 
a more sustainable automobile industry.
An important stakeholder who needs to be accounted for in an explicit manner by the 
field is the consumer; consumers need to be central to the development of a more 
sustainable industry. In the case o f the automobile industry, they can severely influence 
the demand for new vehicles and enhance pressures over the social and legal licenses. It 
can be argued that the focus o f the field in the supply side of industry needs to be 
reconsidered, thereby adding additional importance to the consumer. It has been proposed 
by the GIN network that the 'greening o f industry' field should shift to the 'greening of 
industrial systems', which would incorporate not only the industry but also other relevant 
stakeholders (GIN, 2009).
The study cases have also indicated that the 'greening of industry' literature needs to 
consider the relevance o f market forces shaping the economic licence alongside the 
pressures posed by the social license and political licenses. These have a significant 
impact on the formation o f the legal license to operate, and consequently, on the 
environmental performance o f the industry. Hence, the wider process of policy formation 
has taken into account the importance of the interplay between the different licenses to 
operate. The Brazilian ethanol program is representative of a state-led initiative to 
achieve a partial system of innovation, and large subsidies were put in place for R&D 
development, the distribution o f fuel and the establishment of initial demonstrations to 
1 gain the trust o f consumers in the new technology (Zapata and Nieuwenhuis, 2008). In 
the California case study, the interplay between the licenses emerged in a different 
manner, since the regulators, especially the California Air Resources Board, were more 
preoccupied with setting up the legal license than addressing some of the wider economic 
implications (Sperling, personal communication, 10 March 2006). The ELV case is also 
more preoccupied with the legal license, since the automobile industry will have the 
physical and financial responsibility to treat and recycle old cars (Toffel, 2003). 
Automakers in this case have been involved in adjusting the ELV processing system,
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taking into account the consumers, the dismantling industry, the shedding industry and 
the materials industry.
8.7 - Implications for the industry
Automakers have traditionally opposed environmental regulation. However, in the cases 
investigated in this thesis, regulation has provided positive effects for society in terms of 
environmental benefits. The automobile industry has historically questioned the technical 
feasibility o f the standards proposed as well as the costs relating to their implementation, 
and has lobbied for subsidies. In accordance with the ‘license to operate* framework, 
industry has therefore adopted proactive political strategies to influence the formation of 
the political and legal licenses to operate. The initial focus of the industry was on the 
economic license, and environmental measures are adopted only if  the industry is 
pressured by the legal license.
Firms have traditionally taken a proactive role in dealing with the formation of the legal 
license. In all the case studies presented in this work, political collusion has been 
observed, since the industry has searched for more flexible standards and greater 
flexibility with regard to the potential implementation of the standards. However, in a 
situation o f economic constraints and growing social pressures, cooperation with 
regulators can be beneficial for firms. Cooperative relationships, through a solid political 
license to operate, can reduce uncertainty as regards new technological investment, and 
provide the firm with the security to construct long-term corporate environmental 
strategies that match the investment cycles in the automobile industry (Reinhardt, 2000).
Traditionally, governments have provided support for the development of the automobile 
industry in their territories; several countries have perceived the presence of a large and 
strong automobile industry in their country as being socially desirable due to the positive 
local and national economic effects. The industry therefore has a strong position to
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aggressively negotiate subsidies or other types of grants in order to adopt novel 
technologies.
The Brazilian case study illustrates this argument. Here, the automobile industry was 
specifically attracted to the country by the vast subsidies provided by the government to 
draw large industrial groups in the 1960s (Benevides, 1976). Hence, when the initial 
studies indicated the political willingness to foster the development of ethanol, the 
industry rapidly pushed for subsidies to be incorporated into the larger policy, including 
the R&D costs, the marketing campaign to gain consumer support and the support for the 
distribution o f the fuel (Leite, 1990).
Notwithstanding this good negotiating position, it might be wise for the auto industry to 
perceive the importance o f the environmental dimension as a central element in their 
business model (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003). In fact, the growing importance of the 
environment for society may pose significant restrictions on the economic license to 
operate. The social licence to operate has also increased in importance for the industry as 
it is deeply connected to the economic license; the joint effect of the two licenses also has 
a significant impact on the legal license.
Since regulation is evolving and adopting a deeper understanding of the effects of 
industrialised products on human life and on the environment, industries should tailor 
their products and services in that context and decide what steps can be taken towards to 
ineet these challenges. Because the environmental dimension and technological 
development are directly connected, industry needs to perceive technological strategy and 
environmental strategy as a single theme. However, all the case studies presented in this 
research support the conclusion that industry has concentrated its efforts on incremental 
innovations rather than more radical solutions to environmental problems which would 
challenge the basic business model of the industry. Moreover, despite the large barriers to 
entry, disruptive technologies, such as electric vehicles and hydrogen fuelled vehicles, 
could potentially be brought to the market by external entrepreneurs following the
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innovators dilemma discussion (Christensen, 1997).
Automakers have, opposed regulation in the case presented. However, the effects of the 
legal license have been positive and this has provided the industry with benefits in a 
number o f cases. For example, safety and environmental regulation have been effective in 
safeguarding domestic markets from foreign competition. Since other areas of the world 
have adopted EU regulations at a later stage than in Europe, this has created a market for 
European products, yet, the license to operate does not allow for this to be incorporated.
The automobile industry has generally opposed the implementation of standards that 
required investment in R&D and has consistently overestimated ex-ante costs o f  
regulation (Sperling et al., 2004). Automobile technological development has been 
fostered through the pressures posed by the legal license, and this has been adopted 
because o f the legal impositions and not because of economic reasons. The strategy o f  
firms has therefore been to maximise economic profit by stretching sunk-costs and 
requesting additional flexibility as well as other types of government subsidies.
The formation o f the legal and political licenses has been directly influenced by the 
industry, which has adopted politically proactive behaviour. Here, several tactics have 
been followed, yet the industry has consistently argued about the impossibility of meeting 
standards, offering other outcomes, including extended deadlines, direct subsidies and 
government sponsored R&D solutions. From the perspective of the 'license to operate' 
framework, the economic license has been of paramount importance in each of the 
selected cases and has contributed to hindering more radical sustainability solutions for 
the industry.
The selected cases have also shown that the government has been central in selecting the 
policy arrangements which shaped the licenses to operate and, as a result, this has 
influenced the environmental performance of the industry. The cases have revealed 
several governmental approaches for influencing both the legal and the economic licenses
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to operate. Such examples include: investment in R&D to foster technological 
development, the reduction of information asymmetry and the enhancement of 
information disclosure. Information is relevant since policy makers should have a better 
idea of what is possible in technological terms, in line with the specific economic 
conditions. The cases also show relevant examples where regulators were able to invest 
in basic R&D and set suitable environmental goals. A significant example of a 
government intervention that fostered direct R&D was observed in the Brazilian ethanol 
program case study. Here, the CTA research centre was responsible for developing 
ethanol-only engines, and provided the necessary information regarding the technical 
feasibility of the initiative (Veja, 1979). Technology was later adopted by major 
automakers who had a reduced cost o f adoption and adaptation to their specific needs and 
technical constraints. Therefore, the consumers also profited, since they had information 
relating to the reliability and levels o f performance of the ethanol-only vehicles.
The analysis o f the ZEV mandate, described in Chapter 7, provides another important 
example of where environmental regulation has been able to create positive economic 
effects for a specific firm. However, in all the other cases, firms opposed the regulation 
and no competitive effects were observed. The Toyota response to the ZEV mandate was 
the only case where a firm was able to adopt a proactive position in launching a product 
and this generated a considerable market advantage. Following the analysis presented by 
Reinhard (2000), the Toyota Motor Company was able to assume an environmental 
product differentiation strategy and acquire considerable market gain in California. The
i
Prius was presented as a unique product with improved environmental attributes; it 
respected the three requirements presented for environmental product differentiation 
(Reinhardt, 2000), and was able to create a willingness in customers to pay for improved 
environmental attributes. They succeeded in this by communicating the enhanced 
environmental attributes o f the product and other attributes of its products to the 
consumer and regulators. Competitors were unable to rapidly imitate the Toyota Hybrid 
Synergy Drive System that had been developed to power the Prius. The competitive 
advantage that Toyota was able to gain was centred on the type o f product offered and the
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differentiation strategy o f providing environmental features. According to the framework 
of environmental regulation and the corporate strategy presented by Orsato (2006), the 
case can be broadly classified as an eco-branding type o f competitive advantage.
The ELV case study is illustrative of pro-active behaviour by the firm to present a 
cooperative solution to government so that command-and-control measures would not be 
established. In Germany, when the Ministry of the Environment -  BMU - provided a 
signal that it would establish the Extended Responsibility Principle for industry to take 
care o f old vehicles, the automakers association -  VDA - rapidly set up a study group to 
present a feasible solution for regulators. In 1991, PRAVDA (the used-car utilisation 
project of the German automobile industry) was set up, proposing a shared responsibility 
among all the stakeholders involved in the ELV issue. Similar cooperative agreements 
were established in France and Italy, with the accord-cadre and the Fare system. 
However, direct opposition to establishing a Euro level directive was proposed by the 
commission in the 1990s. Despite the considerable opposition of the carmakers and the 
extensive work that had been carried out in these countries to reach a shared 
responsibility agreement, the EPR concept was established by the ELV Directive.
Industry has always been aware of the potential threats the legal license poses to its 
respective business models . In this context, non-market strategies are crucial elements 
that the industry can adopt in the formation of legal restrictions. As regards the 
environmental dimension, the social licence has become more important in the context of 
the environmental performance o f the industry; it has also become prominent with the 
rapid expansion o f the corporate environmental strategy. The dissemination of 
environmental ideas in society in general have played a further and important role in the 
growth o f environmental thinking in recent years, since social pressures have a tendency 
to develop larger political salience.
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8.8 > Implications for policy makers
The need to call in the government significantly reduces the power of firms to carry out a 
process o f change. Therefore, the intrinsic perception that firms would be the central 
instigators o f change may not reflect reality.
Policy makers are able to influence the corporate environmental performance of industry 
using a wide range o f strategies. Ideally, public policy should shape the four licenses. 
However, the case studies show examples where the licenses have been influenced in 
diverse manners.
In the Brazilian ethanol case study, the Brazilian government was able to influence the 
formation o f the social, economic and political licenses. To pressure the social license, a 
strong marketing campaign was put together to convince the Brazilian consumer that 
ethanol-only vehicles were reliable and had similar levels of performance as petrol- 
fuelled vehicles. The economic license was shaped by the large direct and indirect 
subsidies that were implemented, including tax breaks, subsidies for the price of the fuel, 
and most importantly, the governmental and technological development of ethanol-only 
engines. Here, the political license was shaped by the shared perception that providing 
subsidies to the ethanol industry would be translated into larger macroeconomic benefits 
for the country.
i
The economic license has also been developed by several of the policy makers who have 
implemented the regulation and by the shape of the political license. In the case of the 
North American ZEV mandate, large subsidies were given to the North American 
automobile firms to develop the next generation of vehicles; in the Brazilian case study, 
the Brazilian government provided indirect subsidies in the form of government-led 
research and development, which was passed onto the automakers.
Policy makers may also interact with industry in the formation of the legal and political
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licenses in order to build cooperative relationships, which may provide a better 
understanding o f the business model o f the industry and show to what extent it is possible 
to expand the industry’s current business model. The analyses of the case studies suggest 
that governments must be able to pose credible legal threats and create an environment 
where information exchange is encouraged. The information regarding what is possible 
under the pressures posed by the economic licenses at specific points in time is crucial for 
the regulators so that they can understand what can be achieved under any specific 
economic state.
Another important implication for policy makers refers to the credibility that policy 
makers must gain. Credibility produces long-term effects which shape social, legal and 
political licenses. The short-term vision initially adopted by the regulators and firms to 
solve the air emission problem in the United States has provided lessons for the adoption 
of a long-term policy view . Regulators should ideally indicate long-term regulatory paths, 
so that industry can combine the new investment cycles with newer technological 
developments. Regulators need to bear in mind that firms will maximise sunk-costs and 
minimise their investment in uncertain future technologies. However, regulators are also 
burdened with imperfect knowledge, both as regards environmental science and 
concerning the capability o f  the industry to respond. Hence, the long-term policy can be 
difficult to construct, as can be seen in the case of CO2 regulation in Europe. Ultimately, 
the long- term policy may end up weaker because regulators are more cautious about
what can be achieved, or they may be less aware o f potential environmental
\
consequences if  action is not taken.
One of the strategies presented in the case studies, refers to the integrated environmental 
technological policy which is focused on creating conditions that will reduce negative 
environmental externalities and enhance aggregate funding in R&D. Here, public 
investment in R&D reduces the uncertainty of technological developments and minimises 
the problem o f asymmetric information. However, depending on the economic and 
political situations, society must not be prone to provide large indirect subsidies to
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industry.
The case studies conducted in this work bring to light specific characteristics of the 
automobile industry and show examples of both types of regulation approach. In the 
technology prescriptive case, no negative economic impacts to firms have been observed. 
In these cases, automobile firms have acted collectively and all the firms have been 
affected similarly. However, The ZEV case study is representative of a case where 
standards were set. In this case, competition was enhanced and positive outcomes were 
generated for the first movers in the case of Toyota.
8.9 - Limitations o f the analysis
The 'license to operate' framework has limitations that restrict the conclusions as well as 
the implications for policy makers and firms. Despite considering the influence of several 
stakeholders, the framework is not able to forecast future regulations. The drawback of a 
wide framework is that many elements are considered according to a set model; this also 
accounts for particular relationships (Gunningham, 2007). Through vagueness and large 
categories, it is always possible to argue that something fits, but the significance of some 
of the issues can be lost if  this is not richly contextualised within a historical 
^understanding. In this respect, the framework is suitable for dealing with historical cases.
Another drawback o f this framework is that firms and regulators can be perceived as
single homogeneous players. However, this may not be true in all cases. Governments
and firms are large bodies with different sections and agencies that sometimes have
contradictory goals. In the case of a government agency, the problem of regulatory
capture can emerge, and with large automobile firms with various divisions there may be
divergence as to how much to invest in Research and Development and which products
should be launched on the market. These are important elements that are not
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appropriately captured in this analytical framework. However, the extension of the 
framework proposed here is able to dilute some of this criticism, with the addition of a 
'political license to operate'.
The market structure of the automobile industry is an important element that needs to be 
accounted for. As previously indicated in Chapter 5, the automobile industry is 
characterised by a concentrated market in which a few large firms operate. The cases 
selected are representative of three important world markets: the United States, Europe 
and Brazil. Each one of these has particular characteristics, but they display the 
oligopolistic competition characteristic o f the automobile market. As far as regulation is 
concerned, automobile firms have, in most instances, operated as a block, and have 
worked together to defend their interests, confronting the proposed standards and 
requesting more flexibility and less stringent standards.
Another important aspect is that licenses can pull in different directions. Sometimes it 
may not be possible to clearly understand the net effect of several o f the costs and 
benefits imposed at a specific time, or even to perceive how each of the licenses affects 
the management style o f the firm. In this respect, the framework is more suitable to 
comprehend past events.
The framework is pitched in a continuous improvement form. However, there may be
i
cases where the licenses can bring about a negative net effect. The recent episode with 
the Toyota Prius is relevant to illustrate this point. The Toyota hybrid actually went into 
reverse when the social license collapsed because of problems with the accelerators, 
wheel motors and brakes. This damaged the reputation of the company, so tightening the 
economic license to operate. In this sense, the relationships may not be always 
unidirectional or positive for the industry. At times, developments in the social license 
can pose a significant constraint on the economic license. Therefore, in order to further 
develop this work, it would be profitable to apply the 'license to operate' framework to
229
other industries that have been subject to environmental regulations. Such a comparison 
would provide additional elements that could enhance the understanding of the 
application of the framework to context specific instances.
Another potential area of development in this work would be to consider the benefits and 
costs relating to the international harmonisation of environmental standards. This has not 
been discussed in this work as the case studies have been taken in different historical 
contexts. However, in an increasingly globalised world, this has recently been hotly 
debated. The harmonisation o f environmental standards has contradictory effects upon 
the automobile industry: it may reduce costs since economies of scale can be maximised 
and cost savings generated. On the other hand, the industry has profited from different 
environmental standards, such as old and obsolete technologies which can be applied to 
less stringent markets, with the sunk costs that have been invested stretched over long 
periods of time. Emerging economies are generally supplied with less advanced products.
Several observers in the industry have perceived a future scenario where the global 
demand for automobiles will become more similar. Firms may want to provide the same 
product around the world and several synergies and economies could thereby be 
achieved. However, due to the differences o f legislation and consumer tastes, this may 
not be possible. The tendency towards the internationalisation of environmental policies 
and approaches to environmental regulation may also be observed in the regulators.
Moreover, if  the industry is already offering a more sophisticated product in terms of
fenvironmental performance, governments and regulators may be more inclined to set a 
regulatory framework that will support this innovation. This has been the case with the 
ELV directive in Europe, where the market is already taking care of the industry’s 
responsibility to collect and recycle old car hulks.
Nevertheless, the framework does not provide an indication of time; this is a relevant 
aspect of elements that have been treated by other frameworks, especially with regard to 
the political economy, and it considers the political salience of particular themes. Here,
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the length of time is advantageous to the industry and supports back-up planning, so 
providing confidence for the future.
8.10 - Future developments
By connecting the discussion provided in this work - which is situated in the 'greening of 
industry' body o f literature - with the current developments in the industry, it can be 
argued that public policy has the potential to change the economic license to operate. As 
a consequence, drastic changes to the automobile industry may take place. In the context 
of the 'license to operate' framework, the cases have indicated that the legal license has 
generated technological effects with important business effects that tend to challenge the 
business model of the industry. Here, deeper social environmental preoccupations can 
lead to stronger pressures on the formation of legal licenses that might defy the present 
business model, and the incumbents may lose market share for new entrants who rely on 
more sustainable radical innovations. In this respect, the joint effect of the social, legal 
and political licenses are changing the boundaries of the economic license to operate.
The recent financial crisis has also had a significant effect on the economic license to 
operate. The solid political licence to operate has led to vast economic support being 
j given to the industry, displaying the limits of the 'license to operate'. GM in America, for 
example, received a large amount of governmental aid; some authors even indicated that 
the firm was partially nationalised (Mufson, 2009). The requirement for this kind of 
intervention changes how the industry perceives the legal license for the future, as well as 
the process o f forming the legal license. In this specific case, the terms of the license 
strongly favour policy makers. This political licence in the case of GM, and indeed other 
auto companies around the world, legitimised and brought about a profound restructuring 
of the business to reduce capacity, close down several brands, reduce employment, and 
off-load certain liabilities from the balance sheet. All of these actions thereby reinstated
231
(at least for the time being) the economic licence to operate, as indicated by the partial 
resale o f GM shares by the US government on the open market.
The 'license to operate' framework can be helpful in understanding present and future 
issues in the industry. However, this view only applies when the framework is populated 
with context-specific details and only then does the framework become more meaningful. 
The framework is also not suitable to predict the future outcomes of regulations. The case 
studies here have been specifically selected as ex-post cases, since the framework is 
helpful for positioning the researcher in the events that have already happened, taking 
into account the short-term and long-term effects of the legal license. Therefore, as 
previously discussed, the framework indicates how changes in the legal licenses have 
been translated into changes in the environmental performance of the industry.
8.11 - Portfolio of cases for future research
8.11.1 - Empirical
The suggestion for future research in the area would have to bear in mind what is 
possible under constrained scenarios, taking into account the technological capacities of 
the industry. For the automobile industry, the advent of electric vehicles appears the 
most relevant technological development which has the potential to bring about a 
revolution in the industry by completely reshaping the terms of the licenses to operate. 
The automobile industry is in the early stages o f such transformation towards all electric 
vehicles, as major automakers and new market entrants begin to offer electric vehicles 
that have a similar performance to internal combustion vehicles and larger ranges 
between charges. Mass produced vehicles, launched in 2010, such as the General Motors 
Chevy Volt and the Nissan Leaf can potentially dictate the directions of future research.
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In this sense, cases that contrast environmental leaders and laggards in the same industry 
and cases o f alternative energy sources (wind and solar applications) that have a 
disruption potential may enhance the field.
Another area that has not been fully explored under the 'greening of industry' umbrella, 
is research in developing nations. The study o f the 'greening of industry' in developing 
nations has been fragmented and limited to specific cases, mostly looking at specific 
successful cases o f industry or pollution prevention measures by governments (Van 
Rooij, 2010). The field could therefore greatly gain from the expansion of the scope of 
studies enhancing the knowledge about the'greening of industry 'in these countries
The particular characteristics of developing nations are relevant as regards reorienting 
environmental regulation. Traditional pollution prevention strategies which have been 
adopted in developed nations may not be appropriate in developing nations as there is 
lack o f resources for monitoring and regulation enforcement, a weak enforcement 
capacity and a capture-prone governance (McAllister et al. 2010). The way the political 
and legal licenses are shaped have peculiar features that need to be taken into 
consideration. However, several factories in developing nations have more advanced 
processes in areas o f rapid growth (World Bank, 2000).
Despite the effort to produce a collection of cases by the World Bank (2000), the 
literature is still fragmented, as several studies have begun to address the characteristics 
o f developing nations (Kathuria, 2009) to see how a new less legalistic form of regulation 
is emerging in certain countries, including: Asia (Angel and Rock, 2000), China (Carter 
and Mol, 2006), Costa Rica (Riveira, 2004), Mexico (Blackman and Bannister, 1998), 
India (Bishwanath and Baneijee, 2004) and Brazil (Lemos, 1998; Jayaraman and 
Lanjouw, 2004).
In the context of the 'license to operate' framework, the political and legal licenses 
represent diverse dimensions for developing nations which may be more prone to support
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industry in these countries than developed ones. Several countries have radically 
supported the development o f the automobile industry. For instance, the Brazilian case 
study presented in this work indicates that that industry has been able to build a strong 
political license to operate which has served to support the economic license in times of 
need in the form o f  subsidies or other structural support policies.
8.11.2 - Theoretical
Frameworks that account for radical and rapid change need to be further researched. The 
license to operate, for instance, comfortably deals with incremental change, as previously 
described in the case studies in this work. However, the framework may not be as 
suitable for rapid change. The prioritization o f the licenses, as well as how the licenses 
are shaped, as shown in the cases studies, may be changed in the process of discontinuous 
industry restructuring.
The indication o f  time is also problematic; frameworks like stage models are still 
incremental and follow a continuous improvement rationale. So far, the ' greening of  
industry' body o f  literature has been fine for understanding the required changes in the 
automobile industry due to incremental changes to the internal combustion engine and the 
all-steel-body structure. Nevertheless, future research should make use of frameworks 
that are able to account for more radical change both in terms of scale and the pace; here 
electric vehicles may constitute the basis for discontinuous change.
It is worth considering how useful the license to operate framework is as regards 
comprehending the significance o f contemporary developments for future outcomes. As a 
rule, the framework appears to work best in historical reconstructions of events where the 
start and end points are known, and hence a post-hoc rationality or explanation can be 
imposed upon the data. What is less certain, however, is whether the framework allows 
us to understand how far a certain new development (let us take zero emission zones in
234
urban areas as an example) constitutes significant new imperatives for the license to 
operate.
Furthermore, with respect to the underlying assumptions of the license to operate 
framework and the greening o f industry approach, it is not clear where the limits to the 
viability of the license really lie. That is to say, more radical critics might conclude that 
environmental problems are inherent in modem industrial capitalism, and to that extent, 
industry cannot simultaneously be the cause o f the problem and the solution.
8.113 - Methodological aspects
This research is based on historical case studies following the methodological approach 
indicated in Chapter 4. A potential development for the 'greening of industry' body of 
literature would be to engage in more action oriented research with firms that are going 
through the greening course o f action. The insider’s view of what happens during the 
negotiation process of environmental regulation on the firm’s management style provides 
an important aspect that the literature needs to investigate. Moreover, decisions regarding 
corporate strategy and technological development may provide a more nuanced 
understanding o f corporate environment performance during instances of regulatory 
pressure. Such insights might also be gleaned, albeit from a different perspective, by 
action research within a regulatory or governmental body. At the methodological level, it 
is also important to highlight greening not only as an action initiated as a response to 
environmental regulation but as a broader set of measures adopted by industry that 
provides positive environmental externalities to society.
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Table 8.1 - The effect of the legal license on the other licenses
US initial C02 
regulations
ZEV Mandate Brazilian ethanol 
programme
EU ELV Directive
Technology requirements of 
the legal license
Catalytic
converters
Engine 
development; 
Hybrid vehicles
Ethanol engines/ 
Flex Fuel engines
Reduction in 
material use/ 
enlargement of 
recyclability of 
materials
Industry behaviour Initial opposition, 
Strict legal 
compliance
Opposition, 
lobby and court 
battles.
Japanese firms 
have been able 
to gain first 
mover 
advantages, 
launching the 
Toyota Prius 
and the Honda 
Insight.
Initial opposition; 
acceptance after 
large subsidies were 
offered
Initial opposition and 
proposition of 
alternative legal 
instruments; 
eventual alliances 
with existing 
industry and legal 
compliance.
Effects on the economic 
license to operate
Limited to the 
industry, no 
competition effects 
have been observed 
in the first wave.
Limited to the 
industry, no 
competition 
effects have 
been observed 
in the first 
wave. Positive 
effects for 
Toyota with the 
Prius.
Limited effects for 
the industry. 
Positive 
macroeconomic 
effects for Brazil.
Positive effects for 
the local dismantlers; 
an unknown for the 
industry.
Effects on the social license 
to operate
Drastic reduction 
in pollution in 
large centres.
Significant 
reduction in 
emissions. 
However, long­
term effects 
have not been 
assessed.
Positive 
environmental 
benefits, reduction 
of emissions in large 
city centres and 
great consumer 
support for the 
initiative
Wider sustainability 
issues
Source: Case Studies
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Annex 1 - Interviews
1.1 - Case Study 3 (California Tailpipe Emissions Regulations)
Person Date
Professor Daniel Sperling 08 March, 2007
Professor Daniel Sperling 24 March, 2007
Professor Robert Kagan 12 April, 2007
General Motors USA Representative 04 May, 2007
Professor Joan Ogden 10 May, 2007
Professor Mark Delucchi 10 May, 2007
Dr. Gustavo Collantes 11 May, 2007
Professor Allan Lloyd 15 May, 2007
CALEPA 22 May, 2007
Toyota USA 23 May, 2007
Nissan USA 23 May, 2007
CARB Staff 11 June, 2007
1.2 - Case Study 1 (EU ELY directive)
Person
Professor Gerrant Williams (Warwick) 
Representative Nissan Europe 
Representative ford UK 
ELV Representative UK 
ELV Representative Spain 
Mike Rivers (Ford -  U K )
Cervera, Representative ELV facility Spain 
Representative Car take Back UK 
SMMT representative 
UK government Representative 1 
UK government Representative 2
1.3 - Case Study 2 (Brazilian Ethanol Experience) 
Person
Professor University o f Brasilia 
Fiat do Brasil 1 
Ministry of the Environment 
ANFAVEA
Ministry o f Trade and Commerce 
Ministry o f Agricultural Development 
Professor at University of Sao Paulo 1 
Professor at University of Sao Paulo 2 
Fiat do Brasil 2 
Environmental Env. NGO
Date
17 September, 2007 
03 July, 2007 
09 July 2007 
09 July 2007 
05 December 2006 
25 July 2007 
4 December 2007 
02 August 2007 
22 August 2007 
22 August 2007 
22 August 2007
Date
11 December 2006 
11 December 2006
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12 December 2006 
15 December 2006 
15 December 2006 
18 December 2006
18 December 2006
19 December 2006 
19 December 2006
